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THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Byron L. Warnkent tt 
Although the fifth amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination applies to all citizens, law enforcement officers 
traditionally have had to either waive the privilege when sub-
jected to questioning or face punitive personnel action. Courts 
consistently held that a law enforcement officer's right to retain 
office depended on a willingness to forego constitutional 
protections. 
The Supreme Court decided several cases beginning in the 
late 1960's that extended the full fifth amendment privilege to 
law enforcement officers, but lower courts have misconstrued 
these cases and have continued to deny fifth amendment protec-
tions. In 1974, Maryland became the first of four states to enact 
a law enforcement officers' bill of rights. Although the Maryland 
statute is more comprehensive than those in California, Florida, 
and Virginia, it has received narrow judicial interpretation. 
This article first reviews the history of the law enforcement 
officer's fifth amendment and statutory protections. The article 
then proposes a Model Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. 
This bill insures not only fifth amendment protection, but pro-
vides officers with a full complement of substantive and proce-
dural protections. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fifth amendment privilege against government compelled self-
incrimination is most often examined in situations in which a law en-
forcement officer is the government "compellor" and a private citizen is 
the accused person from whom an incriminating statement is sought. 
This article examines the situation in which the accused, as well as the 
accuser, is a law enforcement officer, and it focuses on the accused of-
ficer's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
The law enforcement officer is intimately familiar with both the sub-
stantive and procedural law pertaining to investigatory interrogation. 
For this reason, it may first appear that the officer needs less, or certainly 
no more, protection from abuse than a private citizen. The same status 
that endows the officer with intimate knowledge of the law, however, also 
creates a problem that the accused private citizen does not face. When 
the law enforcement officer is the accused, the accuser is usually the po-
lice department itself. As the officer's employer, the accuser has an addi-
tional weapon in the interrogation arsenal: the threat of adverse 
personnel action if the accused officer does not cooperate fully. 
A law enforcement agency may "charge" a law enforcement officer 
through a noncriminal administrative process. The administrative regu-
lations of virtually every law enforcement agency prohibit "conduct un-
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becoming an officer," 1 "insubordination,"2 and "neglect of duty."3 
Conduct unbecoming an officer is generally defined as "any conduct 
which adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the bureau to which he 
is assigned."4 As courts have recognized, "[t]he standard 'conduct un-
becoming a police officer' is an elastic term subject to a wide variety of 
differing interpretations depending on the individual conception of how 
policemen should conduct themselves."5 Conduct unbecoming an of-
1. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual defines "unbecom-
ing conduct" as follows: 
Every employee shall conduct himself at all times, both on and off 
duty, in a manner which reflects most favorably on the Agency. The 
phrase "reflects most favorably" pertains to the perceptions of both citi-
zens and other Agency employees. Conduct unbecoming an employee 
shall include that which tends to bring the Agency into disrepute, or re-
flects discredit upon the employee as a representative of the Agency, or 
that which tends to impair the operation or efficiency of the Agency or 
employee. 
MD. STATE POLICE ADMIN. MANUAL ch. 5, § I-3-l (2d. ed. 1977 & Supp. 1984). 
2. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual defines "insubordi-
nation" as follows: 
An employee shall promptly obey all lawful orders of a superior, in-
cluding those from a superior relayed by an employee of equal or lesser 
rank. A lawful order is any order, either verbal or written, which an em-
ployee should reasonably believe to be in keeping with the performance of 
the duties or the responsibilities of his post. 
!d.§ I-4-2. 
3. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual defines "neglect of 
duty" as follows: "The failure of a police employee to take appropriate action, 
either on or off duty, on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other condition deserv-
ing police or Agency administrative attention is considered neglect of duty." !d. 
§ I-28-3. 
4. Jacocks v. Montgomery County, 58 Md. App. 95, 112, 472 A.2d 485, 493 (1984) 
(quoting Shannon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 4 Pa. Cornrow. 492, 496, 287 A.2d 858, 
861 (1972)); see In re Zeber, 398 Pa. 35, 43, 156 A.2d 821, 825 (1959); Upper More-
land v. Mallon, 9 Pa. Commw. 618, 627 n.5, 309 A.2d 273, 279 n.5 (1973), aff'd, 
461 Pa. 241, 336 A.2d 266 (1975); see also Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 382, 20 
So. 2d 912, 914 (1944) ("behavior ... not calculated to instill respect for him in his 
subordinates or to win for himself or his force the confidence of the general public 
. . . is indecorous and unbecoming to his high office"). 
5. Hruby v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 22 Ill. App. 3d 445, 453, 318 N.E.2d 
132, 138 (1974); accord Gaudette v. Board of Public Safety, 20 Conn. Supp. 147, 
127 A.2d 836 (1956); People ex rei. Dougan v. Greene, 97 A.D. 404, 89 N. Y.S. 1067 
(1904). 
In Jacocks, 58 Md. App. 95, 472 A.2d 485, the law enforcement officer went on 
a tirade directed toward a superior officer. The court held that the use of insulting 
and offensive language and the allegation of incompetence, in the presence of a third 
police officer, would probably have an adverse effect on morale, efficiency, and disci-
pline and thus was conduct unbecoming an officer. In Shannon, 4 Pa. Cornrow. 492, 
287 A.2d 858, on the other hand, the court found similar conduct not to constitute 
conduct unbecoming an officer. In that case, the officer said, "I will be a son of a 
bitch .... [Y]ou will regret and remember this day." !d. at 495, 287 A.2d at 860. 
The holding was supported by the fact that (1) the statement was directed toward 
the police chief in the absence of civilian witnesses, (2) the profane portion of the 
statement was actually directed toward the officer himself, (3) the police chief was 
not intimidated by the remark, and (4) the statement was in response to the chief's 
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fleer, insubordination, and neglect of duty may include such activities as 
disobeying the order of a superior officer6 and withholding information 
related to an investigation. 7 A determination that an officer has commit-
ted one of these offenses can result in a variety of adverse personnel ac-
tions: reprimand, reassignment, loss of leave, suspension, reduction in 
rank, or even dismissal from the law enforcement agency. Imposition of 
the most severe sanction, that of dismissal, usually requires "cause," a 
concept that one court has defined as "some substantial shortcoming 
which renders the employee's continuance in office in some way detri-
mental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law 
and sound public opinion recognizes as good cause for his no longer 
holding the position."8 
Investigations of law enforcement officers are rarely purely criminal 
in nature. Most investigations deal with situations that are hybrid ad-
ministrative-criminal or are purely administrative. A common example 
of the hybrid situation is a complaint by an arrestee that the officer used 
excessive force. The allegation, if substantiated, constitutes both a viola-
tion of an administrative regulation9 and a criminal battery .10 The 
instructions to the officer to report for duty timely, notwithstanding emergency 
medical needs of his son. 
Because "unbecoming conduct" is such an elastic term, it has been the subject 
of void-for-vagueness attacks. E.g., Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal. 3d 755, 
762-72, 710 P.2d 845, 849-56, 221 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782-89 (1985). Most "unbecom-
ing conduct" cases do not implicate first amendment protections. As such, constitu-
tionality is evaluated as applied under the facts of the case. United States v. 
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). An officer cannot complain that the regulation 
is void-for-vagueness if the conduct is such that the officer must have known that it 
could lead to discipline or dismissal. Cranston, 40 Cal. 3d at 770, 710 P.2d at 854, 
221 Cal. Rptr. at 787-88; accord Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612, 619-20 (W.O. 
Va. 1982). 
6. See Upper Moreland, 9 Pa. Commw. at 627, 309 A.2d at 279; Gaudette, 20 Conn. 
Supp. 147, 127 A.2d 836. 
7. Id.; Coursey v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339 
(1967). 
8. Davenport v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 2 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 278 N.E.2d 
212, 215 (1972) (quoting Coursey, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339). The court 
also stated that " 'cause' is to be decided and applied in the discretion of the Board 
and a court should not reverse unless the Board's findings are so unrelated to re-
quirements of the service or are so trivial as to be unreasonable or arbitrary." /d. 
(quoting Davis v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 37 Ill. App. 2d 158, 185 N.E.2d 
281 (1962)); see Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 8, 156 A. 245, 247-48 
(1931) ("What constitutes cause for removal must necessarily be a matter of discre-
tion in the commission."). 
9. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual's instruction with 
regard to the use of force is as follows: "A police employee, acting in his official 
capacity, will not use unnecessary or excessive force." Mo. STATE POLICE ADMIN. 
MANUAL ch. 5, § 1-33-0. 
10. Battery is the unjustified, offensive, and nonconsensual application of force by direct 
or indirect physical conduct to the person of another. See generally R. PERKINS & 
R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 151-58 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter PERKINS); W. 
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 685-91 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 
LAFAVE & ScoTT]. Use of excessive force to effectuate an arrest is a criminal bat-
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purely administrative situations include violations and infractions of a 
myriad of departmental regulations. 11 However, even if an investigation 
commences as a purely administrative matter, a violation of virtually any 
departmental rule or regulation could lead to criminal charges under the 
common law misdemeanor of misconduct in office. 12 This offense in-
cludes malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance by a public officer 
while in the exercise of official duties or while acting under color oflaw, 13 
provided the conduct is a wilful abuse of authority and not merely an 
error in judgment.t4 
When an officer is suspected of some wrongdoing, the officer is noti-
fied that a superior officer or a member of an internal investigating unit 
tery and may be resisted by self-defense. See.People v. Soto, 276 Cal. App. 2d 81, 80 
Cal. Rptr. 627 (1969); Boyes v. Evans, 14 Cal. App. 2d 472, 479, 58 P.2d 922, 925 
(1936); Jones v. United States, 512 A.2d 253, 259 n.8 (D.C. App. 1986); State v. 
Holley, 480 So. 2d 94, 95-96 (Fla. 1985); State v. Franz, 9 Kan. App. 2d 319, 676 
P.2d 157 (1984); State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652, 655 (Me. 1978); State v. Nunes, 546 
S.W.2d 759, 761 (Mo. App. 1977); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.04(2)(a)(ii)(3) (1962); 
see also Rodgers v. State, 280 Md. 406, 373 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 
(1977); Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Right to Forcefully Resist Illegal 
Arrest, 44 A.L.R.3d 1078, 1091-94 (1972). 
11. These violations and infractions include unbecoming conduct, see supra note I; in-
subordination, see supra note 2; neglect of duty, see supra note 3; criticizing the 
agency, MD. STATE POLICE ADMIN. MANUAL ch. 5, § 1-5-0; immoral conduct, id. 
§ 1-8-0; incompetence. /d. § 1-36-0. 
12. Misconduct in office is also known as official misconduct, misbehavior in office, mal-
conduct in office, malpractice in office, misdemeanor in office, and corruption in· 
office. Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 387 n.l, 384 A.2d 456, •458 n.l (1978). 
13. See generally PERKINS, supra note 10, at 540-50; e.g., Chester v. State, 32 Md. App. 
593, 601-10, 363 A.2d 605, 610-13, cert. denied, 278 Md. 718 (1976); State v. Carter, 
200 Md. 255, 89 A.2d 586 (1952). "The corrupt behavior may be (1) the doing of an 
act which is wrongful in itself- malfeasance, or, (2) the doing of an act otherwise 
lawful in a wrongful manner -misfeasance; or, (3) the omitting to do an act which is 
required by the duties of the office- non-feasance." Duncan, 282 Md. at 387, 384 
A.2d at 458. "The word 'corruption,' as an element of misconduct in office, is used 
in the sense of depravity, perversion or taint." PERKINS, supra note 10, at 542. 
Although it is true that not every set of facts sufficient to constitute conduct 
unbecoming an officer or neglect of duty is sufficient for misconduct in office, the 
crime is broad, particularly in its nonfeasance mode. 
Any intentional and deliberate refusal by an officer to do what is uncondi-
tionally required of him by the obligations of his office is corrupt as the 
word is used in this connection because he is not permitted to set up his 
own judgment in opposition to the positive requirement of the law. Since 
this is corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his 
office there is no reason to require more for conviction. On the other 
hand, when the officer has discretion in regard to a certain matter, his 
intentional and deliberate refusal to act indicates no more, on its face, than 
that this represents his judgment as to what will best serve the public inter-
est. Even in such a case the officer will be guilty of misconduct in office if 
his forbearance results from corruption rather than from the exercise of 
official discretion . . . . 
/d. at 546 (emphasis in original). 
14. See H. GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
152 (1940) (hereinafter GINSBERG). 
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wishes to make some inquiries. 15 The investigating officer either ex-
pressly states16 or implies, or custom dictates, that the officer must coop-
erate during questioning or face possible adverse personnel action. 17 The 
penalty or threatened penalty for failure to cooperate is typically greater 
in situations in which the department believes that the information is 
vital to an investigation and believes that the officer is the only or best 
source of the information. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that citizens have the 
right to refuse "to answer official questions put to him in any ... pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, when the answers might 
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."18 Although law en-
forcement officers presumably are entitled to that same right, they are 
often required to give statements under threat of adverse personnel ac-
tion or have been discharged for the failure to give statements. 19 This 
dilemma has never received more than sporadic, short-lived, and incom-
plete attention. 
When law enforcement officers early in this century began to litigate 
to secure the guarantees of the fifth amendment, courts took the position 
that the privilege of being a public servant is dependent upon a willing-
ness to forego constitutional rights and privileges.20 It was not until the 
late 1960's that the United States Supreme Court undertook to rectify the 
situation. In 1967, in Garrity v. New Jersey, 21 and in 1968, in Gardner v. 
Broderick,22 the Court set out to eliminate the law enforcement officer's 
dilemma of having to choose between maintaining employment and exer-
cising the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
Together, Garrity and Gardner stand for the following propositions: 
(1) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, any state-
15. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728{b) (1987). 
16. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual's instruction with 
regard to interrogations is as follows: "During any administrative investigation an 
accused employee shall, at the request of competent authority, submit to an interro-
gation and polygraph examination." MD. STATE POLICE ADMIN. MANUAL ch. 5, 
§ 1-16-1. 
17. For example, the Maryland Annotated Code provides: 
This subtitle does not prevent a law enforcement agency from commenc-
ing any action which may lead to a punitive measure as a result of a law 
enforcement officer's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, blood, 
breath, or urine tests for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph ex-
amination, or interrogation, after having been ordered to do so by the law 
enforcement agency. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(7)(ii). 
18. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441, 444-45 (1972) (includes administrative and investigatory proceedings); In re 
Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 683, 516 A.2d 976, 981 (1986). 
19. Failure to give a statement is usually charged as insubordination or failure to obey a 
lawful order. See supra note 2. 
20. E.g., Christal v. Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567-68, 92 P.2d 416, 419 
(1939); see infra part II.B. 
21. 385 u.s. 493 (1967). 
22. 392 u.s. 273 (1968). 
458 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
ment given under threat of adverse personnel action is unconstitutionally 
coerced;23 (2) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, 
the taking or threatening to take any adverse personnel action in re· 
sponse to the assertion of the privilege against compelled self·incrimina· 
tion has an unconstitutional, chilling effect upon the privilege;24 (3) if a 
law enforcement officer is granted immunity but nonetheless refuses to 
answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official 
duties, the officer may be dismissed;25 and ( 4) if a law enforcement officer 
is granted immunity and answers questions specifically, directly, and nar-
rowly related to official duties, the officer may be dismissed if the answers 
provide cause for dismissal.26 Consistently, however, courts have misun· 
derstood, misapplied, or simply evaded Garrity, Gardner, and their 
progeny.27 
Since 1970, and with greatest frequency between 1973 and 1977, 
there have been many unsuccessful attempts in Congress to enact a law 
enforcement officers•· biil of rights. These legislative efforts have been 
designed to accomplish what Garrity and Gardner sought to accom-
plish. 28 Although federal legislation has never been enacted, congres-
sional efforts have served as an impetus for state statutes providing law 
enforcement officers' bills ofrights.29 Maryland in 1974 enacted the Law 
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). 30 By 1978, California, 
Florida, and Virginia had also enacted statutory protection. 
Maryland's statute is by far the most comprehensive, but Maryland 
courts have interpreted the Maryland statute narrowly.31 The Florida 
and Virginia laws, which are the two weakest statutes, have similarly 
been narrowly interpreted by their respective state courts. The Califor-
nia statute, stronger than the Florida or Virginia statutes but weaker 
than the Maryland statute, has received the broadest judicial interpreta-
tion. The Supreme Court of California, in the course of interpreting its 
state statute, has understood and correctly applied Garrity and Gardner 
and their progeny. 
This article first analyzes the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination as it applies to law enforcement officers.32 It 
then examines legislative efforts to secure these and other rights for law 
enforcement officers, including the unsuccessful federal attempt33 and the 
23. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-500. 
24. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79. 
25. /d. at 278. 
26. /d. 
27. See infra part III.B. 
28. See infra part IV.A. 
29. See infra parts IV.B., C. 
30. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 722, 1974 MD. LAWS 2471-77 (codified as amended at 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-7340 (1987)). 
31. See infra part IV.B. 
32. See infra parts II., III. 
33. See infra part IV.A. 
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somewhat successful attempts in four states just mentioned.34 Finally, 
the article proposes a Model Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. 35 
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO 
INCORPORATION AGAINST THE STATES 
A. The Status of the Privilege 
The notion that an individual should not be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself evolved as a common law doctrine in England36 and thus 
became part of the common law in this country before 1776.37 After the 
United States gained independence, states adopted this concept as part of 
their state constitutions. 38 And when, in 1791, the first ten amendments 
34. See infra parts IV.B., C. 
35. See infra Appendix. 
36. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 114(a) (3d ed. 1984) [here-
inafter McCORMICK]; 1 W. LAFA~E & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 6.2(a) 
(1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL); 0. STEPHENS, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 18-23 (1973); Pittman, The Colo-
nial and Constitutional History of the. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); Sherman, Informal Immunity: Don't You Let That 
Deal Go Down, 21 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1987) [hereinafter Sherman]. In Bram 
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Supreme Court stated: 
There can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the doc-
trine that one accused of crime could not be compelled to testify against 
himself had reached its full development in the common law, was there 
considered as resting on the law of nature, and was imbeddled in that 
system as one of its great and distinguishing attributes. 
/d. at 545. 
37. See Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150-51, 406 A.2d 415, 418 (1979); Watts v. State, 
99 Md. 30, 35-36, 57 A. 542, 544 (1904); Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6, 7, 8 A. 571, 571 
(1887); Young v. State, 68 Md. App. 121, 127-32, 510 A.2d 599, 602-05, cert. de-
nied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986). 
By state constitution, Maryland adopted all of the common law of England as 
it existed on July 4, 1776, subject to change by the Maryland General Assembly. 
MD. CONST., DECL. RIGHTS art. 5. The other twelve original states did likewise, 
either by constitutional provision or a "reception statute." As other states joined 
the union, they either expressly adopted the common law or were at least heavily 
influenced by it. LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 10, at 66; see generally Pope, The 
English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REv. 6 (1910). 
38. Forty-eight states have adopted the privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
by constitution, and Iowa and New Jersey have accomplished the same result 
through legislation. Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HARV. L. REV. 21, 30 
(1965). The Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides "[t]hat no 
man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case." 
MD. CONST., DECL. RIGHTS art. 22. This provision of the Maryland Constitution 
has been held to be in pari materia with its federal counterpart. Richardson v. State, 
285 Md. 261, 401 A.2d 1021 (1979). The language in a few state constitutions may 
provide a guarantee that is slightly broader in scope than the federal constitution. 
See McCORMICK, supra note 36, at 115. Moreover, in the last decade, a few state 
courts of last resort have interpreted their state constitutional provision to provide 
greater protection. E.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113-15, 545 P.2d 272, 
280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 
(1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); see Wilkes, 
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to the Bill of Rights were added to the United States Constitution, the 
fifth amendment included the prohibition that "[n]o person ... shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " 39 
The Supreme Court in 1897 recognized in Bram v. United States4fJ 
that the fifth amendment standard should be the same as the common 
law standard.41 A year earlier, the Court had stated that "the true test of 
admissibility [under the common law was whether] the confession is 
made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any 
sort."42 
The existence of the common law privilege, state constitutional pro-
visions, and the fifth amendment suggest that there must have been con-
siderable protection against compelled self-incrimination. In fact, the 
scope of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination was quite nar-
row before 1964 and rarely, if ever, afforded protection to law enforce-
ment officers. First, the fifth amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination was not a limitation upon state governments until it 
was incorporated against the states in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan.43 Sec-
The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 KY. L.J. 729, 735-41 
(1976). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Comment, Expanding Criminal Procedural 
Rights Under State Constitutions, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 909 (1976). 
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Court stated 
that the privilege: 
has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurispru-
dence. So deeply did the inequities of the ancient system impress them-
selves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one 
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of 
their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule 
of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a 
constitutional enactment. 
Id. at 597. · 
40. 168 u.s. 532 (1897). 
41. The Court in Bram stated: 
A brief consideration of the reasons which gave rise to the adoption of the 
Fifth Amendment, of the wrongs which it was intended to prevent and of 
the safeguards which it was its purpose unalterably to secure, will make it 
clear that the generic language of the Amendment was but a crystalliza-
tion of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled when the Amendment 
was adopted . . . . 
/d. at 543. 
42. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 
574, 583-87 (1884)). In Bram v. United States, the Court stated: 
As the facts by which compulsion might manifest itself, whether physical 
or moral, would be necessarily ever different, the measure by which the 
involuntary nature of the confession was to be ascertained was stated in 
the rule, not by the changing causes, but by their resultant effect upon the 
mind, that is, hope or fear, so that, however diverse might be the facts, the 
test for whether the confession was voluntary would be uniform, that is, 
would be ascertained by the condition of mind which the causes ordinarily 
operated to create. 
168 U.S. at 548. 
43. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908), the Supreme 
Court rejected incorporating against the states the fifth amendment privilege against 
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ond, courts rarely invoked the common law as a source for the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination after the Bill of Rights was rati-
fied.44 Third, state courts of last resort have only recently, and then to a 
limited degree, relied on state constitutional provisions to protect indi-
vidualliberties.45 
Even though the fifth amendment did not apply to the states, the 
Supreme Court in 1936 began to address the most egregious state cases of 
compelled self-incrimination. In Brown v. Mississippi,46 the Court found 
a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause when a state 
official obtained a confession by brutality and violence.47 Over the next 
three decades, the Court resolved numerous cases under the due process 
compelled self-incrimination, holding that such a protection was neither "a funda-
mental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free govern-
ment [nor] the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government .... " Citing 
Twining, the Court later stated that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination may 
be withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for the state." Sny-
der v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). For over 55 years, the Court consist-
ently reaffirmed the nonincorporation of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. E.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1961); Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 53-58, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947); Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1937). 
44. Courts purport to adhere to the principle of deciding cases on nonconstitutional 
grounds if possible. Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150 n.1, 406 A.2d 415,418 n.1 
(1979) (quoting State v. Raithal, 285 Md. 478, 484, 404 A.2d 264, 267 (1979)). 
Instead, courts usually either (1) use the constitutional analysis for constitutional 
protections that had their roots in the common law, or (2) deem the constitutional 
and nonconstitutional analysis to be identical. In Hillard, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland "rediscovered" the common law basis for the prohibition against com-
pelled self-incrimination after years of dormancy. Just two years earlier, in State v. 
Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 1105 (1977), the court stated that voluntariness of a 
statement "is bottomed upon constitutional grounds [and] ... The imposition upon 
the state of the federal constitutional prohibition against compelled self-incrimina-
tion effected no change in the voluntariness requirement followed by Maryland for 
the admissibility of confessions and admissions." /d. at 34-35, 375 A.2d at 1107-08; 
see also Young v. State, 68 Md. App. 121, 127-32, 510 A.2d 599, 602-05, cerL de-
nied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986). 
45. See supra note 38. As recently as 1974, one commentator considered it an astonish-
ing development that courts were "willing to protect rights of criminal defendants 
that are no longer guaranteed under the Federal Constitution." Wilkes, The New 
Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. 
L.J. 421, 425 (1974). In 1977, Justice Brennan wrote: 
I suggest to the bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for 
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it 
would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional 
. questions. 
[T]he very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes 
a clear call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus 
of our double protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the 
states betray the trust the Court has put in them. 
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 502-03 (1977). 
46. 297 u.s. 278 (1936). 
47. /d. at 285-86. 
462 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
clause, using a voluntariness test, applied on a case-by-case basis.48 Vol-
untariness encompasses a totality of the circumstances analysis, which 
usually depends on either the conduct of the interrogating police officers, 
or the characteristics ofthe accused, or both.49 Unacceptable police con-
duct ranges from trickery and subtle coercion50 to threats of physical 
harm51 to actual physical brutality and torture.52 Evaluation of police 
conduct also includes the length of time the accused is subjected to ques-
tioning53 and the conditions during questioning. 54 The determinative 
characteristics of the accused include age, 55 physical condition, 56 mental 
condition, 57 and education. 58 
B. The Status of Law Enforcement Officers 
Prior to incorporation of the fifth amendment in 1964,59 the law 
enforcement officer enjoyed virtually no protection against compelled 
self-incrimination. In no reported opinion did a law enforcement officer 
in a criminal case make an incriminating statement later found to be in-
voluntary because it was made under threat of loss of job. On the con-
trary, many judicial decisions affirmed the administrative sanction of 
dismissal for a law enforcement officer who remained silent.60 The rna-
48. See generally 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 6.2; Grano, Voluntariness, Free 
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979). 
49. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CASES AND CONCEPTS§ 16.02 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter WHITEBREAD). 
50. E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 
(1954). See generally White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. 
REv. 581 (1979); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968). 
51. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
52. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
53. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (five hours of interrogation); Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 hours of interrogation); Chambers v. Florida, 
309 U.S. 227 (1940) (five days of interroation). 
54. E.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (deprivation of sleep); Payne v. Arkansas, 
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (deprivation of food); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 
(1945) (deprivation of clothes); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (held 
incommunicado). 
55. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (15-year-o1d). 
56. E.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (bullet wound); Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368 (1964) (bullet wound). ' 
57. E.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) ("truth serum" type of medication); 
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (low intelligence quotient); Fikes v. 
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (schizophrenic). 
58. E.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (fifth grade education); Payne v. Arkan-
sas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (fifth grade education); cf Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 
55 (1951) (non-English speaking). 
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
60. E.g., McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 324 P.2d 923 (1958); Christal v. 
Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939); Fallon v. New Orleans 
Police Dep't, 238 La. 531, liS So. 2d 844 (1959); Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 
166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940); Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245 
(1931); see Recent Decision, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91, 98-101 (1968) (brief history 
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jority of these cases rejected an assertion of the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination.61 In others, particularly the earlier cases, the 
compelled self-incrimination issue was neither raised by the law enforce-
ment officer nor addressed by the court. 62 
The law enforcement officer's privilege against compelled self-in-
crimination was not recognized when the officer was called before a 
grand jury,63 was forced to execute a waiver of immunity from prosecu-
tion, 64 was ordered to submit to a polygraph examination, 65 or adminis-
tratively questioned. 66 Regardless of the context or the forum, the result 
was the same: discharge from the law enforcement agency, usually for 
conduct unbecoming an officer, or for insubordination, or both, followed 
by affirmance of that action by the courts.67 These cases conveyed the 
message that in order to remain employed, a law enforcement officer 
must renounce constitutional freedoms available to the public at large. 
The consistent theme of the early decisions was that a law enforcement 
officer not only accepts employment under these terms but also that he 
has a duty to dispel suspicion by full explanation. 
The leading authority for more than a quarter century for the prop-
osition that the waiving of constitutional rights is one of the duties of a 
law enforcement officer was Christal v. Police Commissioner,68 a case de-
cided in 1939 by the Court of Appeal of California. In Christal, police 
officers who refused to answer questions before a grand jury were 
charged administratively with "conduct unbecoming an officer and diso-
bedience of orders. "69 The officers appealed their dismissals, asserting 
that they had a constitutional privilege of refusing to testify before the 
grand jury. The court agreed that the officers had a right to remain silent 
but held that duty required them to disclose information, even to the 
point of incriminating themselves, and that they could be dismissed if 
they refused to answer. 70 The court stated: 
When police officers acquire knowledge of facts which tend to 
incriminate any person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to 
their superiors and to testify freely concerning such facts when 
called upon to do so before any duly constituted court or grand 
jury. It is for the performance of these duties that police of-
of forfeiture of government employment as punishment for those who "plead the 
fifth"). 
61. E.g., McCain, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 324 P.2d 923; Christal, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 
P.2d 416; Fallon, 238 La. 531, 115 So. 2d 844; Canteline, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 
972. 
62. E.g., Souder, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245. 
63. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
65. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
66. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. 
68. 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939). 
69. Id. at 566, 92 P.2d at 418. 
70. Id. at 567, 92 P.2d at 419. 
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fleers are commissioned and paid by the community, and it is a 
violation of said duties for any police officer to refuse to disclose 
pertinent facts within his knowledge even though such disclo-
sure may show, or tend to show, that he himself has engaged in 
criminal activities. 
We are not unmindful of the constitutional privilege above 
mentioned which may be exercised by all persons, including po-
lice officers, in any proceeding, civil or criminal. . . . As we 
view the situation, when pertinent questions were propounded 
to appellants before the grand jury, the answers to which ques-
tions would tend to incriminate them, they were put to a choice 
which they voluntarily made. Duty required them to answer. 
Privilege permitted them to refuse to answer. They chose to 
exercise the privilege, but the exercise of such privilege was 
wholly inconsistent with their duty as police officers. They 
claim that they had a constitutional right to refuse to answer 
under the circumstances, but it is certain that they had no con-
stitutional right to remain police officers in the face of their 
clear violation of the duty imposed upon them .... 
There is nothing startling in the conception that a public 
servant's right to retain his office or employment should depend 
upon his willingness to forego his constitutional rights and priv-
ileges to the extent that the exercise of such rights and privi-
leges may be inconsistent with the performance of the duties of 
his office or employment. 71 
Almost twenty years later, the same court held that even the exercise of a 
71. Id. at 567-69, 92 P.2d at 419 (citations omitted). One of the omitted citations is to 
McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), in which 
Justice Holmes, upholding an officer's dismissal for violating the rule prohibiting 
political activity, stated that a law enforcement officer "may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." /d. at 
220, 29 N.E. at 517. 
Cf Wendland v. Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 786, 298 P.2d 863 (1956) (police officer 
with more than 25 years service could be discharged for refusal to testify before the 
grand jury but could not be denied a pension); In re Hoertkom, 15 Cal. App. 2d 93, 
59 P.2d 218 (1936); In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 59 P.2d 213 (1936) (compan-
ion cases indicating that although police officers could assert a privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination when asked questions before the grand jury, they could 
not use the privilege to prevent being sworn as a witness before the grand jury). 
Christal v. Police Comm'r was relied on by Justice Harlan in dissent in Garrity 
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 504 n.3 (1967), the case that extended full fifth amend-
ment privileges to law enforcement officers. See infra text accompanying notes 97-
105. The year after Christal, the Court of Appeals of New York cited Christal in 
upholding the state constitutional requirement that police officers called before the 
grand jury either execute a waiver of immunity from prosecution or forfeit their 
public employment. Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972. This is 
the same constitutional provision that was found unconstitutional by the Sup Court 
in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). See infra notes 110-21 and accompa-
nying text. 
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constitutional guarantee can support a charge of conduct unbecoming an 
officer. 72 The court affirmed a dismissal for insubordination, disobedi-
ence, and conduct unbecoming an officer because a police officer refused 
to take a polygraph test concerning missing cash receipts.73 
The following year, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Fallon v. 
New Orleans Police Department,14 upheld the provision of the state con-
stitution that mandated forfeiture of office for any public employee who 
refused to waive immunity from prosecution or who refused, on grounds 
of compelled self-incrimination, to answer any question related to gov-
ernment affairs or the conduct of any employee. 75 The court reasoned 
that the public good outweighs one individual's constitutional rights, 
particularly when holding public office is not a right but is a privilege 
"conferred only upon such terms and conditions, as the people, speaking 
through their chosen representatives, might determine. "76 
In Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 11 an officer was charged adminis-
tratively and criminally. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania not only 
denied the officer his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination, but essentially shifted the burden of proof in his criminal 
case. In affirming the civil service commission's dismissal for conduct 
unbecoming an officer, the court stated that "in order to show his fitness 
to continue as an officer in the police department, he was bound to excul-
pate himself from any wrongdoing. This he did not do, but remained 
silent before the commission. In itself this was conduct unbecoming an 
officer. " 78 
As these cases illustrate, state courts consistently upheld the right to 
terminate the employment of a law enforcement officer who refused to 
cooperate in departmental investigations, notwithstanding the right 
against compelled self-incrimination found in the common law, state 
constitutions, and the federal constitution. The courts did not engage in 
any judicial wizardry in barring fifth amendment protection to law en-
forcement officers. They simply ruled that under state constitutional 
law, and as a matter of professional standards, law enforcement officers 
72. McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 324 P.2d 923 (1958); accord Fichera v. 
State Personnel Bd., 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1963). In Coursey v. 
Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339 (1967), the 
court stated that statutes prohibiting courts from even suggesting to civil and crimi-
nal litigants that they submit to a polygraph examination do not apply before a 
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners because the department must use poly-
graph testing to meet the statutory requirement that it investigate charges of 
misconduct. 
73. McCain, 160 Cal. App. 2d at 177, 324 P.2d at 926. 
74. 238 La. 531, 115 So. 2d 844 (1959). 
75. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(P)(1). 
76. Fallon, 238 La. at 546, 115 So. 2d at 849 (quoting Ricks v. Department of State 
Civil Serv., 200 La. 341, 363, 8 So. 2d 49, 56 (1942)). 
77. 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245 (1931). 
78. /d. at 9, 156 A. at 248; see also Avent v. Police Bd., 49 Ill. App. 2d 228, 199 N.E.2d 
637 (1964) (refusal to obey an order to answer questions posed by a superior officer 
concerning a sobriety test constituted conduct unbecoming an officer). 
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stood outside the purview of the fifth amendment. This view met with no 
opposition from the Supreme Court, which held that the fifth amend-
ment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination was inapplicable 
to state court proceedings. 
Ill. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AFTER 
INCORPORATION AGAINST THE STATES 
A. The Status of the Privilege 
Beginning in 1936, the Supreme Court made limited use of the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect state court de-
fendants, applying it to only the most extreme cases of compelled self-
incrimination. 79 At the same time, the Court continued to hold that the 
fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination was in-
applicable to state court proceedings.80 With the advent of the Warren 
Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure,81 however, the dec-
ade of the 1960's brought rapid and significant change. 
In 1961, the Court made the exclusionary rule applicable to the 
states in Mapp v. Ohio. 82 Two years later, the Court incorporated the 
sixth amendment right to counsel against the states in Gideon v. Wain-
wright. 83 The following year, with the fifth amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination not yet incorporated, the Court employed a 
right to counsel approach to exclude statements made at a critical stage 
subsequent to the attachment of the right to counsel. 84 The Court then 
directly and significantly expanded fifth amendment rights in a series of 
cases beginning with Malloy v. Hogan 85 and ending with Miranda v. 
Arizona.86 
1. From Malloy to Miranda 
In 1964, the Court made the safeguards of the fifth amendment pro-
hibition against compelled self-incrimination applicable to the states in 
Malloy v. Hogan. 87 A year later, in Griffin v. California,88 the Court held 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 46-58. 
80. See supra note 43. 
81. See generally 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, §§ 2.1-.9. 
82. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
83. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
84. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See generally WHITEBREAD, supra 
note 49, § 16.03. The right to counsel attaches at the initiation of judicial adver-
sarial proceedings, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), or at a trial-like confronta-
tion. E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970) (preliminary hearing); Mempha 
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing proceeding). A critical stage is when sub-
stantial rights of the defendant may be affected without counsel. Eg., United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup). See generally WHITEBREAD, supra note 49, 
§ 31.03(b)-(c). 
85. 378 u.s. 1 (1964). 
86. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
87. 378 u.s. 1 (1964). 
88. 380 U.S. 609, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965). 
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that a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of the privilege is as much a 
constitutional violation as actually compelling witnesses to incriminate 
themselves. The Court prohibited both jury instructions and 
prosecutorial comment that would permit a jury to draw a negative infer-
ence from a defendant's silence at trial. 89 Two years after Malloy, in 
Miranda v. Arizona,90 the Court made clear that the fifth amendment 
would be the focal point for the analysis of compelled self-incrimination 
cases. 
Malloy and Miranda are landmark cases in the history of the fifth 
amendment. In Malloy, the Court broke new ground by squarely hold-
ing that states must respect the fifth amendment privileges of their citi-
zens. Justice Brennan stated for the Court: "The Fourteenth 
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the 
Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement - the right of 
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered 
exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence."91 
In Miranda, the Court found that, notwithstanding its prior hold-
ings, police science literature and police manuals were instructing inter-
rogators to use isolation, persuasion, trickery, and subtle coercion to 
obtain confessions, and in no way discouraged the use of the "third de-
gree. "92 Because such practices lead to flagrant constitutional violations, 
the Court mandated four specific warnings to any person subjected to 
custodial interrogation. 93 Although fifth amendment analysis is typically 
viewed as the dual approach ofvoluntariness and Miranda, 94 the goal of 
Miranda was to realize, by the use of per se rules if necessary, the prom-
89. Id. at 613. The Court further stated that "comment on the refusal to testify ... is a 
penalty imposed by the courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down 
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." ld. at 614. 
90. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
91. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8. 
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55. With reference to the "third degree," the Court 
stated: "Offensive to the Constitutional guarantees of liberty are confessions wrung 
from an accused by overpowering his will, whether through physical violence or the 
more subtle forms of coercion commonly known as the 'third degree.'" Hysler v. 
Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942). Webster's Dictionary defines the "third degree" 
as "the subjection of a prisoner to mental torture (as continuous questioning over 
excessively long periods) or physical torture (as restriction to a meager diet or depri-
vation of sleep) in an effort to wring a confession from him." WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2378 (1976). 
93. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73. The four warnings are that (1) the defendant has the 
right to remain silent; (2) if the defendant waives that right, any statement given 
may be introduced as evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant has the right 
to an attorney present during questioning; and (4) if the defendant cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be provided during questioning. ld. De minimus variations are 
permissible. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981). 
94. The vitality of the Court's mandate in Miranda has been lessened by recent deci-
sions. E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (the "public safety excep-
tion"); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (custody requires arrest); Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (narrowing the scope of interrogation). With 
the weakening of Miranda, the due process and right to counsel approaches are 
gaining in importance in the analysis of compelled self-incrimination cases. See 
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ise of the fifth amendment that no person would be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself. 95 Chief Justice Warren advised that "[u]nless adequate 
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in cus-
todial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly 
be the product of his free choice. " 96 
2. Garrity and Spevak 
Beginning in 1967, three years after Malloy extended the prohibi-
tions against compelled self-incrimination to state governments, the 
Court decided six cases that had a significant impact on the fifth amend-
ment rights of law enforcement officers. The first two were the compan-
ion cases of Garrity v. New Jersey 97 and Spevak v. Klein.98 In Garrity, 
police officers were interrogated about an alleged conspiracy to obstruct 
the administration of traffic laws. 99 They were informed that under New 
Jersey law they would be subject to removal from office if they exercised 
their right to remain silent. 100 The officers answered the questions, their 
answers were admitted into evidence in their subsequent criminal trials 
on conspiracy charges, and they were convicted. 
In resolving the issue of whether a state can use the threat of dis-
charge to obtain incriminating statements from a public employee, the 
Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 519-22 (1986) (due process approach); Michi-
gan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (right to counsel approach). 
95. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
96. /d. at 458. 
97. 385 u.s. 493 (1967). 
98. 385 u.s. 511 (1967). 
99. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. The officers were interrogated by the State Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, under order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey to investigate alleged 
irregularities in the handling of municipal court cases. /d. 
100. The New Jersey statute in effect at the time provided: 
Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public 
office, position or employment (whether state, county or municipal), who 
refuses to testify upon matters relating to the office, position or employ-
ment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defendant or is called as a 
witness on behalf of the prosecution, upon the ground that his answer may 
tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself or 
refuses to waive immunity when called by a grand jury to testify thereon 
or who willfully refuses or fails to appear before any court, commission or 
body of this state which has the right to inquire under oath upon matters 
relating to the office, position or employment of such person or who, hav-
ing been sworn, refuses to testify or to answer any material question upon 
the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to 
be a witness against himself, shall, if holding elective or public office, posi-
tion or employment, be removed therefrom or shall thereby forfeit his of-
fice, position or employment and any vested or future right of tenure or 
pension granted to him by any law of this State provided the inquiry re-
lated to a matter which occurred or arose within the preceding five years. 
Any person so forfeiting his office, position or employment shall not there-
after be eligible for election or appointment to any public office, position or 
employment in this State. 
N.J. REV. STAT.§ 2A:81-l7.1 (Supp. 1965). 
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Court did not reach the constitutionality of the forfeiture statute. In-
stead, the Court focused on whether fear of discharge for refusal to an-
swer, on the one hand, and fear of self-incrimination, on the other, 
created a " 'choice between the rock and the whirlpool' which made the 
statements products of coercion .... " 101 In a five-to-four decision, the 
Court found that duress is inherent when an individual is forced to 
choose between exercising the fifth amendment privilege and remaining a 
law enforement officer and, therefore, the statements were involuntary as 
a matter of law. Rejecting the State's argument that a law enforcement 
officer has no constitutional right to employment and must accept the 
position on the terms under which it is offered, the majority stated that 
police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitu-
tional rights." 102 Moreover, "[t]he option [presented to the police of-
ficers]" to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-
incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain 
silent." 103 
Writing in dissent, Justice Harlan adopted the pre-incorporation 
view that a law enforcement officer forfeits constitutional rights as a con-
dition of employment. 104 The other dissent, written by Justice White, 
recommended the notion that would be adopted as dicta in four subse-
quent cases. He contended that the appropriate balance between the fifth 
amendment privilege and· the "legitimate interest [of citizens] in ridding 
themselves of faithless officers [was to exclude the compelled statement in 
any criminal proceeding but allow its use] to discharge an employee who 
refuses to cooperate in the State's effort to determine his qualifications for 
continued employment. "10s 
In Garrity's companion case, Spevak v. Klein, 106 the Court followed 
the Garrity analysis, holding that a state cannot disbar an attorney be-
cause of a refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry. The Court stated that an 
101. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (citing Stevens v. Marks, 393 U.S. 234, 243 (1966) (quoting 
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926))). 
102. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. 
103. /d. at 497. The Court also relied upon Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 
(1956), a pre-incorporation case holding that due process was violated by discharg-
ing a public school teacher solely for invoking the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination before a congressional committee. The Court stated: "The privilege 
against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise 
could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presump-
tion of perjury." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 499-500 (quoting Slochower, 350 U.S. at 557-
58). 
104. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500-10. Justice Harlan believed that "[t]he validity of a conse-
quence depends both upon the hazards, if any, it presents to the integrity of the 
privilege and upon the urgency of the public interests it is designed to protect."' /d. 
at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Relying on Christal v. Police Comm'r. 33 Cal. App. 
2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939), he concluded that when confronted with alleged police 
misconduct, the public interests outweigh the integrity of the privilege. Garrity, 385 
U.S. at 509-10. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76. 
105. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 532 (White, J., dissenting). 
106. 385 U.S. at 511 (1967). 
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individual cannot enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed unfettered exer-
cise of the right to remain silent if there may be a penalty for asserting 
that right. The Court observed that the instrument of threat is as power-
ful as actual compulsion by use of the legal process. 107 
In Spevak, as in Garrity, Justice White's suggestion of an appropri-
ate balance between constitutional rights and employment rights was not 
considered by the majority. 108 However, Justice Fortas' concurrence in 
Spevak did address Justice White's concern, as follows: 
I would distinguish between a lawyer's right to remain silent 
and that of a public employee who is asked questions specifi-
cally, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his 
official duties as distinguished from his beliefs on other matters 
that are not within the scope of the specific duties which he 
undertook faithfully to perform as part of his employment by 
the State. This Court has never held, for example, that a po-
liceman may not be discharged for refusal in disciplinary pro-
ceedings to testify as to his conduct as a police officer. It is 
quite a different matter if the State seeks to use the testimony 
given under this lash in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 109 
The fifth amendment, incorporated against the states on behalf of all 
citizens in Malloy, was expressly incorporated on behalf of law enforce-
ment officers in 1967 in Garrity. However, at the same time, first in the 
dissent in Garrity and then in the concurrence in Spevak, the groundwork 
was laid for balancing the constitutional rights of law enforcement of-
ficers with the historical requirement of full accountability of the public 
trust. 
3. Gardner and Sanitation Men 
The year after Garrity and Spevak, the Court decided the compan-
ion cases of Gardner v. Broderick 110 and Uniformed Sanitation Men Asso-
ciation v. Commission of Sanitation .111 In Gardner, a police officer was 
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating police corruption 
and bribery stemming from illegal gambling. He was advised that if he 
did not waive his right to remain silent and did not waive immunity from 
prosecution, he would be discharged under New York law. 112 Unlike 
107. /d. at 516 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)). 
108. In Spevak, Justice Douglas observed that "[w]hether a policeman, who invokes the 
privilege when his conduct as a police officer is questioned in disciplinary proceed-
ings, may be discharged for refusing to testify is a question we did not reach in 
Garrity." Spevak, 385 U.S. at 516 n.3. 
109. /d. at 519-20. 
110. 392 u.s. 273 (1968). 
111. 392 u.s. 280 (1968). 
112. At the time, the New York City Charter provided: 
If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after 
lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court 
or judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body author-
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Garrity, in which threat of discharge led the officer to make a statement, 
in Gardner the officer refused to make a statement, which resulted in 
discharge. 113 The police department argued successfully in state court 
that it is constitutional to confront a law enforcement officer with a 
"choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood, 
[because] he is directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city 
or State which is his employer. He owes his entire loyalty to it." 114 Un-
persuaded, a unanimous Supreme Court115 reversed the Court of Appeals 
of New York, which had affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the of-
ficer's petition for reinstatement. Applying the holding of Garrity to a 
"chilling effect" situation as in Griffin, Justice Fortas reasoned that an 
unsuccessful attempt to coerce is as unconstitutional as a successful one. 
Accordingly, dismissing an officer for asserting the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination is as much a fifth amendment violation as coerc-
ing the officer to make a statement by threatening dismissal. 116 
Thus, the import of Gardner is that Garrity applies regardless of the 
choice made by the law enforcement officer when confronted with the 
dilemma of choosing between a constitutional right and continued em-
ized to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to 
testify or to answer any question regarding the property, government or 
affairs of ihe city or of any county included within its territorial limits, or 
regarding the nomination, election, appointment or official conduct of any 
officer or employee of the city or of any such county, on the ground that 
his answer would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immu-
nity from prosecution on account of any such matter in relation to which 
he may be asked to testify upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or 
tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employ-
ment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appoint-
ment to any office or employment under the city or any agency. 
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1123. At the time, the New York Constitution provided: 
No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, providing, that any public officer who, upon being called 
before a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his present office 
... or the performance of his official duties ... refuses to sign a waiver of 
immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any rele-
vant question concerning such matters before such grand jury, shall by 
virtue of such refusal, be disqualified from holding any other public office 
or public employment for a period of five years ... and shall be removed 
from his present office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his 
present office at the suit of the attorney-general. 
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
113. The Court framed the issue as '"whether a policeman who refuses to waive the pro-
tections which the privilege gives him may be dismissed from office because of that 
refusal." Gardner, 392 U.S. at 276. 
114. /d. at 277. 
115. Justice Black concurred in the result. /d. at 279. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice 
Stewart, wrote a concurring opinion. /d. at 285. 
116. The Court stated in Gardner: "He was dismissed for failure to relinquish the pro-
tections of the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . [T]he mandate of the great 
privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its 
ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of 
the loss of employment." /d. at 278-79 (footnote and citation omitted). 
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ployment. Significantly, the Court, in dicta, unanimously heeded Justice 
White's call for an appropriate balance, issued a year earlier in his Gar-
rity dissent and advanced by Justice Fortas in concurrence in Spevak. 
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in Gardner, stated that if a police 
officer is provided with immunity, then failure to answer questions nar-
rowly relating to the performance of official duties may result in a consti-
tutionally permissible discharge from office. 117 
Through the holdings of Garrity and Gardner, the Supreme Court in 
an eighteen month period rewrote seventy-five years worth of law per-
taining to the rights of law enforcement officers. Moreover, applying the 
appropriate balance, recognized in the dicta of Gardner, a law enforce-
ment agency could take disciplinary action against a law enforcement 
officer without interfering with the privilege against compelled self-in-
crimination, and an officer could assert the privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination without interfering with the agency's disciplinary pro-
cess. Thus, the fifth amendment rights of a law enforcement officer, 
when appropriately balanced with the rights of a law enforcement 
agency, produce the following: 
(1) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, any 
statement given under threat of adverse personnel action is unconstitu-
tionally coerced (Garrity holding); 118 
(2) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, the 
taking or threatening to take any adverse personnel action in response to 
the assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination has an 
unconstitutional chilling effect upon the privilege (Gardner holding); 119 
(3) if a law enforcement officer is granted immunity but nonetheless 
refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to 
official duties, the officer may be dismissed (Gardner dicta); 120 and 
(4) if a law enforcement officer is granted immunity and answers 
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the 
officer may be dismissed if the answers provide cause for dismissal (im-
plicit in the Gardner dicta).1 21 
117. The Court stated: 
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, di-
rectly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, with-
out being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his 
answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal. 
The facts of the case, however, do not present this issue. Here, peti-
tioner was summoned to testify before a grand jury in an investigation of 
alleged criminal conduct. He was discharged from office not for failure to 
answer relevant questions about his official duties, but for refusal to waive 
a constitutional right. 
ld. at 278 (citation and footnote omitted). 
118. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-500. 
119. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79. 
120. Jd. at 278. 
121. Jd. 
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In Gardner's companion case, Uniformed Sanitation Men Associa-
tion v. Commission of Sanitation, 122 the Court found that fifteen sanita-
tion workers were not discharged because of a refusal to account for their 
official conduct but because they asserted and refused to waive a consti-
tutional privilege. 123 Justice Fortas, again writing for a unanimous 
Court, reversed the judgment that had affirmed the dismissal of the 
workers' action for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief. He 
reiterated the Gardner dicta but, under the facts before the Court, found 
that Garrity and Gardner were dispositive. 124 
4. Turley and Cunningham 
In 1973, in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 125 the Court reaffirmed its prior 
holdings and more clearly explained the dicta in Gardner and Sanitation 
Men. In Turley, architects were disqualified from public contracts be-
cause they refused to waive their privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation and immunity from prosecution. 126 Finding Garrity, Gardner, and 
Sanitation Men controlling, the Court rejected the State's argument that 
its interest in disqualifying the architects from public contracts is suffi-
ciently strong to override the privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion, concluding that a "waiver secured under threat of substantial 
economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary." 127 
More significant was the Court's amplification of the dicta in Gard-
ner and Sanitation Men. The term immunity in Gardner must have been 
intended as a constitutional term of art. The Court in Turley stated that 
if a government agency needs or wants information, then the prosecutor 
must provide a grant of immunity, accompanied by the power of the 
courts to compel immunized testimony through civil contempt proceed-
ings.128 Adhering to the theme of the need for an appropriate balance, 
the Court stated that "[i]mmunity is required if there is to be 'rational 
accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legiti-
122. 392 u.s. 280 (1968). 
123. /d. at 283. 
124. The Court stated: 
[I]f New York had demanded that petitioners answer questions specifi-
cally, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official 
duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring re-
linquishment of the benefits of the constitutional privilege, and if they had 
refused to do so, this case would be entirely different. 
They were entitled to remain silent because it was clear that New York 
was seeking, not merely an accounting of their use or abuse of their public 
trust, but testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitutional 
prohibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally. 
/d. at 285 (footnote omitted). 
125. 414 u.s. 70 (1973). 
126. /d. at 75-76. 
127. /d. at 82-83. 
128. /d. at 81-82, 84. 
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mate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.' " 129 "It is in 
this sense that immunity statutes have 'become part of our constitutional 
fabric.' " 130 The Court noted that had adequate immunity been given, 
then cancellation of and disqualification from government contracts 
would have been permissible. 131 
Four years later, in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 132 the Court struck 
down a New York statute that provided for the removal of an officer of a 
political party, as well as disqualification from holding public office for 
five years, if the officer refused to waive the privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination or refused to waive immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion.133 The State of New York, having argued the losing side in Gard-
ner, Sanitation Men, and Turley, attempted to distinguish Cunningham 
on the ground that there was no threatened economic loss associated 
with a non-paying, honorary political position. The State argued further 
that its interest in the integrity of the political system justified any consti-
tutional infringement. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, de-
clared the statute to be in violation of the fifth amendment, rejecting any 
attempt to distinguish the facts of Cunningham from Garrity, Gardner, 
Sanitation Men, and Turley. 134 As for the State's asserted interest, he 
wrote that the "[g]overnment has compelling interests in maintaining an 
honest police force and civil service, but this Court did not permit those 
interests to justify infringement of Fifth Amendment rights in Garrity, 
Gardner, and Sanitation Men ... .''135 
Taken together, Garrity, Spevak, Gardner, Sanitation Men, Turley, 
and Cunningham signalled a new era in the evolution of the fifth amend-
ment rights of law enforcement officers, an era in which their second-
class constitutional status was apparently eliminated. The last three 
decades of the century promised to be an era in which, as Justice Douglas 
said in Garrity, police officers would not receive a "watered-down version 
129. /d. at 81 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972)). 
130. /d. at 81-82 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)). 
131. Turley, 414 U.S. at 84-85. 
132. 431 U.S. 801 (1977). This case is sometimes referred to as Lefkowitz /1 
133. /d. 
134. The Court stated: 
[Garrity, Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley] settle that government 
cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony which has 
not been immunized. It is true ... that our earlier cases were concerned 
with penalties having a substantial economic impact. But the touchstone 
of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic sanctions and 
imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-incrimi-
nation which the Amendment forbids. 
[The statute] is therefore constitutionally indistinguishable from the 
coercive provisions we struck down in Gardner, Sanitation Men, and 
Turley .... The threatened loss of such widely sought positions, with their 
power and perquisites, is inherently coercive. 
/d. at 806-07. 
135. /d. at 808. 
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of constitutional rights." 136 With the states required to apply federal law 
under Malloy, the Garrity and Gardner combination appeared to protect 
law enforcement officers both ways. If an officer gave a statement under 
threat of adverse personnel action, Garrity made the statement involun-
tary and unconstitutional as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, puni-
tive personnel action was taken when an officer refused to give a 
statement, the action was unconstitutional under Gardner. If there were 
any concern that these might be short-lived Warren Court era doctrines, 
that concern was addressed a decade later in Cunningham when Chief 
Justice Burger, speaking for a seven-to-one Court, 137 relied on Garrity 
and Gardner. He emphasized that even the compelling governmental in-
terest in honest law enforcement is not sufficient justification for diluting 
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 138 
B. The Status of Law Enforcement Officers 
The promises of Garrity and Gardner were never fully realized for 
law enforcement officers. Although the blatant contravention of Garrity 
and Gardner was remedied, subtle violations were not. In situations in 
which courts were confronted with constitutional, 139 statutory, 140 or reg-
136. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. 
137. Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist took no part in the decision. Justice Stevens' 
dissent in no way undermined Ga"ity or Gardner but took the position that they did 
not apply because those asserting the fifth amendment privilege in Cunningham 
were policymaking government officials and not typical public employees. /d. at 
810-15. 
138. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 804-08. 
139. In Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975), the court invali-
dated the so-called "Charter warnings" of section 10-110 of the Philadelphia Home 
Rule Charter, which provided for forfeiture of office for assertion of the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. The court held that the statement obtained 
under such threat was not only inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, but 
inadmissible for impeachment purposes because, under Pennsylvania law, use for 
impeachment would chill the defendant's election to testify. The concurring justice 
believed that the statement induced by the "Charter warnings" had to be suppressed 
for impeachment purposes because of federal constitutional law. He stated that 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), constitutionally permitting the use of 
statements for impeachment, applied only to statements taken in violation of Mi-
randa but otherwise trustworthy. According to the concurrence, statements that 
violate Garrity are inherently coercive, involuntary, and untrustworthy and there-
fore inadmissible both in the case in chief and on cross-examination. 462 Pa. at 252, 
341 A.2d at 65-66. 
In Sellers v. Corlberton, 224 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), Dade 
County conceded the unconstitutionality of the county code provision that required 
forfeiture of office for assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
The county charter, however, still contained a forfeiture provision. In Englander v. 
State, 246 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1971), the court applied Garrity and Gardner to invali-
date the waiver of immunity signed by a member of the City Council of the City of 
Miami Beach and to strike down the charter provision. 
140. In Raphael v. Conrad, 371 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D. Ind. 1974), the court found 
unconstitutional the state code provision that required an affidavit in order to be 
eligible to be a paid lobbyist. The affidavit required a statement that the affiant is 
not, and never was, a member of the communist party, and that the affiant never 
476 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
ulatory 141 provisions similar to those in Garrity and Gardner, the provi-
sions were struck down quickly by courts or amended by legislatures. 
However, once across-the-board violations were remedied, unconstitu-
tional action~ continued that were more difficult to detect and prove. 
System-wide, explicit schemes sanctioning punitive personnel action for 
the assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination were 
replaced with incident-by-incident threats, either express or implied, and 
grants of immunity to a law enforcement officer were rare. 142 Law en-
forcement officers still face the constitutionally impermissible dilemma of 
attempting to preserve a career by relinquishing the privilege, as in Gar-
rity, or preserving the privilege at the cost of a career, as in Gardner. 
Courts confronted with these situations frequently reflect the layman's 
attitude toward those who "hide behind" the fifth amendment. 143 Some 
courts have ruled against law enforcement officers without invoking or 
misapplying Garrity and Gardner, resting on grounds such as the inappli-
cability of the fifth amendment because the officer did not fear a criminal 
prosecution, 144 because the officer failed to assert the fifth amendment 
privilege, 145 or because of the lack of either a Garrity coercion or a Gard-
ner chill. 146 Many more courts either misunderstand, or perhaps even 
refused to answer any question posed by any congressional committee concerning 
communist party affiliation. The court held that refusal to answer these questions 
on fifth amendment grounds could not be used to deny employment in a field regu-
lated by the state. 
141. In Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub 
nom., 416 U.S. 956 (1974), the court found unconstitutional the police department 
rule that prohibited both the refusal to testify on grounds of self-incrimination and 
the refusal to waive immunity when so requested by a superior officer; see Holloway 
v. State, 26 Md. App. 382, 389, 339 A.2d 319, 324, cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975) 
("[w]hether the policy be statutory or by regulation the result would be the same 
under Garrity, for the effect upon the officer would most surely be the same"); cf 
Everitt Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 39 Colo. App. 336, 565 P.2d 967 (1977) 
(unemployment compensation benefits could not be denied because of assertion of 
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination before an administrative agency). 
142. See infra part III.B.2. 
143. Of course, there is the occasional court that extends, rather than limits, the Gardner 
rule. E.g., Baxley v. North Charleston, 533 F. Supp. 1248 (D.S.C. 1982) (extending 
Gardner to prohibit discharging a law enforcement officer for asserting his sixth 
amendment right to counsel). 
144. Devine v. Goodstein, 680 F.2d 243, 246-47 (1982) (finding no evidence of belief that 
a written report would form the basis of a criminal prosecution); Johnston v. 
Herschler, 669 F.2d 617, 619 (lOth Cir. 1982) (when discharged special agent stated 
in deposition that protecting against compelled self-incrimination was not the rea-
son for his refusal to answer). 
145. United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 717 (lst Cir. 1980) ("defendant did not 
claim the privilege"). 
146. The court in Jndorato stated: 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the rules have been 
interpreted to mean that a state police officer who refuses on fifth amend-
ment grounds to comply with an order to provide self-incriminating state-
ments would be dismised. The language used in the rules - providing 
that for violation a member may be tried and upon conviction may be 
subject to dismissal or other disciplinary action - suggests that dismissal 
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evade, the Garrity and Gardner holdings, the immunity requirement, or 
both. 
1. Misunderstanding the Fifth Amendment Holdings of Garrity and 
Gardner 
A number of courts bolster their opposition to fifth amendment 
rights by quoting Gardner out of context to support the erroneous posi-
tion that officers must relinquish their rights in return for the privilege of 
being law enforcement officers. 147 In Gardner, Justice Fortas noted that 
the police department had argued that although an attorney cannot be 
"confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeit-
ing his means of livelihood, the same principles should not protect a po-
liceman."148 Before rejecting the department's argument, the Court set 
forth the argument presented by the department that law enforcement 
officers should be held to a different standard than attorneys, stating: 
Unlike the lawyer, [the police officer] is directly, immediately, 
and entirely responsible to the city or State which is his em-
ployer. He owes his entire loyalty to it. He has no other "cli-
ent" or principal. He is a trustee of the public interest, bearing 
the burden of great and total responsibility to his public em-
ployer. Unlike the lawyer who is directly responsible to his cli-
ent, the policeman is either responsible to the State or to no 
would not have automatically followed defendant's invocation of the fifth 
amendment. 
/d. at 716 (emphasis added). 
147. Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213, 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1970) ("high obligation 
owed by a policeman to his employer and his peculiar position in our society cer-
tainly must be taken into account in considering the nature and effect of disciplinary 
proceedings instituted by the employer"); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 65 
(D. Md. 1970) ("a police officer holds a position of public trust, and in that respect, 
his conduct must be of a higher moral character than that of the ordinary citizen"); 
Civil Serv. Ass'n, Local400 v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 455, 188 
Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1983) ("While a public employee cannot be forced to give an 
answer which may tend to incriminate him or her in criminal proceedings, he may 
be required to choose between disclosing information and losing his employment."); 
Sczaciarz v. California State Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 918, 145 Cal. 
Rptr. 396, 403 (1978) ("Unless the government seeks testimony that will subject its 
giver to criminal liability, the constitutional right to remain silent absent immunity 
does not arise."); Gerace v. Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 3d 350, 358, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
917, 923 ( 1972) ("Fitness to serve as a policeman and criminal behavior are anti-
thetical and antagonistic and cannot coexist."). Other courts have reached the same 
result without referring to Gardner. E.g., Eshelman v. Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376, 
378, 560 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1977) ("compulsory use of the polygraph during depart-
mental investigation is consistent with the maintenance of a police or sheriff's de-
partment that is of the highest integrity and beyond suspicion"); Richardson v. City 
of Pasadena, 500 S. W.2d 175, 177 (fex. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd of other grounds, S 13 
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1974) ("[b]y accepting public employment as a police officer he 
subordinated his right of privacy as a private citizen to the superior right of the 
public to an efficient and credible police department"). 
148. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 277. 
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This distinction, rejected in Gardner as a basis for providing less consti-
tutional protection to law enforcement officers than to attorneys, is often 
erroneously quoted as the holding of Gardner. 150 Thus, many courts mis-
construe Gardner, reaching a conclusion totally opposite to the intended 
holding in that case. 
Gardner was especially misunderstood by the United States district 
court in Pinkney v. District ofColumbia. 151 The court began by miscon-
struing Gardner in the manner just described. This error was then com-
pounded by the court's holding that, although a constitutional privilege 
may not be totally abridged, no constitutional question is raised when a 
constitutional right is merely burdened. According to the court: 
[T]he government employee, unlike the ordinary citizen, is a 
"trustee of the public interest" . . . . [S]ecuring from govern-
ment employees an accounting of their public trust by no 
means justifies the state in totally abridging the fifth amend-
ment rights of public employees. But it does justify the imposi-
tion of some burdens on the privilege. The demarcation line 
between the permissible and impermissible is plainly set out in a 
line of cases beginning with Gardner. 
[The public employee] could have either contested his proposed 
removal by disclosing information about the pending criminal 
charges and in the process exposed himself to potential self~in­
crimination, or as he did, he could have chosen to remain silent 
and thereby sacrificed his right to a hearing and, through that, 
the chance of retaining his job. No waiver of fifth amendment 
immunity was compelled. To be sure, this choice placed -plain-
tiff on the horns of a dilemma and burdened him in the exercise 
of his fifth amendment right to remain silent. But under Gard-
ner and its progeny the choice that plaintiff was faced with sim-
ply did not rise to constitutional proportions. 152 
Employing this extraordinary rationale, the court upheld as constitu-
149. Id. at 277-78 (footnote omitted). 
150. E.g., Pinkney v. District of Columbia, 439 F. Supp. 519, 533 (D.D.C. 1977); Allen 
v. Greensboro, 322 F. Supp. 873, 877 (M.D.N.C. 1971); Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 
F. Supp. 1213, 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Civil Serv. Ass'n, Local 400 v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 455, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1983); cf. Matter of 
Glancey,- Pa. -, -, 527 A.2d 997, 1002-03 (1987) Gudge who refused to answer 
a question on a required financial disclosure form, based on the fifth amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, could be removed from office for mis-
conduct). This misunderstanding also affects the commentators. See Recent Deci-
sions, 33 ALB. L. REV. 397, 403 (1969); see also Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties 
and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 
415-16 n.116 (1976). 
151. 439 F. Supp. 519 (D.D.C. 1977). 
152. Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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tiona} the same conduct expressly prohibited by Garrity and Gardner as a 
violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 153 
Some courts have adopted similar reasoning to hold that law en-
forcement officers may be required to take polygraph examinations as 
part of their work related responsibilities. Frequently, courts fail even to 
recognize that polygraph examinations present a fifth amendment Gar-
rity and Gardner problem. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Rich-
ardson v. City of Pasadena, 154 upheld a dismissal for insubordination 
based on refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Using language 
remarkably similar to cases from the pre-incorporation era, the court 
said: 
By accepting public employment as a police officer he 
subordinated his right of privacy as a private citizen to the su-
perior right of the public to an efficient and credible police de-
partment. A police officer is guilty of insubordination in 
refusing a direct order of a superior officer to submit to a poly-
graph examination during a departmental investigation of a 
matter relating to efficiency and credibility when reasonable 
cause exists to believe that the police officer so ordered can sup-
ply relevant knowledge or information. Insubordination in re-
fusing a reasonable and constitutional command cannot be 
upheld without jeopardizing the system of police administra-
tion which is premised on discipline. 155 
Even those courts that do recognize polygraph tests as presenting a fifth 
amendment Garrity and Gardner issue frequently rule against the law 
enforcement officer on the merits of the claim. 156 
153. A different version of being "only slightly unconstitutional" is DeWalt v. Barger, 
490 F. Supp. 1262 (M.D. Pa. 1980). After quoting Pinkney, the court supported its 
conclusion that the officer's six week suspension and transfer did not unconstitution-
ally infringe on his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, 
in part, because he may have been "suspended and transferred not only for invoking 
his fifth amendment rights but also for violating ... the Pennsylvania State Police 
Field Regulation." /d. at 1272 n.6. Justice Douglas stated in Garrity that police 
officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights [and] a 
State may not condition [the exercise of a constitutional right] by the exaction of a 
price." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. 
154. 500 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 
1974) (indefinite suspension and permanent dismissal was lawful for refusing to sub-
mit to polygraph examination that was not unreasonable). 
155. /d. at 177. 
156. Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (15-day suspension upheld 
as not violative of the fifth amendment or due process); Rivera v. Douglas, 132 Ariz. 
117, 644 P.2d 271 (1982) (directive to submit to polygraph examination did not 
violate the fifth amendment and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious); 
Eshelman v. Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376, 560 P.2d 1283 (1977) (dismissal for refusal to 
submit to polygraph examination upheld because "the officer [was] informed (1) 
that the questions [related] specifically and narrowly to the performance of his offi-
cial duties, (2) answers [could not] be used against him in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution, and (3) that the penalty for refusing [was] dismissal"). 
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An even more significant misunderstanding of the doctrine of Gar-
rity and Gardner is the notion that a law enforcement officer may be 
forced to choose between the constitutional privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination and a career if the law enforcement agency, in ques-
tioning the officer, limits its questions to those "specifically, directly, and 
narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties."157 This mis-
understanding results from a reading of the Gardner dicta out of con-
text.158 The Gardner dicta stands for the proposition that if a law 
enforcement officer is granted immunity, but nonetheless refuses to an-
swer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official du-
ties, the officer may be dismissed. The thrust of this proposition is that, 
in order to punish for failure to answer questions, the law enforcement 
agency must provide as much protection as it is requiring the law en-
forcement officer to relinquish; that is, immunity must be granted in ex-
change for the officer's relinquishment of the privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination. 
The Gardner requirement that questions be "specifically, directly, 
and narrowly" related to the performance of official duties159 provides 
further limitation on the law enforcement agency. Thus, not only must 
immunity be granted, there can be no dismissal unless the incriminating 
answer is in response to an employment-related inquiry. A number of 
courts, in direct contravention of Garrity and Gardner, permit discipli-
nary action against law enforcement officers simply because the questions 
asked are official in nature, even though the principal requirement that 
the officer be granted immunity has not been satisfied.160 
157. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278. 
158. The language of the dicta in Gardner is as follows: 
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, di-
rectly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, with-
out being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his 
answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, Garrity 
v. New Jersey, supra, the privilege against self-incrimination would not 
have been a bar to his dismissal. 
/d. at 278 (footnote omitted). 
Although the problem arises from a misreading of Gardner, the problem may 
be slightly exacerbated by use of the unofficial version, published by the West Pub-
lishing Company, which incorrectly breaks this one-sentence quote into two 
sentences by placing a period instead of a comma after "himself" and before "Gar-
rity." 88 S. Ct. at 1916. The unofficial version published by the Lawyers Co-opera-
tive Publishing Company is consistent with the official United States Reports. 20 L. 
Ed. 2d at 1086-87. 
159. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278. 
160. In O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976), the court upheld a 30-
day suspension for failure to answer questions on a financial disclosure form. In 
rejecting the fifth amendment claim, the court held that, as long as the questions are 
specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the "privilege [against 
compelled self-incrimination] is not infringed when public employees are dismissed 
for failing to answer questions . . . . " 
In Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1974), the court 
upheld withdrawal of a Department of Defense security clearance for access to clas-
sified information because of the failure to answer questions on interrogatories relat-
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2. Misunderstanding the Immunity Requirement 
The immunity requirement is described in the dicta of Gardner, 
Sanitation Men, and Turley. These cases stand for the proposition that a 
law enforcement officer may be dismissed if he is provided with immu-
nity but nonetheless refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and 
narrowly related to official duties. Gardner's reference to immunity is as 
follows: 
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions spe-
cifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of 
his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity 
with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a 
criminal prosecution of himself, . . . the privilege against self-
incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal. 161 
In Sanitation Men, the companion case to Gardner, the immunity 
requirement was further explained: 
As we stated in Gardner v. Broderick, if New York had 
demanded that petitioners answer questio·ns specifically, di-
rectly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official 
duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without re-
quiring relinquishment of the benefits of the constitutional privi-
lege, and if they had refused to do so, this case would be 
entirely different.t62 
In Turley, the immunity requirement was clarified even further: 
Although due regard for the Fifth Amendment forbids the 
State to compel incriminating answers from its employees and 
contractors that may be used against them in criminal proceed-
ings, the Constitution permits that very testimony to be com-
ing to alleged homosexual conduct. Relying on Gardner and Sanitation Men, the 
court validated the action because it was not "the result of some governmental sus-
picion concerning his alleged homosexual conduct, but ... was based on the inabil-
ity of the government to continue its clearance procedure without Marks first 
disclosing additional information." 
In Matter of Glancy, - Pa. -, 527 A.2d 997 (1987), the court upheld the 
recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry Panel Review Board that the judge be re-
moved from office. The court stated: 
[A]lthough compliance with the reporting requirement is compulsory in 
the sense that one's right to hold judicial office is conditioned upon it, 
there is not present the demand for total relinquishment of fifth amend-
ment rights. Moreover, the inquiry put to a judge by Question 11 is a type 
which "specifically, directly and narrowly" relates to the performance of 
his official duties. 
Id. at-, 527 A.2d at 1005; see also Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 83, 84 (N.D. 
Ill. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037, reh'g denied, 
410 U.S. 947 (1972) (denial of motion of a removed judge to prevent nomination of 
candidates to fill the judicial vacancy caused by his removal). 
161. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278 (footnoted omitted) (emphasis added). 
162. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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pel/ed if neither it nor its fruits are available for such use .... 
Furthermore, the accommodations between the interest of the 
State and the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have 
means at its disposal to secure testimony if immunity is sup-
plied and testimony is still refused. This is recognized by the 
power of the courts to compel testimony after a grant of immu-
nity by use of civil contempt and coerced imprisonment. . . . 
Also, given adequate immunity, the State may plainly insist 
that employees either answer questions under oath about the 
performance of their job or suffer the loss of employment. 163 
Although compelled testimony may not be used directly or deriva-
tively against an officer in a criminal proceeding, the dicta of Gardner, 
Sanitation Men, and Turley indicate that compelled testimony may be 
used against the officer in an administrative or other civil proceeding, 
provided the testimony follows a grant of immunity. If the fifth amend-
ment privilege is properly protected by a grant of immunity, the content 
of answers to specific employment-related questions, as well as the failure 
to answer such questions, can result in disciplinary actiori and dismissal. 
What is less clear from the dicta of these cases is the meaning of 
"immunity." These cases permit three interpretations of the protection 
required by the fifth amendment in order to dismiss an officer because of 
either his refusal to answer or the content of his compelled statement. 
The three possible minimal levels of fifth amendment protection are: (1) 
a formal grant of immunity, (2) Miranda-like warnings that no com-
pelled statement or other evidence derived from a compelled statement 
can· be admitted in any criminal proceeding; and (3) neither a grant of 
immunity nor Miranda-like warnings. The third interpretation is based 
on the assumption that the holding of Garrity will be self-executing for 
the officer, providing an automatic immunity as a matter of law. 
Resolution of the immunity question requires examination of the 
Supreme Court's seminal immunity case, Kastigar v. United States, 164 de-
cided after Gardner and Sanitation Men but before Turley and Cunning-
ham. In Kastigar, the Court established the fifth amendment immunity 
standard as "use and derivative use" immunity. Under use and deriva-
tive use immunity, an individual who has been granted immunity may be 
prosecuted criminally for crimes arising from the criminal transaction in 
reference to which testimony was compelled. 165 However, the prosecutor 
may not use the compelled testimony or any information obtained di-
rectly or indirectly from such testimony. 166 
163. Turley, 414 U.S. at 84 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
164. 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see Shennan, supra note 36, at 24-34 (brief history of statutory 
immunity); Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L. 
REV. 791, 797-814 (1978). 
165. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453-54. 
166. Id. at 454. 
The constitutional inquiry, ... is whether the immunity granted 
under this statute is coextensive with the scope of the privilege. If so, 
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Gardner, Sanitation Men, Turley, and Cunningham were each de-
cided in the context of a statute requiring the affirmative waiver of the 
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In Gard-
ner and Sanitation Men, decided prior to Kastigar, the Court found un-
constitutional the requirement that the officer affirmatively waive 
immunity, but the Court did not address what, if any, affirmative obliga-
tion the government might have. After Kastigar, dicta in Turley and 
Cunningham strongly suggest that a formal grant of immunity is 
required. 
a. Interpretation One: Formal Grant of Immunity 
In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 167 the Court stated that the fifth amendment 
requires an affirmative grant of immunity by the State and prohibits re-
quiring ari affirmative waiver by the defendant. The Court explained that 
"if answers are to be required . . . States must offer to the witness 
whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not 
insist that the employee ... waive such immunity." 168 Further support-
ing the interpretation that the Court intended a formal grant of immu-
nity is its discussion of the consequences of the refusal to answer 
questions after a grant of immunity. The Court stated: 
[T]he accommodation between the interest of the State and the 
Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means at its dis-
posal to secure testimony if immunity is supplied and testimony 
is still refused. This is recognized by the power of the courts to 
compel testimony, after a grant of immunity, by use of civil 
contempt and coerced imprisonment. 169 
In addition, the Turley Court referred with approval to the Kastigar stan-
dard of use and derivative use as the scope of the immunity grant neces-
sary to comport with the fifth amendment. 170 Thus, the soundest reading 
of the Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley dicta, particularly in light of 
Kastigar, is that a formal grant of use and derivative use immunity is 
required in order to compel testimony when administrative dismissal is 
the sanction for either the failure to testify or for information revealed in 
testimony that supports a "for cause" dismissal. Anything less than a 
formal grant of immunity is probably less than the Supreme Court con-
templated. Moreover, only "interpretation one" provides the procedural 
safeguards necessary to protect the officer. 
Nonetheless, lower courts have failed to recognize this interpreta-
petitioners' refusals to answer based on the privilege were unjustified, and 
the judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of immunity has 
removed the dangers against which the privilege protects. 
ld. at 149 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
167. 414 u.s. 70 (1973). 
168. ld. at 85 (emphasis added). 
169. ld. at 84. 
170. ld. at 85. 
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tion of immunity as being required by the Supreme Court. There are 
probably two reasons for this misunderstanding. First, Gardner, Sanita-
tion Men, and Turley were each decided in the context of a statute that 
unconstitutionally required an affirmative waiver by the individual of his 
or her fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
As a consequence of the holdings in these cases, there are no longer stat-
utes in effect that require individuals to waive formally the fifth amend-
. ment privilege. Because the issue is no longer "can the government 
require the defendant to waive immunity," but is now a question of 
"what affirmative obligation, if any, does the government have to estab-
lish immunity," the significance of the immunity discussion in these cases 
is easily lost or the cases are incorrectly distinguished, or both. Because 
the immunity language of these cases is sometimes seen solely as refer-
ring to the now defunct waiver of immunity statutes, the issue of whether 
the government must provide immunity and, if so, what is constitution-
ally required for immunity is either misunderstood or perceived as inap-
plicable to the case at bar. 
Second, even conscientious attempts on the part of courts to resolve 
the immunity question often produce inadequate results because of reli-
ance solely on Gardner for the immunity dicta. Garrity and Gardner are 
the landmark decisions on the fifth amendment rights of law enforcement 
officers. Turley, on the other hand, is not the seminal case and involved a 
non-public employee's right to contract with the government. Reliance 
on Garrity and Gardner, instead of Turley, is natural when resolving law 
enforcement officer cases. 
Unfortunately, when attempting to resolve the immunity issue, reli-
ance on Garrity and Gardner, while ignoring Turley, is a fatal flaw. Gar-
rity does not contain the immunity requirement. Gardner, of course, 
does. However, both Gardner and its companion case, Sanitation Men, 
were decided four years before Kastigar. Turley, decided a year after the 
landmark immunity case of Kastigar, is the most recent, most complete, 
and most clear articulation of the Court. The Turley immunity language, 
when read in pari materia with Kastigar, strongly suggests that the im-
munity requirement of Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley is a formal 
grant of use and derivative use immunity. 
b. Interpretation Two: Miranda-Like Warnings 
A middle ground position requires that the law enforcement officer 
be given Miranda-like warnings. Under this approach, a formal grant of 
immunity is not required on the theory that Garrity provides immunity 
as a matter oflaw. However, unlike the self-executing theory of the third 
interpretation, the second interpretation requires that the law enforce-
ment officer be "duly advised of his options and the consequences of his 
choice."171 As the Supreme Court of California stated, "The logic un-
171. Westen v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943,948 (Fed. 
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derlying Gardner is that an officer under investigation is not required to 
speculate as to what his constitutional rights are." 172 The second inter-
pretation requires that the law enforcement officer be advised of the Gar-
rity exclusionary rule, which provides that no statement given under 
threat of adverse personnel action can be used against the officer in a 
criminal proceeding. Moreover, no evidence derived directly or indi-
rectly from a compelled statement may be used in a criminal proceeding. 
Although this notification is not as protective as a formal grant ofimmu-
nity, it is probably sufficient to satisfy the constitutional minimum. 
The Second Circuit adopted this position when confronted with the 
immunity issue in Sanitation Men, following the remand by the Supreme 
Court. The sanitation department reinstated the plaintiffs, called them to 
appear at an inquiry, and advised them: (1) that any answers they pro-
vided or any evidence derived from their answers could not be used 
against them in a criminal case, and (2) that failure to answer could re-
sult in disciplinary action. 173 The sanitation workers asserted their fifth 
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, were charged 
with misconduct, and, following a hearing, were dismissed. The district 
court granted the sanitation workers' motion for summary judgment, 
adopting the position that a formal grant of immunity was required and 
that the City of New York lacked the statutory authority to grant 
immunity. 174 
Cir. 1983); Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Uni-
formed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commission of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 961 (1972). 
172. Lybarger v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 822, 834, 710 P.2d 329, 336, 221 Cal. 
Rptr. 529, 536 (1985) (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
173. The Deputy Administrator read the following "warnings" to each interrogated 
employee: 
[Y]ou have all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Laws of the 
State of New York and the Constitution of the United States, including 
the right ... to remain silent, although you may be subject to disciplinary 
action by the Department . . . for failure to answer material questions 
relating to the performance of your duties as an employee of the City of 
New York. 
I further advise you that the answers you may give to the questions 
propounded to you at this proceeding, or any information or evidence 
which is gained by reason of your answer, may not be used against you in 
a criminal proceeding except that you may be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion for any false answer .... 
Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 621; accord United States ex rei Annunziato v. Deegan, 
440 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1971); see Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1396 
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (emphasizing that warnings must include evidence derived from the 
compelled statements and not just the statements themselves); Eshelman v. 
Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376, 378-79, 560 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (1977) (must also be ad-
vised that questions will relate specifically, narrowly, and directly to the perform-
ance of official duties); Rivera v. Douglas, 132 Ariz. 117, 644 P.2d 271 (1982); see 
also Westen v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 951 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (when the public employee was properly advised of rights, it was 
immaterial that her counsel did not understand their significance). 
174. Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 621-22. 
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Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, reversed, holding 
that it was sufficient that the workers were advised of the use and deriva-
tive use exclusionary rule. The court stated that Garrity and Gardner 
implicitly stand for the proposition that it is not necessary to have a for-
mal grant of immunity, 175 notwithstanding Justice Fortas' reference in 
Sanitation Men to "proper proceedings."176 The court held that proper 
proceedings means "proceedings, such as those held here, in which the 
employee is asked only pertinent questions about the performance of his 
duties and is duly advised of his options and the consequences of his 
choice." 177 Moreover, the court also held that it was immaterial that 
there was no statute authorizing a grant of immunity. Accordingly, the 
court dismissed as inapplicable the provision of the New York Code of 
Criminal Procedure that restricted the granting of immunity to "comp~­
tent authority." 178 
The Seventh Circuit, in Confederation of Police v. Con fisk, 179 implic-
itly adopted the middle ground position. The court noted that the police 
officers in that case were never informed, either at the grand jury pro-
ceeding or at the departmental inquiry, that any information they gave 
could not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.180 The court 
dismissed the department's argument that the internal affairs division 
(lAD) is not empowered to grant immunity, holding that such power is 
not necessary under Garrity. The court stated: 
In Garrity, the Supreme Court indicated that the Fifth 
Amendment itself prohibited the use of statements or their 
fruits where the statements had been made under the threat of 
dismissal from public office. Therefore, by advising the officers 
that their statements, when given under threat of discharge, 
cannot be used against them in subsequent proceedings, the 
lAD is not "granting" immunity from prosecution; it is merely 
advising the officers of the constitutional limitations on any 
criminal prosecution should they answer. 181 
c. Interpretation Three: Self-Executing Immunity 
The final position is that the authorities are not required either to 
grant immunity or to inform the officer of the exclusionary rule. This 
175. /d. at 626-27. 
176. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 285. 
177. Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 627. 
178. /d. at 627-28. This case, decided two years before Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441 (1972), established the constitutional minimum for a grant of immunity as 
"use and derivative use." Thus, Judge Friendly was not only struggling with the 
need for a grant of immunity versus an exclusionary device, but also with what a 
grant of immunity means- transactional immunity, use and derviative use immu-
nity, or use immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 239-48. 
179. 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., 416 U.S. 956 (1974). 
180. /d. at 895. 
181. /d. at 895 n.4 (citing Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 627) (emphasis in original). 
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position is premised on the notion that the Garrity holding is self-execut-
ing, providing immunity as a matter of law, because statements given 
under threat of adverse personnel action are coerced and, as such, are 
always suppressed as compelled self-incrimination. This analysis is 
faulty because it compels a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege with-
out providing a formal grant of immunity or at least expressly advising of 
the exclusionary rule resulting from Garrity. Nonetheless, this approach 
is often taken by law enforcement agencies and frequently sanctioned by 
the courts. 
The interpretation of a Garrity self-executing immunity has been ap-
plied with unfortunate results. In Gulden v. McCork/e, 182 two public em-
ployees were discharged for refusing to submit to polygraph 
examinations and for refusing to sign departmental waivers that the ex-
aminations were conducted consensually. 183 In their suit for reinstate-
ment, the employees argued that the employer was required to "make an 
affirmative tender of immunity" once the employees articulated their fifth 
amendment concerns. 184 Rejecting this position, the Fifth Circuit held 
that: · 
An employee who is compelled to answer questions (but who is 
not compelled to waive immunity) is protected by Garrity from 
subsequent use of those answers in a criminal prosecution. It is 
the very fact that the testimony was compelled which prevents 
its use in subsequent proceedings .... Failure to tender immu-
nity was simply not the equivalent of an impermissible com-
pelled waiver of immunity.1ss 
If Garrity were the self-executing "immunity statute" that this third 
approach indicates, the Supreme Court would not have felt the need to 
issue its decisions in Gardner or Sanitation Men in 1968, Turley in 1973, 
182. 680 F.2d 1070, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (5th Cir. 1982). 
183. /d. at 1071. 
184. /d. at 1074. 
185. /d. at 1075. The court went on to state that "[w]e, however, decline to answer the 
highly speculative question whether an affirmative grant of immunity might, at some 
point, be necessary under controlling Supreme Court authority." /d. (emphasis in 
original). Other courts have held that immunity is an automatic self-executing con-
stitutional protection. Womer v. Hampton, 496 F.2d 99, 108 (5th Cir. 1977) (state-
ments and fruit cannot be used anyway under Garrity; therefore, there is no need 
for warnings); accord DeWalt v. Barger, 490 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1980); 
Hank v. Codd, 424 F. Supp. 1086, 1087 ("immunity ... flows automatically from 
the Supreme Court's decision in Garrity"); Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213, 
1217 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (same as to compelled polygraph examination). In Gerace v. 
County of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), the California 
Court of Appeal found automatic self-executing immunity, stating: 
When the department chose to invoke administrative procedures to 
inquire into their fitness as police officers and most particularly when they 
chose to compel answers by invoking the Manual of Policy and Ethics, the 
appellants became secure from prosecution as surely as if a grant of immu-
nity had been given to them. 
100 Cal. Rptr. at 923. 
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or Cunningham in 1977. If Garrity granted automatic immunity, then 
the plaintiffs in these four cases could not have argued successfully that 
their fifth amendment rights had been abridged or chilled and those 
plaintiffs could have been lawfully discharged, barred from contracting, 
or barred from public office. 
The practical effects of the three different interpretations - granting 
immunity, providing warnings, or doing neither- are quite different. 
For example, if a law enforcement officer is asked a narrow, employment-
related question during an internal investigation and refuses to answer, 
he could be charged with violating departmental rules and regulations 
prohibiting conduct unbecoming an officer, insubordination, or both. 
The legality of the officer's subsequent dismissal depends on whether the 
officer's case is governed by the Gardner holding or the Gardner immu-
nity dicta. If it comes within the Gardner holding, it is unconstitutional 
for the authorities to take, or threaten to take, any adverse personnel 
action to punish an asserted fifth amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination. If, on the other hand, the situation comes within the 
Gardner immunity dicta, the officer could be discharged for cause. The 
question turns on whether the officer's fifth amendment privilege has 
been protected. If the privilege has not been secured, and the officer is 
forced to choose between the exercise of constitutional rights and contin-
ued employment, then the officials have strayed into unconstitutional ter-
ritory. If, on the other hand, the officer's privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination has been constitutionally insured through immunity, 
yet the officer refuses to answer questions narrowly related to job per-
formance, then the officer has exposed himself to proper disciplinary 
action. 
As the prior survey of cases indicates, courts have misconstrued 
Supreme Court authority in several fundamental respects. The lack of 
understanding of the concept of immunity set forth in Gardner, Sanita-
tion Men, and Turley forces upon law enforcement officers the same Hob-
son's choice that a unanimous Supreme Court intended to eliminate two 
decades ago. The rationale of many courts is that Garrity provides an 
automatic immunity so that the officer should have no fear that the state-
ment would ever be used against him criminally. Under this overly 
broad reading of Garrity, the officer does not have a right to assert a fifth 
amendment privilege, and the authorities are within their discretion to 
dismiss the officer from the police force. Thus, instead of applying Gar-
rity, Gardner, and their progeny to vindicate the fifth amendment rights 
of law enforcement officers, courts have applied those cases to sanction 
yet another generation of constitutional infringement. 
IV. THE STATUTORY BILL OF RIGHTS ERA 
Any optimism that law enforcement officers may have experienced 
following Garrity and Gardner must have been short-lived in light of the 
judicial and administrative response to these decisions. Courts did not 
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appear to understand and frequently failed to apply the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. There was, therefore, no incentive for police departments 
to change internal investigatory policies. Because the executive and judi-
cial branches were still treating law enforcement officers as constitution-
ally inferior, Congress, as well as some state legislatures, began to 
address the problem. 
A. The Failed Federal Attempt 
Since 1970, seventy-two bills have been introduced in the United 
States Congress in an attempt to enact a law enforcement officers' bill of 
rights.l 86 Fifty-two of these bills were introduced between 1973 and 
1977. Most of these bills were introduced as amendments to the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 187 The approach of 
these bills was to force states to enact legislation substantially similar to 
186. H.R. 19,734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16,039, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 
H.R. 163, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 266, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 
269, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 527, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 808, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1209, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1834, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1944, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 2149, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 2383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3226, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4477, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4598, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4599, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4600, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4901, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 5436, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6632, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6633, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H;R. 7406, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 8604, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 9035, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 9542, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11,638, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 413, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 843, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 1654, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3919, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 4476, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 4762, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5338, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5862, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6941, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 7215, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 8805, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 10,285, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11,253, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 12,227, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 518, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1030, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1225, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1851, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2801, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5787, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6716, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6717, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6718, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 13,687, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 101, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1226, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2899, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3836, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 2301, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 36, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 354, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 525, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3596, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1981); S. 1168, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 28, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983); H.R. 1894, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3037, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983); H.R. 124, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 175, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985); H.R. 482, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
187. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified.as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-29, 2510-
21; 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1201-03; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-96c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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the proposed federal law enforcement officers' bill of rights by denying 
funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 188 to those 
states that failed to comply. 189 All seventy-two bills were referred to the 
Judiciary Committee, which conducted hearings on only two of the bills. 
None of the bills, however, was reported out of committee. Nonetheless, 
the existence of these bills - even though never enacted - as well as the 
testimony of their proponents, confirmed the presence and the extent of 
the law enforcement officer's fifth amendment dilemma. 
The theme echoed on the floor of Congress for almost two decades 
has been that law enforcement officers are not demanding special privi-
leges but are merely seeking the privileges afforded other citizens. Propo-
nents of federal legislation for law enforcement officers have observed 
that officers experience frustration, a sense of isolation, and low morale 
because they enjoy fewer rights than ordinary citizens. In 1972, New 
York Congressman Edward Koch, now Mayor of New York City, ar-
gued before Congress, in conjunction with his cosponsorhip of a bill of 
rights for law enforcement officers, that the legislation would simply in-
sure that officers receive the rights to which they are already entitled as 
citizens. He stated: 
This bill does not provide any special privileges for police of-
ficers; it simply affirms the rights they are due as citizens of this 
country. It is unfortunate that in a nation like ours such a bill 
is needed; but history has shown all too often that policemen's 
rights are abridged by local department regulations and proce-
dures. In some communities, ... when -~ccused of malfeasance, 
[police officers] are not given the same rights and protections 
accorded ordinary citizens .. Furthermore, an imbalance has 
evolved because, while we have taken steps to insure the rights 
of defendants and complainants, we have failed to protect the 
rights of policemen.t9o 
The following year, Illinois Congressman Frank Annunzio, upon in-
troducing legislation on behalf of law enforcement officers, similarly re-
188. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was created by the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. /d. 42 U.S.C. §§ 370l-96c. The Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration ceased operation, due to a lack of appropri-
ations, on April 15, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 16,694 (1982). 
189. Illinois Congressman Frank Annunzio, speaking on behalf of two of the bills, 
explained: 
[T)he law enforcement officers bill of rights ... is identical to legisla-
tion cosponsored by 125 colleagues in the 92d Congress. It would ... 
guarantee police officers the same civil rights enjoyed by all other citizens; 
set up a grievance panel to hear the grievances of police officers who claim 
their civil rights had been violated; and would deny LEAA funds to any 
community that did not conform to the provisions of this bill. 
119 CONG. REC. H2051 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973). 
190. 118 CONG. REC. H23,900 (daily ed. June 30, 1972). 
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marked that he sought only to afford officers the same legal protection 
that all other citizens enjoy. 
It is regrettable that legislation of this nature is needed at 
all. Law enforcement officers should be entitled to the same 
protection of the laws they are required to enforce. Policemen 
should be as free of intimidation and harassment during the 
process of a hearing as is the average citizen .... 191 
In 1976, a bill was introduced on the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives as an amendment to Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968. 192 Its major protections included (1) proce-
dural safeguards during investigation and interrogation, (2) a prohibition 
against punitive action and adverse inference in return for assertion of 
the fifth amendment, unless provided immunity from prosecution, (3) the 
right to an attorney or another chosen representative present during in-
terrogation, (4) a prohibition against retaliation for the exercise of any of 
the protections provided, (5) a grievance process to investigate law en-
forcement officers' complaints of denial of any of the protections pro-
vided, and (6) the right to bring a Civil suit against anyone violating any 
of the protections provided. 193 Illinois Congressman Martin Russo, 
191. 119 CONG. REC. H2051 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973). 
192. 122 CONG. REC. H28,947-49 (daily ed. Sep. 2, 1976). 
193. The proposed law enforcement officers' bill of rights provided in part: 
[N]o grant ... shall be made ... to any State: .. unless there is in effect 
with respect to such State ... a law enforcement officers' bill of rights 
which substantially provides as a minimum the following rights for the 
law enforcement officers of such State .... 
RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION 
Sec. 2. Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation for 
alleged malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance of official duty, with a 
view to possible disciplinary action, demotion, dismissal, or criminal 
charges, the following minimum standards shall apply: 
(I) No adverse inference shall be drawn and no punitive action taken 
from a refusal of the law enforcement officer being investigated to partici-
pate in such investigation or be interrogated other than when such law 
enforcement officer is on duty, or when exigent circumstances otherwise 
require. 
(2) Any interrogation of a law enforcement officer shall take place at 
the offices of those conducting the investigation, the place where such law 
enforcement officer reports for duty, or such other reasonable place as the 
investigator may determine. 
(3) The law enforcement officer being investigated shall be informed, 
at the commencement of any interrogation, of the nature of the investiga-
tion, the names of any complainants, and the identity and authority of the 
person conducting such investigation, and at the commencement of any 
interrogation of such officer in connection with any such investigation 
shall be informed of all persons present during such interrogation. All 
questions asked in any such interrogation shall be asked by or through a 
single interrogator. 
(4) No formal proceeding which has authority to penalize a law en-
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speaking on behalf of the legislation, stated: 
At this late stage of our Nation's history, it seems an 
anomaly to me that our country's courageous law enforcement 
officials should be denied the same constitutional protections 
guaranteed to all other Americans. Many Americans take 
these liberties and rights for granted, but for those citizens who 
have ever experienced life without them the saga reads very dif-
ferently. Congress has extended these safeguards to other 
groups not previously protected and should continue this pro-
cess today. This amendment seeks to add legislative substance 
to the constitutional provisions that protect citizens who are 
under criminal investigations. 194 
On September 2, 1976, after six years of unfavorable committee con-
sideration, a federal law enforcement officers' bill of rights, voted upon as 
a floor amendment to another bill, was defeated 213 to 148, and no simi-
lar legislation has reached the floor of the House of Representatives or 
the United States Senate since. The activity at the national level, how-
ever, has provided an impetus for similar activity in at least a few state 
legislatures. 
B. The Maryland Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights 
In 1974, Maryland became the first state to enact a law enforcement 
officers' bill of rights (LEOBOR). 195 The primary purpose of the LE-
forcement officer may be brought except upon charges signed by the per-
sons making those charges. 
(5) Any interrogation of a Jaw enforcement officer in connection with 
an investigation shall be for a reasonable period of time, and shall allow 
for reasonable periods for the rest and personal necessities of such Jaw 
enforcement officer. 
(6) No threat, harassment, promise, or reward shall be made to any 
law enforcement officer in connection with an investigation in order to 
induce the answering of any question, but immunity from prosecution may 
be offered to induce such answering. 
(7) All interrogatories of any law enforcement officer in connection 
with the investigation shall be recorded in full. 
(8) The Jaw enforcement officer shall be entitled to the presence of his 
counsel or any other one person of his choice at any interrogation in con-
nection with the investigation. 
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
Sec. 6. Whenever a personnel action which will result in any loss of 
pay or benefits, or is otherwise punitive is taken against a Jaw enforcement 
officer, such Jaw enforcement officer shall be notified of such action and 
the reasons therefor a reasonable time before such action takes effect. 
RETALIATION FOR EXERCISING RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. There shall be no penalty nor threat of any penalty for the 
exercise by a law enforcement officer of his rights under this Bill of Rights. 
122 CONG. REC. H28,947-48 (daily ed. Sep. 2, 1976). 
194. /d. at H28,950. 
195. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 722, 1974 Mo. LAWS 2471-77 (codified as amended at 
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OBOR is to provide substantive and procedural protections during disci-
plinary investigations, interrogations, and hearings. As noted by the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, "[i]n enacting the LEOBOR, the 
Legislature vested in law-enforcement officers certain 'rights' not avail-
able to the general public." 196 The protections provided by the LE-
OBOR that are relevant to this article are contained in sections 728, 733, 
and 734 of article 27 of the Maryland Annotated Code. 197 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-7340 (1987)). The LEOBOR has been amended 
21 times. Additionally, there are six bills before the 1988 session of the Maryland 
General Assembly. H. 411, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; H. 428, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; H. 
453, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; S. 40, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; S. 82, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; S. 
227, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess. 
196. Nichols v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 53 Md. App. 623, 627, 455 A.2d 446, 449, cen. 
denied, 296 Md. 111 (1983). But see Elliott v. Kupferman, 58 Md. App. 510, 523, 
473 A.2d 960, 967 (1984) ("to some extent, by supplanting local merit system laws 
to which some police officers formerly were subject, LEOB[O]R may in fact have 
lessened their procedural rights"). A bill introduced in the 1988 Maryland General 
Assembly would permit a law enforcement officer to "elect, in the alternative [to the 
LEOBOR], the procedural or substantive rights or guarantees provided under a col-
lective bargaining agreement." The bill would further provide that LEOBOR 
"rights ... may not be diminished or abrogated by any law, ordinance, or regulation 
... or by any provision of any collective bargaining agreement." S. 227, 1988 Md. 
Leg. Sess.; see also Abbott v. Admin. Hearing Bd., 33 Md. App. 681, 688, 366 A.2d 
756, 760 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 727 (1977) (LEOBOR preempted county's 
merit system ordinance, which did not violate the equal protection clause by treat-
ing police officers differently, because "[t]he nature of the duties of police officers is 
sufficiently different from those of other public employees to justify the establish-
ment of different procedures to be employed in disciplinary actions involving police 
officers"). 
197. The sections of the LEOBOR not covered in this article are as follows: The defini-
tions in section 727 establish which individuals and situations are within the scope 
of the LEOBOR. Specifically, subsection 727(b) defines "law enforcement officer" 
as any person who (1) is authorized to make arrests, and (2) is a member of one of 
nine classes of law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Sheriff of Baltimore City v. Ab-
shire, 44 Md. App. 256, 263-64,408 A.2d 398, 402 (1979), cen. denied, 287 Md. 756 
(1980) (subsection 727(b )(5) includes the office of sheriff of any county, but the legis-
lature excluded Baltimore City because its deputies were included in the State Merit 
System Law). Subsection 727(c) excludes any officer serving in a probationary sta-
tus upon initial entry into a law enforcement agency, except when brutality is al-
leged. To attain the permanent status necessary to come within the protection of 
the LEOBOR, the officer must complete successfully the police training course es-
tablished by the Police Training Commission. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-201 
(1986 & Supp. 1987); see Moore v. Fairmount Heights, 285 Md. 578, 585-86, 403 
A.2d 1252, 1256 (1979). The LEOBOR has presented some practical problems by 
including within its protections officers who arguably should not have been included 
because they serve elected officials who have the constitutionally sanctioned power 
to appoint and to terminate subordinates. In Allgood v. State, 43 Md. App. 187, 
403 A.2d 83 7 ( 1979), a deputy sheriff, serving at the pleasure of the elected sheriff, 
argued that the LEOBOR "should be construed as a tenure provision and at the 
very least sufficiently so as to require a law enforcement officer's employer to justify 
a dismissal .... " /d. at 190,403 A.2d at 839. The court of special appeals recog-
nized that, even though the officer had no tenure and served at the pleasure of the 
sheriff, section 733 might preclude dismissal in response to the exercise or demand 
of a constitutional right. However, the court affirmed the ruling that the plaintiff 
failed to state a claim because the section 733 argument was raised for the first time 
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Section 728 198 establishes procedural safeguards during interroga-
on appeal. /d. at 191, 403 A.2d at 839-40. The following year, in addressing the 
case of a non-tenured police chief who served at the pleasure of the county execu-
tive, the court of appeals held that although the LEOBOR excluded certain proba-
tionary officers from its scope, it did not exclude non-tenured officers or police 
chiefs. DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437, 446, 418 A.2d 1191, 1196-97 
( 1980). In an attempt to reconcile the police chief's LEOBOR rights with the newly 
elected county executive's right to appoint whomever he pleased, the court held that 
the police chief could be replaced for any reason other than the lawful exercise of his 
constitutional rights, in this case first amendment freedom of speech. /d. at 44 7-54, 
418 A.2d at 1197-1201. Subsequent to DiGrazia, the legislature excluded from LE-
OBOR coverage (1) officers serving at the pleasure of a charter county, Act of May 
12, 1981, ch. 328, 1981 Mo. LAws 1675, 1676, and (2) police chiefs of any incorpo-
rated city or town. Act of May 4, 1982, ch. 204, 1982 LAws 1716; see also Windsor 
v. Bozman, 68 Md. App. 223, 511 A.2d 69, cert. denied, 308 Md. 237, 517 A.2d 
1120 (1986). 
Subsection 728(a) provides a right to engage in political activity when off duty. 
Section 729 provides a protection against disclosure of assets except during a con-
flict of interest investigation or when required by state or federal law. Section 729A 
provides for the regulation of secondary employment. Section 730 provides for a 
hearing prior to any adverse personnel actions recommended as a result of investiga-
tion or interrogation, except for summary punishment, emergency suspension, or if 
the officer is convicted of a felony. Section 731 provides for the procedure for hear-
ing board decisions on the merits, as well as recommendations for punishment. Sec-
tion 732 provides for appeals of hearing board decisions to the appropriate circuit 
court. Section 734A provides for summary punishment for minor departmental vio-
lations with the consent of the officer. Section 734B provides for preemption by the 
LEOBOR of other state and local laws. Section 734C controls false statements. 
Section 7340 permits an officer's waiver of LEOBOR rights. 
198. The procedural protections of subsection 728(b). not discussed textually are as fol-
lows: Subsection 728(b)(l2) prohibits placing adverse material in a personnel file 
without providing an opportunity, unless waived, to review and respond in writing. 
It also provides a procedure for expungement. Subsection 728(b)(l2) was included 
in the original act, but as an amendment and not as part of the pre-filed bill. See H. 
354, 1974 Md. Leg. Sess. Subsection 728(b)(5)(i) requires notification of the nature 
of the investigation prior to interrogation. Subsection 728(b)(3) requires notification 
of the name of the officer in charge of the investigation, as well as those present 
during any interrogation, and limits questioning to one interrogator per interroga-
tion session. In Widomski v. Chief of Police, 41 Md. App. 361, 397 A.2d 222, cert. 
denied, 284 Md. 750 (1979), the court held that this subsection does not prohibit 
successive interrogations, particularly when the questioning is conducted by a differ-
ent interrogating officer in a different locale, provided successive interrogations do 
not violate the requirement of subsection 728(b)(6) that any interrogation only con-
tinue for a reasonable period of time. /d. at 370-73, 397 A.2d at 228-29. Subsection 
728(b)(9) requires Miranda warnings prior to interrogation of any officer under 
arrest or likely to be placed under arrest. Subsections 728(b)(l) and (b)(6) require 
that any interrogation take place at a reasonable time, preferably during duty hours, 
unless there is an exigency, and continue only for a reasonable period of time. Sub-
section 728(b)(2) requires that any interrogation take place at a reasonable location, 
preferably the office of the investigating officer or the police unit where the incident 
allegedly occurred. Subsection 728(b)(l4) provides that polygraph examinations 
may be administered without a representative present during the actual administra-
tion if(l) the questions have been reviewed by the law enforcement officer or repre-
sentative, (2) the polygraph examination administration is observed by the 
representative, and (3) the operator's report is made available within 10 days. Sub-
section 728(b)(5)(ii) requires notification of all charges and witnesses at least 10 days 
prior to any hearing. Subsections 728(b)(5)(iii)-(iv) require a copy of exculpatory 
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information at least 10 days prior to any hearing. Cf Chief, Montgomery County 
Dep't of Police v. Jacocks, 50 Md. App. 132, 436 A.2d 930 (1981) (extending the 
Jencks rule to LEOBOR proceedings). Subsection 728(b)(8) requires a copy of the 
complete interrogation session, if requested, at least 10 days prior to any hearing. 
This means that "the record may be wholly written, or wholly taped, or wholly 
transcribed, or a combination of any two or more of the three methods, so long as 
there is a complete and preserved record for the review by counsel and by a court, if 
there be an appeal." Widomski, 41 Md. App. at 372-73, 397 A.2d at 229. Subsec-
tion 728(b)(4) limits investigations for brutality to duly sworn complaints filed 
within ninety days of the alleged brutality. In Maryland State Police v. Resh, 65 
Md. App. 167, 499 A.2d 1303 (1985), the court interpreted this subsection as plac-
ing a 90-day statute of limitations on brutality complaints received from outside the 
law enforcement agency but placed no such limitation on brutality charges filed by 
superior officers based on the information contained in the detailed report required 
to be filed by any officer involved in an incident of injury as a result of force used to 
make an arrest. /d. at 177, 499 A.2d at 1309; see also Walker v. Lindsey, 65 Md. 
App. 402, 500 A.2d 1061 (1985) (permitting a complaint to be duly sworn by a 
minor). Subsection 728(b)(10) provides for the right to have counsel present and 
available for consultation at all times during interrogation. The "and available for 
consultution" language was added in 1983. Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 660, 1983 Mo. 
LAWS 2097. This amendment was in response to Nichols v. Baltimore Police De-
partment, 53 Md. App. 623, 455 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 296 Md. Ill (1983), which 
considered counsel's role to be merely that of interposing objections to questions as 
in the taking of a deposition in a civil care. /d. at 629, 455 A.2d at 450. Subsection 
728(b)(ll) preserves the law enforcement officer's right to file suit for any cause of 
action arising out of official duties by assuring that neither statute nor regulation 
will limit that right. This subsection was included in the original act, but as an 
amendment and not as part of the pre-filed bill. See H. 354, 1974 Md. Leg. Sess. 
Although the right to file civil suit cannot be limited by the legislature or the law 
enforcement agency, it can and has been limited by the courts. If a citizen files a 
false brutality complaint, for example, against an officer, resulting in a disciplinary 
hearing at which the officer is exhonerated, and the officer then sues the citizen, the 
cause of action would lie in malicious use of civil process, or defamation, or both. 
For malicious use of civil process, the officer must prove that as a result of the 
complaint, (1) the law enforcement agency initiated formal disciplinary proceedings, 
(2) there was no probable cause for the proceeding, (3) the officer suffered a special 
grievance greater than the inconvenience and cost of the proceedings, and (4) the 
officer had to initiate formal proceedings to reattain his or her status. E.g., Imig v. 
Ferrar, 70 Cal. App. 3d 48, 57-60, 138 Cal. Rptr. 540, 544-46 (1972). See generally 
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (5th ed. 1984). As for 
defemation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 
164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985), that because of the procedural safeguards of the LE-
OBOR, any citizen filing a brutality complaint has absolute immunity against a 
cause of action in defamation. The court stated: 
We are not unmindful of the deeply disturbing and demoralizing ef-
fect a false accusation of brutality may have on a law-enforcement of-
ficer .... It is regrettable that our holding here will, in some instances, 
"alford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer." We 
are satisfied, however, that the inhibition of citizens' criticism of those en-
trusted with their protection is a far worse evil. 
/d. at 177, 498 A.2d at 275 (citations omitted). In Brady v. Mayor of Laurel, 40 
Md. App. 373, 392 A.2d 89 (1978), a law enforcement officer was sued for breaking 
a citizen's nose while in the course of his duties as an officer. The officer was denied 
legal representation by the local government. After successfully defending t.he law 
suit, he sued for reimbursement of his legal fees. The dismissal of his cause of action 
was affirmed because there was no basis for recovery in tort or contract and because 
subsection 728(b)(ll) was not violated. The court noted that" 'a policeman's lot is 
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tion and investigation of a law enforcement officer. 199 These protections 
include rights guaranteed during200 and subsequent to investigation;201 
rights prior to, 202 during, 203 and as a consequence of interrogation;204 
rights prior to a hearing;205 a statute of limitation on brutality com-
plaints;206 and the right to file suit. 207 
The legislative counterparts to the applicable Supreme Court hold-
ings and dicta are located in subsection 728(b )(7), subsection 728( c), sec-
tion 733, and section 734. Subsection 728(b)(7)(i), the provision 
implementing the Gardner holding, prohibits threats of disciplinary ac-
tion against officers under investigation.208 However, subsection 728(c) 
permits transfers and reassignments that are not punitive in nature when 
they are determined to be in the best interest of the internal management 
of the law enforcement agency.209 
Subsection 728(b )(7)(ii), the provision implementing both the Gar-
rity holding and the immunity requirement of Gardner and its progeny, 
permits a law enforcement agency to require that the officer submit to (1) 
tests for alcohol and controlled dangerous substances, (2) polygraph ex-
aminations, and (3) interrogations specifically relating to the subject of 
the investigation. Noncompliance may result in disciplinary action, but 
compliance makes all results inadmissible and nondiscoverable in a crim-
inal proceeding.210 Moreover, polygraph results are inadmissible, with-
not a happy one,' but ... courts must deal with the law, not morals .... " /d. at 
374, 392 A.2d at 90-91 (footnotes omitted). 
199. An interrogating or investigating officer can be any sworn law enforcement officer 
or, if requested by the Governor, the Attorney General of Maryland or his or her 
designee. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 727(h) (1987). Prior to 1985, an investigating 
or interrogating officer was not defined by the statute. This definition was added as 
an emergency measure, passed by a three-fifths vote in each house, and taking effect 
upon the Governor's signature. Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 249, 1985 Mo. LAWS 
2019, 2021. 
200. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 728(b)(3), (4), (5)(iii). 
201. /d. § 728(b)(5)(ii), (12). 
202. /d. § 728(b)(3), (5)(i), (9), (10), (14). 
203. /d. § 728(b)(1), (2), (3), (6), (7)(i), (8), (10), (14). 
204. /d. § 728(b)(7)(ii). 
205. /d. § 728(b)(5)(iv), (b)(8). 
206. /d. § 728(b)(4). 
207. /d. § 728(b)(11). 
208. "The law enforcement officer under interrogation may not be threatened with trans-
fer, dismissal, or disciplinary action." /d. § 728(b)(7)(i). 
209. Subsection 728(c) provides: 
Effect of subtitle on chief's authority. - This subtitle does not limit the 
authority of the chief to regulate the competent and efficient operation and 
management of a law enforcement agency by any reasonable means in-
cluding but not limited to, transfer and reassignment where that action is 
not punitive in nature and where the chief determines that action to be in 
the best interests of the internal management of the law enforcement 
agency. 
/d. § 728(c). 
210. Subsection 728(b )(7)(ii) provides: 
This subtitle does not prevent any law enforcement agency from requiring 
a law enforcement officer under investigation to submit to blood alcohol 
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out mutual agreement, even in an administrative proceeding.211 
Section 733, also a provision implementing the Gardner holding, 
prohibits retaliation in the form of any actual or threatened adverse per-
sonnel action in return for exercising or demanding any rights provided 
by the LEOBOR, the Maryland Constitution, or the United States Con-
stitution.212 Finally, section 734 provides, upon the denial of any LE-
OBOR right, for the right to file in the circuit court a request for a show 
cause order prior to any hearing here.213 
Two particular aspects of the Maryland LEOBOR are analyzed 
tests, blood, breath, or urine tests for controlled dangerous substances, 
polygraph examinations, or interrogations which specifically relate to the 
subject matter of the investigation. This subtitle does not prevent a law 
enforcement agency from commencing any action which may lead to a 
punitive measure as a result of a law enforcement officer's refusal to sub-
mit to a blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine tests for controlled 
dangerous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, after hav-
ing been ordered to do so by the law enforcement agency. The results of 
any blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine test for controlled danger-
ous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, as may be re-
quired by the law enforcement agency under this subparagraph are not 
admissible or discoverable in any criminal proceedings against the law en-
forcement officer when the law enforcement officer has been ordered to 
submit thereto. The results of a polygraph examination may not be used 
as evidence in any administrative hearing when the law enforcement of-
ficer has been ordered to submit to a polygraph examination by the law 
enforcement agency unless the agency and the law enforcement officer 
agree to the admission of the results at the administrative hearing. 
/d. § 728(b)(7)(ii). This subsection was added by Act of May 17, 1977, ch. 366, 
1977 Mo. LAWS 2128, 2132. Four years later, results were made nondiscoverable, 
as well as inadmissible, in any criminal proceeding. Act of May 12, 1981, ch. 456, 
1981 Mo. LAWS 1895, 1896. This provision goes further than Garrity by prohibit-
ing the use of blood alcohol tests and blood, breath. or urine tests for controlled 
dangerous substances, even though these are not testimonial in nature and therefore 
not protected by the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 
553 (1983). 
211. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(7)(ii). 
212. Section 733 provides: 
A law enforcement officer may not be discharged, disciplined, de-
moted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or otherwise dis-
criminated against in regard to his employment or be threatened with any 
such treatment, by reason of his exercise of or demand for the rights 
granted in this subtitle, or by reason of the lawful exercise of his constitu-
tional rights. 
/d. § 733. Section 733 was included in the original act of 1974. However, as intro-
duced, section 733 only applied to retaliation for the exercise or demand of LE-
OBOR rights. Constitutional rights were added as an amendment. These 
provisions go further than Gardner by prohibiting the creation of a chilling effect 
not only on constitutional rights but also on statutory LEOBOR rights that do not 
have constitutional stature. 
213. Section 734 provides: 
Any law enforcement officer who is denied any right afforded by this 
subtitle may apply at any time prior to the commencement of the hearing 
before the hearing board, either individually or through his certified or 
recognized employee organization, to the circuit court of the county where 
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here. First, the threshold issue of investigation or interrogation is ex-
amined, demonstrating how narrowly the statute has been interpreted 
and therefore how easily a court can decide that the protections of the 
LEOBOR are inapplicable. Second, the LEOBOR's fifth amendment 
Garrity and Gardner provisions are analyzed, using a particular case as 
an example of the inadequacy of the statute. 
1. The Threshold to Procedural Safeguards: Investigation or 
Interrogation 
The fifth amendment protections of Garrity and Gardner are con-
tained in subsection 728{b), which is only applicable "[w]henever a law 
enforcement officer is under investigation or subjected to interroga-
tion12141 by a law enforcement agency,l2tsl for any reason which could 
lead to disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal .... "216 Two opinions 
of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland demonstrate a result-ori-
ented analysis in holding the LEOBOR inapplicable by finding that the 
law enforcement officers were neither under investigation nor subjected 
to interrogation.217 
he is regularly employed for any order directing the law enforcement 
agency to show cause why the right should not be afforded. 
/d. § 734. This section may create confusion because, on first reading, it appears 
that statutory rights may be vindicated but not constitutional rights. Not only 
would that be an absurdity, it is not what the legislature intended. "This subtitle" 
includes constitutional rights because section 733 of the subtitle protects "the lawful 
exercise of [the law enforcement officer's] constitutional rights." Sections 733 and 
734 are in pari materia and should be read together. Nonetheless, clarity would 
prevail if section 734 were amended to "denied any constitutional right or any right 
afforded by this subtitle .... " 
214. If the rights at issue are not merely statutory, but are constitutional, section 733, 
prohibiting actual or threatened adverse personnel action as a result of exercising or 
demanding constitutional or LEOBOR rights, does not require meeting the thresh-
old test of "under investigation" or "subject to interrogation." DiGrazia v. County 
Executive, 288 Md. 437, 452, 418 A.2d 1191, 1200 (1980); Montgomery County 
Dep't of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md. App. 557, 565, 444 A.2d 469, 473, cert. denied, 
294 Md. 142 (1982). 
215. The law enforcement agency may be the officer's agency or another agency. Mayor 
& Comm'rs v. Duckworth, 49 Md. App. 236, 243, 431 A.2d 709, 713 (1981). 
216. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b). Compare subsection (b) with subsection (c). See 
supra note 198. 
217. In addition to the two criticized opinions, there are two opinions that are support-
able. In Montgomery County Dep't of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md. App. 557, 444 
A.2d 469 (1982), a management report indicated that traffic squads accounted for 
9.7% of deployable manpower but accounted for only 3.03% of the work load. 
Consequently, traffic squads were disbanded and their personnel reassigned on a 
productivity basis, enabling the department to cut back to a five-day week, which 
eliminated a five percent pay differential for the reassigned officers. The court of 
special appeals held that these transfers were not punitive within the meaning of the 
LEOBOR. 
In Chief, Baltimore County Police Dep't v. Marchsteiner, 55 Md. App. 108, 
461 A.2d 28 (1983), an officer was reassigned to the Police Athletic League in the 
hope that a reassignment would reSult in a change of attitude and performance. A 
report following complaints of foul and abusive language toward juveniles stated: 
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In Widomski v. Chief of Police,218 the internal affairs division (lAD) 
of the Baltimore County Police twice interviewed an officer in connection 
with illegal police conduct. The suspected officer subsequently submitted 
to a polygraph examination conducted by a lieutenant to determine if the 
officer knew anything that had not yet been disclosed. When the lieuten-
ant's suspicion as to the officer's truthfulness became aroused, the lieu-
tenant asked a series of follow-up questions. The polygraph results 
indicated that the officer had not been truthful in his response to four 
questions. The court found the LEOBOR inapplicable to the polygraph 
test results, ruling that the inquiry had not moved from the inquisitorial 
stage to the investigatory and accusatorial stage until the lieutenant de-
cided that the suspected officer had not been completely truthful in his 
answers. 
In Leibe v. Police Department,219 the inspectional services division 
(lSD) made inquiries arising from departmental suspicion that an officer 
had abused his sick leave allowance. The officer had been reprimanded 
twice for excessive use of sick leave by his shift commander and the of-
ficer's sick leave performance had been evaluated as "unsatisfactory." 
Although the shift commander did not believe that the officer could be 
convicted of a departmental violation, he informed the police chief that 
the officer should be reviewed for demotion. A month later, the police 
chief rescinded the officer's most recent promotion, primarily because of 
his excessive use of sick leave. 
The trial court found that the protections of the LEOBOR were in-
applicable, holding that the demotion was supervisory and administrative 
rather than investigatory and punitive in nature. According to the trial 
court, "[t]he demotion was not punishment for any wrongdoing nor the 
result of a disciplinary type complaint and investigation. The demotion 
was an exercise of the Chief's power and responsibility to effectively and 
efficiently operate the law enforcement agency."220 The court of special 
appeals agreed. The court stated that Webster's Dictionary defines inves-
"The philosophy of the Youth Division, as a Crime Prevention modality, is to build 
a positive image of the police officer in the eyes of young people. . . . Det. March-
steiner's actions are the antithesis of this stated philosophy and are counterproduc-
tive of the goals .... " /d. at 111, 461 A.2d at 30. He was involuntarily reassigned 
to the Patrol Bureau. The court found that this transfer was not punitive and was 
within the best interests of the law enforcement agency. Recognizing that the facts 
presented a closer question in Marchsteiner than in Lumpkin, the court stated: 
It is probably not feasible to fashion a simple litmus test for determin-
ing whether any given personnel action of a law-enforcement agency falls 
within the punitive category. The law in this area must be developed on a 
case-by-case basis, ... [b]ut on the facts of this case, it appears to us that 
the ultimate decision was not punitive in nature. It was an effort to place 
Marchsteiner where his abilities could be used for the benefit of the law 
enforcement agency, rather than to its detriment. 
Marchsteiner, 55 Md. App. at 117, 461 A.2d at 33. 
218. 41 Md. App. 361, 397 A.2d 222, cert. denied, 284 Md. 750 (1979). 
219. 57 Md. App. 317, 469 A.2d 1287 (1984). 
220. /d. at 320, 469 A.2d at 1288. 
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tigation as " 'a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or 
study closely,' " 221 and the court concluded that it would take more than 
these facts to constitute an investigation and thus trigger the protections 
of the LEOBOR. The court stated: 
While we will not here attempt to delineate precisely what ac-
tions will involve detailed examinations or searching inquiries, 
it is clear that the tracking of Leibe's use of sick leave was not 
an investigation. 
The cases demonstrate that something more than counsel-
ing sessions, but perhaps less than formal complaints leading to 
inquiry, is necessary to trigger the LEOB[O]R. Nevertheless, 
examination of sick leave records and even comparing them 
with another employee's is not an investigation as that word is 
normally and ordinarily used.222 
Subsection 728(b) is triggered when an officer is either "under inves-
tigation" or "subjected to interrogation" for something that "could lead 
to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal."223 The definition of "in-
vestigation" quoted by the court of special appeals is underinclusive be-
cause Webster's Dictionary also defines investigation as a "survey" or an 
"official probe" or an "inquiry."224 According to Black's Law Diction-
ary, investigate means "[t]o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or 
observation[; t]o trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire 
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examina-
tion; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry."22S 
In Widomski, the inquiry was conducted by the lAD, the internal, 
investigatory arm of the police department. lAD members questioned 
the suspected officer twice. Five months after the first inquiry, a captain 
ordered the officer under suspicion to take a polygraph examination. 226 
Even assuming that these facts do not compel a finding that the officer 
was "under investigation" within the meaning of the LEOBOR, he was 
"subjected to interrogation" within the meaning of the LEOBOR. Inter-
rogation, in the context of the fifth amendment, was defined by the 
221. /d. at 323, 469 A.2d at 1290. 
222. /d. (citation omitted). 
223. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b). 
224. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1189 (1976). 
225. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979); see, e.g., People v. Orr, 26 Cal. 
App. 3d 849, 860, 103 Cal. Rptr. 266, 272 (1972) ("investigation is the process by 
which the police acquire probable cause"); Meunier v. Bemich, 170 So. 567, 572 
(La. App. 1936) ("we understand investigation to be synonymous with detection"); 
Mason v. Peaslee, 173 Cal. App. 2d 587, 592 n.2, 343 P.2d 805, 808 n.2 (1959) 
(" 'investigation' means the process of inquiring into or tracing down through in-
quiry"); People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 113 Cal. App. 2d 578, 582, 248 P.2d 
786, 789 (1952) ("investigation [is] a patient inquiry into, and examination of all 
reasonably available facts"). 
226. Widomski, 41 Md. App. at 363, 397 A.2d at 224. 
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Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 227 to include not only express 
questioning, but also any words or actions that the police "should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect."228 Even if two lAD officers asking questions and a lieutenant con-
necting a polygraph device to the officer's body, followed by questions, is 
not "express questioning," it certainly comes within the functional 
equivalent as defined in Innis. Subsection 728(b) further requires the 
kind of investigation or interrogation that "could lead to disciplinary ac-
tion, demotion, or dismissal."229 In Widomski, the lAD was investigat-
ing criminal conduct. All illegal conduct constitutes the departmental 
violation of conduct unbecoming an officer.230 The court thus erred in 
holding that the investigation and interrogation of Widomski did not 
trigger the protections of the LEOBOR. 
In Leibe, the court similarly erred. The suspected officer was inves-
tigated for sick leave abuse for six months by the lSD. He was repri-
manded twice, received an "unsatisfactory" performance evaluation, and 
even had a promotion rescinded.231 The shift commander's belief that 
the officer could not be convicted of a departmental violation is both in-
correct and irrelevant. The trial court's determination that "[t]he demo-
tion was not punishment for any wrongdoing [but merely the] exercise of 
the Chief's power and responsibility to effectively and efficiently operate 
the law enforcement agency"232 is absurd. Fraudulently depriving an 
employer of work time is chargeable both departmentally233 and 
criminally. 234 
2. The Garrity and Gardner Fifth Amendment Provisions 
Holloway v. State,235 a pre-LEOBOR case, is the only case in which 
the Maryland courts have addressed the Garrity and Gardner issue. In 
Holloway, a police officer was convicted of possession of heroin allegedly 
stolen from the police property room. The officer gave two oral state-
ments and one written statement on three consecutive days, all of which 
were admitted at trial. In his first statement, he denied having ever been 
in possession of the heroin. In the second and third statements, he ad-
227. 446 u.s. 291 (1980). 
228. /d. at 301 (footnotes omitted). 
229. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b). 
230. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. 
231. The fact that this probably was discovered pursuant to an audit of personnel records 
does not make it any less of an investigation. See Mondovi Coop. Equity Ass'n v. 
State, 258 Wis. 505, 46 N.W.2d 825 (1951). 
232. Leibe, 57 Md. App. at 320, 469 A.2d at 1288. 
233. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. 
234. In addition to the common law misdemeanor of misconduct in office, see supra notes 
12-14 and accompanying text, this conduct constitutes theft by deception. Mo. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(b) (1987). If the income for the time fraudulently not 
worked was $300 or more, the offense is a felony subject to 1 S years imprisonment. 
/d. § 342(f)(1); see also id. § 340(/)(S). 
235. 26 Md. App. 382, 339 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975). 
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mitted signing for the heroin but claimed that he merely took the bags to 
his automobile, counted them, and returned them. Although none of the 
statements standing alone was inculpatory, the three combined created a 
significant issue concerning the officer's credibility. A departmental pol-
icy then in effect provided that the refusal to make a statement to a supe-
rior officer, when an officer is ordered to do so, could result in 
disciplinary action, including termination. The court reversed the con-
viction, finding that the departmental policy made the statements invol-
untary as a matter of law under Garrity. 
The statutory language used to implement the Garrity and Gardner 
fifth amendment holdings is found in subsection 728(b )(7) and section 
733. Subsection 728(b)(7)(ii), which adopts the Garrity holding, provides 
in part: 
The results of any blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine 
test for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examina-
tion, or interrogation, as may be required by the law enforce-
ment agency under this subparagraph are not admissible or 
discoverable in any criminal proceedings against the law en-
forcement officer when the law enforcement officer has been or-
dered to submit thereto.236 
Subsection 728(b )(7)(i) and section 733 both implement the Gardner 
holding. The former provides that "[t]he law enforcement officer under 
interrogation may not be threatened with transfer, dismissal, or discipli-
nary action. "237 The latter provides that: 
A law enforcement officer may not be discharged, disciplined, 
demoted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or 
otherwise discriminated against in regard to his employment or 
be threatened with any such treatment, by reason of his exercise 
of or demand for the rights granted in this subtitle, or by reason 
of the lawful exercise of his constitutional rights.238 
a. The Immunity Requirement 
The legislature's attempt to implement the dicta of Gardner, Sanita-
tion Men, and Turley is contained in the first two sentences of subsection 
728(b)(7)(ii), which provides that: 
This subtitle does not prevent any law enforcement agency 
from requiring a law enforcement officer under investigation to 
submit to blood alcohol tests, blood, breath, or urine tests for 
controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examinations, or 
interrogations which specifically relate to the subject matter of 
the investigation. This subtitle does not prevent a law enforce-
236. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(7)(ii). 
237. /d. § 728(b)(7)(i). 
238. /d. § 733. 
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ment agency from commencing any action which may lead to a 
punitive measure as a result of a law enforcement officer's re-
fusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine 
tests for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examina-
tion, or interrogation, after having been ordered to do so by the 
law enforcement agency.239 
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The fundamental problem with the LEOBOR is that it fails to incor-
porate the immunity requirement of Gardner, Sanitation Men, and 
Turley. Only when immunity is granted may a law enforcement agency 
require an officer to provide a statement and then take disciplinary action 
for the officer's failure to do so. The shortcoming of the Maryland stat-
ute is twofold. First, the statute does not provide the constitutionally 
mandated "use and derivative use" immunity. Consequently, any state-
ments taken under the statute's more limited protection are unconstitu-
tionally involuntary under Garrity, and any actual or threatened adverse 
personnel action has a chilling effect on fifth amendment rights under 
Gardner. Second, even if the statute does provide a constitutionally ac-
ceptable fifth amendment substitute, it does not provide that the law en-
forcement officer be informed that his statements will be inadmissible in a 
criminal proceeding. As far as the officer knows, he or she is still faced 
with the impermissible Hobson's choice. 
In Maryland, there is no inherent or common law power to grant 
immunity. Such power exists only if the legislature or the state constitu-
tion expressly authorizes a grant of immunity.240 Maryland has only a 
few immunity statutes, each limited to a particular offense that the legis-
lature has determined is difficult to investigate and prosecute without the 
testimony of participants in the criminal activity. 241 Maryland's lack of a 
general immunity statute is not due to legislative oversight. Since 1978, 
the Maryland General Assembly has considered but rejected at least five 
general immunity bills.242 
There are three kinds of immunity: (1) transactional immunity, (2) 
use immunity, and (3) use plus derivative use immunity. "Transactional 
immunity" prohibits the prosecution of all criminal transactions about 
which the individual is compelled to testify. Almost all of Maryland's 
limited number of immunity statutes provide transactional immunity.243 
Mere "use immunity," at the other extreme, merely guarantees that the 
compelled testimony itself will not be used in court as evidence against 
the compelled witness. Use immunity is constitutionally defective to 
239. Id. § 728(b)(7)(ii). 
240. Butler v. State, 55 Md. App. 409, 418, 462 A.2d 1230, 1234 (1983); Bowie v. State, 
14 Md. App. 567, 575, 287 A.2d 782, 786 (1972). 
241. In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 516 A.2d 976,983 (1986); e.g., 
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 23-24 (1987) (bribery); id. § 39 (conspiracy); id. § 262 
(gambling); id. § 371 (lottery). 
242. In re Criminal Investigation, 307 Md. at 685 n.5, 516 A.2d at 982 n.5. 
243. Butler, 55 Md. App. at 420, 462 A.2d at 1235. 
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compel testimony in the face of an assertion of the fifth amendment privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination. "Use plus derivative use im-
munity" is the minimum needed to satisfy the fifth amendment because it 
provides as much as it takes away. 244 Use plus derivative use immunity 
guarantees the compelled witness not only that his words will not be used 
against him directly but also that they will not be used indirectly as leads 
to develop other evidence. 245 Once a prosecutor gives a constitutional 
grant of immunity, pursuant to an express immunity statute, "his only 
guarantees of adequate testimonial performance are the threat of con-
tempt and the threat of perjury."246 
There is nothing in subsection 728(b )(7)(ii) to permit reading it as an 
express grant of immunity by the legislature. If the legislature did pro-
vide the power to grant immunity, it would be Maryland's first general 
immunity statute, that is, the State's first immunity statute to apply to 
more than one specific crime.247 It also would be unconstitutional be-
cause it neither immunizes from prosecution for any transaction for 
which testimony is compelled nor protects against both the use of the 
statements as evidence and the use of the statements as leads to develop 
other evidence. From this standpoint, subsection 728(b )(7)(ii) is merely 
an exclusionary device rendering statements inadmissible as evidence. 
The sect~on is thus constitutionally insufficient to compel testimony from 
an individual desiring to exercise the unfettered fifth amendment right to 
remain silent without penalty.248 
244. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972); In re Criminal Investigation, 
307 Md. at 684, 516 A.2d at 982. 
245. Butler, 55 Md. App. at 421, 462 A.2d at 1235. 
246. /d. at 422, 462 A.2d at 1236. 
247. The LEOBOR was designed to provide more rights- not fewer- to law enforce-
ment officers. If police officers are now the only citizens upon whom immunity may 
be "forced" for all crimes, they would be receiving fewer rights than the general 
citizen because immunity offers no advantage to the one immunized. As the court 
stated in Butler v. State: 
Formal immunity is not necessarily the subject of a bargain and is fre-
quently forced upon a reluctant witness against that witness's will. A wit-
ness is summonsed to testify at a trial or before a grand jury. The witness 
claims the privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination. The 
State, upon explicit statutory authorization, may then officially and upon 
the record confer a grant of the appropriate form of immunity upon the 
recalcitrant witness, whether that witness wishes it or not. 
55 Md. App. at 421, 462 A.2d at 1236. Moreover, if subsection 728(b)(7)(ii) were 
an immunity statute, Maryland would have an immunity statute enforceable not 
simply by the judicially approved methods of threat of contempt and threat of per-
jury but by a new threat, that of disciplinary action and loss of employment. 
248. This is not changed by the fact that subsection 728(b )(7)(ii) makes the results of any 
"interrogation, as may be required by the law enforcement agency ... not admissi-
ble or discoverable in any criminal proceedings .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 728(b)(7)(ii) (emphasis added). The fact that it is the law enforcement agency that 
required the statement renders meaningless for the officer the 1981 amendment of 
"or discoverable." See infra note 298. 
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b. Smith v. Howard County 
The problem with the Garrity and Gardner provisions of the Mary-
land LEOBOR is demonstrated in the case of Smith v. Howard 
County.249 After an officer and his superior were engaged in a dispute, 
the superior scheduled a meeting with the officer. The officer requested 
to have a witness present during the meeting, but this request was denied. 
At the meeting, the officer took out a tape recorder in an unsuccessful 
attempt to record the conversation. The department alleged that the of-
ficer surreptitiously taped the conversation, which is a felony in Mary-
land. 250 Inasmuch as the officer's conduct did not violate any 
departmental regulation, he was subject to investigation solely by virtue 
of the felony criminal statute. 
The officer then was notified that he was under investigation and 
was ordered to answer questions. He informed his superiors that he 
would appear as required but would assert his fifth amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. The department's response was 
that he would be subjected only to departmental disciplinary action, that 
he would not be subjected to criminal charges, that any answers he was 
forced to provide would be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding 
against him pursuant to the LEOBOR, and that his failure to answer 
questions could result in the commencement of an action leading to puni-
tive measures, including dismissal. 251 Nonetheless, the police depart-
249. No. 87-CA5262 (Cir. Ct. Howard County, Md., Mar. 2, 1987). The author served 
as co-counsel on behalf of Officer Smith, along with Clarke F. Ahlers, Esq., an ad-
junct professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a former Howard 
County police officer. 
250. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 10-402 (Supp. 1987). Subsection (a) prohib-
its the interception, disclosure, or use of certain wire or oral communication. Sub-
section (b) establishes that the offense is a felony, subject to five years imprisonment 
and a $10,000 fine. 
251. The police department relied on Nichols v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 53 Md. App. 
623, 455 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 296 Md. 111 (1983), in which the court of special 
appeals addressed the limited issue of the meaning of subsection 728(b)(10) of the 
LEOBOR, determining the extent to which a police officer and his or her represen-
tative may consult in order to enter objections to questions asked by an interrogator. 
The court stated that subsection 728(b)(l0) was: 
concerned solely with investigations or interrogations involving possible 
violations of non-criminal departmental policies. Otherwise, the full pano-
ply of Miranda would be applicable, and subsection 728(b)(10) would be 
mere surplusage, since Miranda is founded on the supreme law of the land, 
the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, any attempt by State 
law to restrict Miranda's application would be futile. 
/d. at 628, 455 A.2d at 449. Not only did the Nichols court hold that the lone 
subsection at issue addressed only "non-criminal departmental policies," it found 
that the complaint against the officer was that he "'shirked ... [his] responsibili-
ties,'" id. at 624, 455 A.2d at 447, and thus the "interrogation is, in appellant's case, 
strictly non-criminal." /d. at 629, 455 A.2d at 450. It was in this context that the 
court wrote the language upon which the Department relied in Smith v. Howard 
County: 
The commander may order the officer to answer the question, and if that 
order is refused, the officer in all likelihood faces a charge of disobeying 
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ment was unwilling to secure, and statutorily was incapable of securing, 
immunity for the officer. 
The officer obtained a court order enjoining the police department 
from taking, or threatening to take, punitive personnel action in return 
for the exercise of his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination or of his rights under the LEOBOR. In granting the in-
junction, the court rejected the police department's position that the of-
ficer's asserted rights were inapplicable because the department planned 
to treat the matter as purely noncriminal, departmental, and administra-
tive. According to the court, the department's assertion was not control-
ling because any individual may refuse "to answer official questions put 
to him in any ... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where 
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."252 
As long as there is a potential for criminal charges arising from the con-
duct, the right to remain silent is absolute. Unless there has been a con-
stitutionally sufficient grant of immunity, the person being interrogated 
for potentially criminal conduct has the constitutional right to remain 
silent.253 
Further complications in the Smith case indicate the extent of the 
law enforcement officer's dilemma. First, the LEOBOR could not have 
provided the officer with the constitutional protection of immunity neces-
sary to compel his testimony. Even if there were an applicable immunity 
statute under which immunity could be granted, it could be implemented 
only by the Office of the State's Attorney. Because the officer was 
charged departmentally, his adversary was the Howard County Police 
Department, represented by the Howard County Office of Law, its attor-
neys for civil and administrative matters. 
Second, although the attorneys for Howard County's civil matters 
assured the officer, and proffered to the court, that this matter was and 
would remain purely civil, the attorneys for the people of Howard 
County in criminal matters, the Office of the State's Attorney, could and 
did pursue this matter criminally. The grand jury, however, refused to 
return an indictment against the officer. 
the commander's direct order. Dismissal from the department is a possi-
ble, if not probable, product of the disobedience. In short, the officer, con-
fronted by not answering a question or disobeying a direct order of his or 
her commander, is placed in the position of choosing between facing a 
tiger or facing a lion. Either choice might prove fatal to the officer's career 
in law-enforcement. 
Id. at 628-29, 455 A.2d at 449-50. If the sole purpose of an investigation is an 
accounting of job performance, with no potential criminality because of immunity, 
then an order to answer questions, under threat of loss of employment, is constitu-
tionally permissible. 
252. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (emphasis added); see Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (includes administrative and investigatory 
proceedings); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 683, 516 A.2d 
976, 981 (1986). 
253. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). 
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Third, even if the alleged conduct for which the officer was being 
disciplined did not violate a specific criminal statute, this would not auto-
matically preclude the officer from asserting his privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. The criminal law of Maryland includes the 
common law254 misdemeanor of misconduct in office,255 which includes 
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance by a public officer while in 
the exercise of the duties of office or while acting under color of law. 
Although not all conduct unbecoming an officer or all neglect of duty 
constitutes misconduct in office, the crime of misconduct in office is 
broad, particularly in its nonfeasance mode, in which any failure to act, 
when resulting from corruption rather than discretion, may constitute 
misconduct. As to the affirmative conduct of malfeasance or misfea-
sance/56 "[t]his does not mean a mere error of judgment, but rather a 
wilful abuse of authority, or a grossly indecorous conduct during the per-
formance of his duties .... "257 
Fourth, this case demonstrates that police departments, as para-mil-
itary organizations, have a tendency to abuse the constitutional rights of 
their officers. In Smith, after the officer obtained an injunction to enforce 
his constitutional rights, the department decided to punish him by seek-
ing an indictment, which the grand jury refused to return. One year 
later, the administrative charge was refiled. A settlement was negotiated 
in which the department agreed to drop all charges and the officer agreed 
to accept a letter of "poor judgment." The next day, the officer was in-
structed to sign papers related to the settlement and was incorrectly told 
that his attorney had reviewed them. In fact, the officer was signing a 
confession. The present degree of regulation allows police departments 
to continue to chill the fifth amendment rights of officers through a myr-
iad of punitive measures used in retailiation for the exercise of constitu-
tional guarantees. By failing to regulate departmental treatment of police 
officers, courts and legislatures have unintentionally encouraged this 
tendency. 
C. Statutory Protections in Other States . 
1. California 
In 1976, California enacted the Public Safety Officers Procedural 
Bill of Rights Act. 258 Section 3303 of the Act, which is somewhat analo-
gous to section 728 of the Maryland statute, provides procedural safe-
254. Maryland adopted all of the common law of England as it existed on July 4, 1776, 
subject to change by the Maryland General Assembly. Mo. CONST., DECL. RIGHTS 
art. 5. See supra note 37. 
255. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
256. "[S]ince the reference is not to two different offenses, but merely to two different 
modes of committing the offenses, the courts have had little occasion to indulge in 
hairsplitting discussions of the problem. PERKINS, supra note 10, at 545. 
257. GINSBERG, supra note 14, at 152. 
258. Act of Aug. 16, 1976, ch. 465, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1202 (codified as amended at CAL. 
Gov'T CODE§§ 3300-11 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988)). 
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guards for public safety oflicers259 during interrogation and 
investigation.260 These protections include guaranteed investigation-re-
lated rights,261 as well as rights prior to,262 during,263 and as a conse-
259. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806 
(1983) (a police department clerk-stenographer was subject to departmental regula-
tions and thus could be terminated for insubordination; she was not, however, af-
forded the protections of the statute because the statute applies only to peace 
officers). 
260. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303. The nine subsections of section 3303 are triggered 
whenever there is investigation and interrogation by a member of the officer's 
agency. People v. Velez, 144 Cal. App. 3d 558, 192 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1983) (section 
3303 is not applicable when interrogated by another department). Moreover, sec-
tion 3303 is limited to situations that could lead to punitive action, defined as "any 
action which may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, writ-
ten reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment." CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3303. 
Unlike transfers, which may be punishment or may be advantageous to the officer, 
dismissal and the other four categories of personnel action are per se disciplinary 
and punitive. White v. Sacramento, 31 Cal. 3d 676, 646 P.2d 191, 183 Cal. Rptr. 
520 (1982) (loss of rank and loss of five percent special pay allowance was per se 
punitive); McManigal v. Seal Beach, 166 Cal. App. 3d 975, 212 Cal. Rptr. 733 
( 1985) (same rank and base salary but loss of five percent skill pay was per se puni-
tive); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 649 P.2d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1982) 
(assignment to lower pay grade was per se disciplinary). Compare Turturici v. City 
of Redwood City, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1447, 236 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1987) (a negative 
appraisal, with recommendation for discipline if performance did not improve, was 
an adverse personnel entry, providing the right to a written response under section 
3006, but it was not a punitive action giving rise to an administrative appeal), with 
Hopson v. LOs Angeles, 139 Cal. App. 3d 347, 188 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1983) (a commis-
sion report of departmental violations resulting from a police shooting, entered in a 
personnel file in lieu of disciplinary action because the chief of police had decided 
against discipline, was punitive). 
261. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3305 (no adverse entry in the officer's personnel file unless the 
officer has read and signed (or refused to sign) the adverse instrument); id. § 3306 
(officer has 30 days to file a written response to the adverse entry in the personnel 
file). 
262. /d. § 3303(b) (the right to be informed of the name of the officer in charge of the 
interrogation and all persons to be present during the interrogation); id. § 3303(c) 
(the right to be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to interrogation); 
id. § 3303(f) (the right to examine reports made by the investigating officer as they 
become available, including those already in existence prior to interrogation, except 
those pertaining to an ongoing investigation for which confidentiality has been sup-
ported by articulable reasons; see Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. 
Los Angeles, 236 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. App. 1987)); id. § 3303(g) (the right to be 
informed of constitutional rights prior to interrogation if, at that time, deemed 
chargeable in a criminal proceeding). 
263. /d. § 3303(a) (interrogation conducted at a reasonable time, preferably while on 
duty); id. § 3303(b) (interrogated by no more than two officers at a time); id. 
§ 3303(d) (interrogation session to last only for a reasonable period of time); id. 
§ 3303(f) (officer entitled to record the interrogation); id. § 3303(g) (informed of 
constitutional rights during interrogation if, at that time, the officer is deemed 
chargeable in a criminal proceeding); id. § 3303(h) (right to a chosen representative 
present at all times during the interrogation if punitive action is likely). 
In Lybarger v. Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. 727, 732-33 (Cal. App. 1984), rev'd 
on other grounds, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985), there was 
substantial compliance with the requirement of interrogation by no more than two 
officers. Although five officers were present, only two officers conducted the interro-
gation and a third officer merely asked questions to clarify whether the defendant 
1987] Fifth Amendment. Rights of Police Officers 509 
quence of interrogation.264 The statute on its face is inapplicable in 
certain situations in which its protections may be needed. Section 3303 
does not apply "to any interrogation ... in the normal course of duty, 
counseling, instruction, or informal verbal admonishment." Nor does it 
apply "to an investigation concerned solely and directly with alleged 
criminal activities. " 265 
Although the goal of the legislation is laudable, 266 the California 
statute is less effectice than its Maryland counterpart in implementing 
the dictates of the Supreme Court. Much of the judicial misunderstand-
ing surrounding the Garrity holding, the Gardner holding, and the immu-
nity requirement is manifested in the California statute. The 
constitutional standards set forth in the cases are addressed by overlap-
ping, and sometimes contradictory, statutory language. For example, 
subsection 3304(a) and subsection 3303(e) each begin with the Gardner 
holding: the former prohibits actual or threatened adverse personnel ac-
tion in connection with the exercise of any of the protections afforded by 
the statute,267 and the latter prohibits threatened adverse personnel ac-
tion during interrogation.268 However, despite the fact that no immunity 
is provided, both sections nullify the Gardner holding by authorizing pu-
nitive personnel action in return for asserting the fifth amendment privi-
lege. Subsection 3304(a) permits a charge of insubordination against any 
officer who fails to comply with an order to cooperate with agencies in-
volved in criminal investigations.269 Subsection 3303(e) provides that an 
officer may be punished for the failure to answer questions directly relat-
ing to the investigation or interrogation.270 
As to the polygraph method of submitting to interrogation, the Cali-
fornia statute is more generous than the statutes in the other three states. 
appreciated the severity of the potential consequences. Cf Long Beach Police Of-
ficers Ass'n v. Long Beach, 156 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1010-11, 203 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503-
05 (1984) (officer entitled to have a representative present prior to filing a written 
report required for shooting incidents). 
264. /d. § 3303(f) (access to a tape recording of the interrogation, if made); id. (officer 
entitled to a copy of the stenographer's transcribed notes and any non-confidential 
report made by the investigating officer). 
265. /d. § 3303(h). 
266. "The Legislature . . . declares that the rights and protections provided to peace 
officers under this chapter constitutes a matter of statewide concern." /d. § 3301. 
267. "No public safety officer shall be subjected to punitive action, or denied promotion, 
or be threatened with any such treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the 
rights granted under this chapter, or the exercise of any rights under any existing 
administrative grievance procedure." /d. § 3304(a). 
268. "The public safety officer under interrogation shall not be subjected to offensive 
language or threatened with punitive action .... " /d. § 3303(e). 
269. "Nothing in this section shall preclude a head of an agency from ordering a public 
safety officer to cooperate with other agencies involved in criminal investigations. If 
an officer fails to comply with such an order, the agency may officially charge him 
with insubordination." /d. § 3304(a). 
270. "[A)n officer refusing to respond to questions or submit to interrogations shall be 
informed that failure to answer questions directly related to the investigation or 
interrogation may result in punitive action." /d. § 3303(e). 
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It prohibits nonconsensual polygraph examinations, prohibits discipli-
nary action for refusal to submit to a polygraph examination, and prohib-
its any adverse inference to be drawn from the refusal to submit. 271 
Like the Maryland law, the California statute, in section 3309.5, 
prohibits the denial of any statutory protection and provides for injunc-
tive relief in the superior court in the event of such a denial. 272 Addition-
ally, section 3 309.5 provides for "other extraordinary relief to remedy the 
violation,"273 which can include a writ of mandate to compel back 
pay.274 Moreover, courts have awarded attorney's fees under the private 
attorney general theory, holding that the public policy enforced through 
this statute is sufficient to permit compensating the cost of privately initi-
ated actions. 275 
Only recently have the California courts provided the judicial gloss 
necessary to overcome the California legislature's confusion concerning 
the Supreme Court's fifth amendment case law. In Lybarger v. City of Los 
Angeles,276 the Supreme Court of California implicitly recognized that 
the statute is unnecessarily complex and that its treatment by the appel-
late courts had been artifically strained, sometimes for and sometimes 
against the officer. With a clear understanding of the problem, the court 
indicated that the statute is, or should be, the synthesis of the Supreme 
Court cases, supplemented by statutory protections. The court stated: 
We must construe the act in such a manner as to en-
courage full cooperation with police department investigations 
of criminal offenses, so long as fundamental constitutional 
rights are protected in the process. Such a balancing of inter-
ests is achieved by holding that, although the officer under in-
vestigation is not compelled to respond to potentially 
271. Nonconsensual polygraph examinations are controlled as follows: 
No public safety officer shall be compelled to submit to a polygraph exami-
nation against his will. No disciplinary action or other recrimination shall 
be taken against a public safety officer refusing to submit to a polygraph 
examination, nor shall any comment be entered anywhere in the investiga-
tor's notes or anywhere else that the public safety officer refused to take a 
polygraph examination, nor shall any testimony or evidence be admissible 
at a subsequent hearing, trial, or proceeding, judicial or administrative, to 
the effect that the public safety officer refused to take a polygraph 
examination. 
/d.§ 3307; see Estes v. Grover City, 82 Cal. App. 3d 509, 516, 147 Cal. Rptr. 131, 
135-36 (1978); see also Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 
937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986). 
272. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3309.5. 
273. /d. 
274. Henneberque v. Culver City, 172 Cal. App. 3d 837, 843, 218 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706 
(1985). 
275. See, e.g., Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 649 P.2d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1982); 
Mounger v. Gates, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1248, 239 Cal. Rptr. 18, modified, 194 Cal. 
App. 3d 500 (1987); Henneberque, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 845-47, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 
709-10 (1985); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1021.5 (West 1980). 
276. 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985). 
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incriminating questions, and his refusal to speak cannot be used 
against him in a criminal proceeding, nevertheless such refusal 
may be deemed insubordination leading to punitive action by 
his employer. Seen in this light, the right to remain silent is not 
a "hollow" right. It may be exercised without fear of penal 
sanction. 277 
511 
Taking the middle ground position on the immunity requirement, 
the court held that the officer's dismissal for insubordination for assertion 
of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination was invalid for two 
reasons. First, the officer was not advised, as required by the fifth 
amendment, that any statements he made could not be used against him 
in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Second, he was not advised, as 
required by subsection 3303(g) of the statute, of his constitutional rights 
once "it was deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense 
•••• " 278 The court recognized that the question of when an officer may 
be charged with a criminal offense is a factual issue involving the objec-
tive facts of the investigation and the subjective understanding of the in-
terrogating officer.279 As to which constitutional rights an officer is 
entitled to be informed as a result of subsection 3303(g), the court again 
demonstrated its understanding of the holdings and dicta of Garrity and 
its progeny, balancing contitutional protections and the need for depart-
mental discipline. The court stated: 
Given the context of an administrative inquiry into possible 
criminal misconduct, we think it likely the Legislature intended 
that interrogated officers be advised of their so-called "Miranda 
rights, as modified by the Lefkowitz/Garrity rule . . . . 
[A]ppellant should have been told, among other things, that 
although he had the right to remain silent and not incriminate 
himself, (1) his silence could be deemed insubordination, lead-
ing to administrative discipline, and (2) any statement made 
under the compulsion of the threat of such discipline could not 
be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. 
Although appellant was properly advised of the adverse effect 
of his silence, he was never told of the extent of the protection 
afforded to any statements he might make. That omission was 
critically important here. 280 
277. /d. at 828, 710 P.2d at 332, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 532 (emphasis in original). 
278. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303(g). 
279. Lybarger, 40 Cal. 3d at 829 n.1, 710 P.2d at 333 n.1, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 533 n.l. In 
Lybarger, a criminal investigation was pending, five investigating officers were pres-
ent during the interrogation, and the officer's attorney made an unchallenged state-
ment, in the presence of the investigating officers, that he was being charged with 
five felonies. /d. at 829, 710 P.2d at 333, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 533. The court also 
stated that this subsection is necessarily triggered by an assertion of the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. /d. at 828, 710 P.2d at 332, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 
532. 
280. /d. at 829, 710 P.2d at 333, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 533 (citations omitted); accord Civil 
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Chief Justice Bird, writing in concurrence, agreed with the middle 
ground position requiring the officer be advised of the immunity. "The 
logic underlying Gardner is that an officer under investigation is not re-
quired to speculate as to what his constitutional rights are."281 
2. Florida 
In 1974, Florida enacted the Police Offficers' Bill of Rights,282 
Serv. Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 460, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806, 
814 (1983) ("before being ordered to take a polygraph, an employee must be noti-
fied: (1) that the questions will relate specificaJly and narrowly to the performance 
of his official duties; (2) that the answers cannot be used against him in any subse-
quent criminal prosecution; and (3) that the penalty for refusing is dismissal"). 
281. Lybarger, 40 Cal. 3d at 834, 710 P.2d at 336, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (Bird, C.J., 
concurring). Lybarger resolved the problem created by two opinions, issued a 
month apart, from different districts of the California Court of Appeal. In KeJly v. 
City of Fresno, 205 Cal. Rptr. 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), the court addressed the 
meaning of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303(g), which requires an officer to be informed 
immediately of his constitutional rights once it is deemed that he may be charged in 
a criminal proceeding. The court held that this requires Miranda warnings and also 
held that subsection 3303(g) is in pari materia with subsection 3304(a), which pro-
hibits actual or threatened punitive action because of the exercise of any statutory 
right provided in the act. 205 Cal. Rptr. at 420. As a result, once subsection 
3303(g) is applicable, the officer enjoys the right to remain silent in both a civil and 
criminal context. Employing the self-executing immunity theory, the court noted 
that the fifth amendment precludes the use in a criminal proceeding of any answer 
provided under threat of loss of employment. The court also held that any answer 
provided under threat of adverse personnel action could not be used in a civil ad-
ministrative proceeding. /d. at 424. Thus, although the fifth amendment would 
permit discharge for insubordination for assertion of the right to remain silent, pro-
vided the officer has been granted immunity, the California statute goes further, 
forbidding such a discharge. In light of its holding in Lybarger, the Supreme Court 
of California remanded Kelly for reconsideration. 41 Cal. 3d 919, 719 P.2d 242,226 
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1986). 
Taking an entirely different stance was the intermediate appeJlate court in 
Lybarger, 206 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. App. 1984). Distinguishing Kelly, the court 
found that the officer suffered no harm from the failure to give Miranda warnings 
under subsection 3303(g) because the officer knew he had these rights and in fact 
invoked them. Rejecting Kelly's expansive reading, Lybarger reverted to 1939, 
quoting heavily from Christal v. Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 
(1939), to the effect that a police officer must disclose aJI evidence of criminality 
even if it means incriminating himself. Lybarger, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 736. Moreover, 
the Lybarger court noted that although the statute prohibits punitive action for ex-
ercising statutory rights and provides the right to be advised of constitutional rights, 
it does not prohibit punitive action for exercising constitutional rights, with the ex-
ception of forbidding punishment" for a refusal to submit to a polygraph examina-
tion. /d. at 736-37. In affirming the officer's dismissal for insubordination for 
asserting the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the court stated that 
California has long recognized that a public servant must be willing to forego consti-
tutional privileges inconsistent with the duties of office. /d. at 737. 
282. Act of Oct. 1, 1974, ch. 74-274, 1974 FLA. LAWS 728 (codified as amended at FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 112.531-34 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987)). 
The 1974 statute applied only to those law enforcement officers who were "em-
ployed full time by any municipality or this state or any political subdivision thereof 
.... " /d.§ 112.531(1). Because the office of sheriff is constitutional, deputy sheriffs 
are appointed (not employed) by a sheriff (not a municipality, state, or political 
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which includes procedural safeguards during interrogation and investiga-
tion.283 These protections include rights guaranteed during284 and subse-
quent to investigation;285 rights prior to286 and during interrogation;287 
subdivision) and thus are not within the protections of the statute. Tanner v. Mc-
Call, 441 F. Supp. 503, 508 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Evans v. Hardcastle, 339 So. 2d 1150, 
1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Johnson v. Wilson, 336 So. 2d. 651, 652 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1976). 
Probationary police officers are not employed full time within the meaning of 
the statute. In Smith v. Golden Beach, 403 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), 
the court reasoned that "[i]n light of the past practice of excluding probationary 
policemen from procedural rights accorded permanent employees, we cannot con-
clude that the legislature intended to include probationers within the statute .... " 
/d. at 1347-48. "Employed full time" requires an officer to be available for full 
employment. Consequently, regardless of the number and length of days he 
worked, a patrolman was not employed full time when he also worked a 40-hour 
week as a hospital security guard. Thomason v. McDaniel, 793 F.2d 1247, 1249 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
A law enforcement officer is one, other than a chief of pQlice, ".whose primary 
responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the 
penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.531(1). This 
definition excludes a community service officer who has no general arrest powers, is 
not authorized to carry weapons, does not enforce the law, and does not respond to 
emergency calls. Hollywood v. Litteral, 446 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) (of 12 task areas, two related tangentially to crime prevention or detection, 
three related to enforcement of traffic laws, and seven had no connection with law 
enforcement). 
In 1982, correctional officers were added to the statute. Act of Oct. 1, 1982, ch. 
82-156, 1982 FLA. LAws 490. A correctional officer is one, other than a superinten-
dent, "whose primary responsibility is the supervision, protection, care, custody, or 
control of inmates within a correctional institution ... " but excludes secretarial, 
clerical, and professionally trained personnel. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.531(2). 
283. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.532. Section 112.532 is only applicable when "a law en-
forcement officer or correctional officer is under investigation and subject to interro-
gation by members of his agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary 
action, demotion, or dismissal .... " /d. § 112.532(1). In Waters v. Purdy, 345 So. 
2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court found the statute inapplicable because 
the officer "was not under investigation, but rather was terminated for violation of 
the public safety department's personnel rules which he admitted violating." 
284. /d. § 112.532(1)(c) (the right to be informed of the name of the officer in charge of 
the interrogation); id. § 112.532(1)(d) (the right to be informed of the name of all 
complainants); id. § 112.532(1)(h) (the right to be informed of all rights if arrested 
or likely to be arrested); id. § 112.533(3) (it is a misdemeanor to disclose any docu-
ments or information related to a complaint prior to its public status). 
285. /d. § 112.532(4) (no adverse personnel action unless notified prior to its effective 
date); id § 112.533(2)(b) (investigation presumed inactive if there is no finding made 
within 60 days after the complaint is filed). 
286. /d. § 112.532(1)(c) (the right to be informed of the name of the interrogating officer 
and all persons who will be present during the interrogation); id. § 112.532(1)(d) 
(the right to be informed of the nature of the investigation). 
287. /d. § 112.532(1)(a) (interrogation conducted at a reasonable time, preferably while 
on duty); id. § 112.532(1)(b) (interrogation conducted at the office of the investigat-
ing officer or police unit where the incident allegedly occurred); id. § 112.532(1)(c) 
(questions asked by one interrogator at a time); id. § 112.532(1)(e) (interrogation to 
continue for only a reasonable period of time); id. § 112.532(1)(f) (no offensive lan-
guage, threats of adverse personnel action, or inducements during interrogation); id. 
§ 112.532(1)(g) (interrogation recorded); id. § 112.532(1)(i) (the right to have coun-
sel or other representative present at all times during interrogation). 
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and the right to file suit. 288 The only Supreme Court doctrine echoed in 
the statute is the Gardner holding, prohibiting actual or threatened ad-
verse personnel action in response to the exercise of rights guaranteed by 
the statute.289 Like the Maryland LEOBOR, the Florida statute pro-
vides injunctive relief in the circuit court for officers injured by a denial 
of any right guaranteed by the statute.29o 
3. Virginia 
In 1978, Virginia enacted its Law-Enforcement Officers' Procedural 
Guarantees.291 Compared to the Maryland LEOBOR, the Virginia stat-
ute provides only a few protections, including certain rights guaranteed 
during investigation, 292 rights prior to293 and during interrogation, 294 
and rights prior to295 and during hearings.296 To the extent that .there is 
288. /d. § 112.532(3) (right to sue any individual or group for pecuniary and other dam-
ages suffered during the performance of official duties or for abridgement of civil 
rights arising out of the performance of official duties). The statute provides no 
right to sue for defamation greater than the rights the officer has as a citizen. Mesa 
v. Rodriquez, 357 So. 2d 711, 712-13 (Fla. 1978). As a citizen, the officer is fore-
closed from bringing an action in defamation against any individual who files a 
complaint with the police department, because the public has an absolute constitu-
tional right for redress of grievances and has absolute immunity when filing a griev-
ance in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Gray v. Rodriquez, 481 So. 2d 1298 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). This provision may not be used to file suit for back pay. 
Schrank v. Bliss, 412 F. Supp. 28, 38 (M.D. Fla. 1976). Cf Bembanaste v. 
Hollywood, 394 So. 2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (summary final judg-
ment affirmed for defendant municipality in suit for reinstatement, back pay, costs, 
and attorney's fees because officer's complaint failed to allege that termination re-
sulted from an attempt to exercise any right provided by the statute). 
289. /d. § 112.532(5). "No law enforcement officer shall be discharged; disciplined; de-
moted; denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment; or otherwise discriminated 
against in regard to his employment, or be threatened with any such treatment, by 
reason of his exercise of the rights granted by this part." /d. In Sylvester v. Delray 
Beach, 431 So. 2d. 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam), a complaint alleging 
a threatened denial of promotion, transfer, and reassignment for exercising statutory 
rights and for refusing to abandon litigation created a ·genuine issue of fact sufficient 
to defeat the defendant's summary judgment motion. 
290. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.534. Section 112.534 provides injunctive relief by re-
straining violations of police officer rights contained in sections 112.531 through 
.533. It does not, however, provide injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement. 
Migliore v. Lauderhill, 415 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 431 So. 
2d 986 (Fla. 1983). 
291. Act of Mar. 3, 1978, ch. 19, 1978 VA. LAWS 31 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2.1-.1 to .9 (1987)). 
292. /d.§ 2.1-116.2.2. (informed of nature of investigation and name and rank of investi-
gating officer). 
293. /d. (informed of individuals to be present during interrogation). 
294. /d. § 2.1-116.2.1. (interrogated at a reasonable time and place, preferably while on 
duty). 
295. /d. § 2.1-116.4. (notified in writing of charges and action that may be taken; pro-
vided opportunity to respond to charges orally and in writing with assistance of 
counsel); id. § 2.1-116.5. (subpoena witnesses). 
296. /d. § 2.1-116.5. (present evidence and cross-examine witnesses through counsel). 
Although there is a right to a hearing whenever a law enforcement officer is dis-
missed, demoted, suspended, or transferred for punitive reasons, such right accrues 
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any relation between the law's provisions and the Supreme Court doc-
trines of Garrity and its progeny,297 the law violates rather than vindi-
cates those constitutional decisions. With no recognition of the fifth 
amendment protections of Garrity and Gardner, and with no reference to 
the granting of immunity, the statute provides that "[n]othing in this 
chapter shall ... prevent the suspension of a law-enforcement officer for 
refusing to obey a direct order issued in conformance with the agency's 
written and disseminated rules and regulations."298 The only case ad-
dressing the relation between the Florida statute and the Supreme Court 
authority is Kersey v. Shipley,299 in which two police officers under inves-
tigation for sexual misconduct were dismissed for disobeying a direct or-
der to undergo a polygraph examination. The Fourth Circuit, in 
affirming the dismissal of the officers' civil rights action, failed to recog-
nize that the polygraph order created a self-incrimination issue and sim-
ply held that their discharge was not aribtrary and capricious. 300 
V. CONCLUSION 
Historically, law enforcement officers have not enjoyed the constitu-
tional privilege against compelled self-incrimination that is available to 
all other citizens. Police departments across the county continue to de-
mand that law enforcement officers surrender the privilege as a condition 
of employment or face administrative sanctions, including dismissal. 
The Supreme Court attempted to remedy this problem in 1967 by 
providing full protection for law enforcement officers. 30 1 Since then, four 
state legislatures have enacted a law enforcement officers' bill of rights, 
extending various procedural safeguards.302 Unfortunately, neither 
courts nor legislatures have advanced significantly the rights of law en-
forcement officers in general or their fifth amendment protection in 
particular. 
The protections of the United States Constitution apply to all citi-
zens equally. In choosing their career, law enforcement officers should 
not be required to abandon rights enjoyed by the public at large. One 
solution to the problem is stronger state, or even federal, legislation. The 
appendix to this article provides a Model Law Enforcement Officers' Bill 
only following the punitive personnel action because there is no right to a pre-termi-
nation hearing. Kersey v. Shipley, 673 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 836 (1982). Moreover, the hearing panel's recommendation, even iffavorable, 
is only advisory to the police chief. VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.1-116.7. 
297. Ironically, the Firefighter's and Emergency Medical Technician's Procedural Guar-
antees, Act of Mar. 26, 1987, ch. 509, 1987 Va. Laws 740 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 2.1-116.9:1. to .9:5. (1987)), is broader in scope and prohibits the threaten-
ing of punitive action as retaliation for exercising constitutional or statutory protec-
tions. Id. §§ 2.1-116.9:2.8.,:4. 
298. Id. § 2.1-116.6. 
299. 673 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982). 
300. Id. at 733. 
301. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
302. See supra parts IV.B., C. 
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of Rights. This comprehensive statute would secure for law enforcement 
officers the full range of constitutional protections, including the fifth 
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and would af-
ford other related substantive and procedural rights as well. The legisla-
tive branch should move swiftly and decisively to redress the law 
enforcement officer's unconstitutional predicament. 
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APPENDIX 
MODEL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
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§ 2-117. Punitive disciplinary action. 
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§ 3-101. Generally. 
§ 3-102. Bill of rights. 
§ 3-103. Collective bargaining agreement. 
§ 3-104. Political activity and other first amendment interests. 
§ 3-105. Right of non-disclosure. 
§ 3-106. Fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. 
§ 3-107. Due process of law. 
§ 3-108. Secondary employment. 
Title 4. Procedures. 
Subtitle 1. Investigation. 
§ 4-101. Notice of investigation. 
Subtitle 2. Interrogation. 
§ 4-201. Prior to interrogation. 
§ 4-202. During interrogation. 
Subtitle 3. Disciplinary hearing. 
§ 4-301. Prior to disciplinary hearing. 
§ 4-302. During disciplinary hearing. 
§ 4-303. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing board. 
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§ 4-304. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing officer. 
Subtitle 4. Declaratory hearing. 
§ 4-401. Prior to declaratory hearing. 
§ 4-402. During declaratory hearing. 
§ 4-403. Disposition of declaratory hearing. 
Subtitle 5. Temporary extraordinary procedures. 
§ 4-501. Temporary extraordinary procedures. 
Title 5. Remedies. 
§ 5-101. Grievance. 
§ 5-102. Injunction. 
§ 5-103. Declaratory relief. 
§ 5-104. Appeal from disciplinary or declaratory hearing. 
§ 5-105. Civil suit. 
§ 5-106. Legal defense. 
§ 5-107. Attorney's fees. 
Title 1. Preamble. 
§ 1-101. Policy statement. 
Law enforcement officers have a vital mission in society. The Law 
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights is enacted because: 
(a) historically law enforcement officers have not been afforded the 
full complement of constitutional and other protections provided gener-
ally to members of society; and 
(b) the unique nature of the responsibilities associated with being a 
law enforcement officer, combined with the legitimate needs of a law en-
forcement agency to maintain an efficient and effective organization, re-
quire that law enforcement officers be afforded certain substantive, 
procedural, and remedial protections not afforded to members of society 
generally. 
§ 1-102. Statutory construction. 
, Any ambiguities within the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of 
Rights shall be resolved by providing a liberal interpretation to effectuate 
the policy statement in § 1-101. Any conflict between this bill of rights 
and any other state legislation shall be resolved to give effect to this act, 
which supersedes all state law to the contrary. Similarly, this bill of 
rights preempts all local law. The Administrative Procedures Act is ap-
plicable to the extent that it does not conflict with this bill of rights. 
However, none of the remedies in title 5 require an exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies. 
§ 1-103. Administrative regulations. 
A law enforcement agency may promulgate administrative rules, 
regulations, and procedures necessary to implement this bill of rights. 
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Title 2. Definitions. 
§ 2-101. Agency. 
Agency means a law enforcement agency. 
§ 2-102. Circuit court. 
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In an action related to an administrative hearing, circuit court 
means the circuit court of the county where the administrative hearing 
was conducted or is scheduled to be conducted. Otherwise, circuit court 
means the circuit court of the county where a law enforcement officer 
regularly serves. 
§ 2-103. Declaratory advocate. 
A declaratory advocate is an individual selected by a law enforce-
ment agency to represent the interest of the agency in a declaratory hear-
ing. A declaratory advocate may be an attorney or non-attorney and 
may be a member of the agency or from outside the agency. 
§ 2-104. Declaratory hearing. 
A declaratory hearing is an administrative hearing, initiated by a 
law enforcement officer, against a law enforcement agency, seeking a dec-
laration that a proposed personnel action is punitive and thus invalid 
without a finding of guilt pursuant to a disciplinary hearing. · 
§ 2-105. Disciplinary advocate. 
A disciplinary advocate is an individual selected by a law enforce-
ment agency to represent the interest of the agency in a disciplinary hear-
ing. A disciplinary advocate may be an attorney or non-attorney and 
may be a member of the agency or from outside the agency. 
§ 2-106. Disciplinary hearing. 
A disciplinary hearing is an administrative hearing, initiated by a 
law enforcement agency, against a law enforcement officer, based on 
probable cause to believe that the officer has violated or is violating a 
rule, regulation, or procedure related to service as an officer and is sub-
ject to punitive personnel action. Such hearing results in a finding of 
guilty or not guilty as to each administrative charge and, if guilty, a rec-
ommendation as to punishment. 
§ 2-107. Hearing board. 
A hearing board is a three-member body selected (a) to make a find-
ing of fact on the issue of guilt in a disciplinary hearing, and (b) to rec-
ommend the appropriate punishment in the event of a finding of guilt. 
Subject to the exceptions in § 4-301(i) for small law enforcement agen-
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cies, a hearing board shall be composed of three members of the agency, 
selected from a nine-member hearing board panel, drawn in a neutral 
(preferably computerized) manner from a hearing board pool composed 
of all members of the agency, excluding the police chief and the second 
highest ranking officer. 
§ 2-108. Hearing officer. 
A hearing officer is the judge of law presiding over disciplinary and 
declaratory hearings within a given law enforcement agency. A hearing 
officer may not be a member of the agency and shall be selected, either on 
a permanent, case-by-case, or other basis, by the civilian agency under 
which the law enforcement agency serves. 
§ 2-109. Interrogation. 
A law enforcement officer is subjected to interrogation whenever the 
officer is subjected to any of the following: 
(a) questioning under circumstances that may lead to punitive per-
sonnel action; 
(b) conduct or words designed to elicit a response or should be 
known to be reasonably likely to elicit a response, regardless of whether a 
response is forthcoming, under circumstances that may lead to punitive 
personnel action; 
(c) a polygraph examination; 
(d) chemical testing; 
(e) preparing, completing, or submitting a report, document, or 
questionnaire, whether routine or otherwise, if prepared, completed, or 
submitted, as a result of conduct for which the officer is under investiga-
tion or comes under investigation as a result of the content of such re-
port, document, or questionnaire. 
§ 2-110. Investigation. 
A law enforcement officer is under investigation whenever the law 
enforcement agency for which the officer serves, acting alone or in coop-
eration with another agency, or a division or unit within the agency, or 
an individual officer of the agency who is superior in rank to, and in the 
direct chain of command of, the officer, takes any action with regard to 
the officer, including, but not limited to, asking questions of other officers 
or civilians, conducting observations, evaluating reports, records, or 
other documents, and examining physical evidence, if such action is 
based on reasonable suspicion that the officer will in the future, is at that 
time, or has in the past violated a criminal or civil statute or regulation or 
violated a rule, regulation, or procedure related to service as an officer. 
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§ 2-111. Law enforcement agency. 
A law enforcement agency is any state, county, city, or other gov-
ernmental agency that has as its primary responsibility the prevention 
and detection of criminal activity or the enforcement of criminal, traffic, 
or related laws, including but not limited to, all police departments and 
sheriff departments. 
§ 2-112. Law enforcement officer. 
A law enforcement officer is a member of a law enforcement agency, 
either full-time or part-time, cadet or officer, probationary or non-proba-
tionary, commissioned or non-commissioned, career or non-career, ten-
ured or non-tenured, merit or non-merit, paid or unpaid, who is serving 
in a position for which the primary responsibilities are the prevention 
and detection of criminal activity or the enforcement of criminal, traffic, 
or related laws. A law enforcement officer position is usually indicated 
by formal training (regardless of whether the officer has yet completed or 
even been assigned to such training) and usually is accompanied by the 
power of arrest. 
§ 2-113. Notice. 
Notice means written notice mailed or hand-delivered. Notice shall 
be provided directly to a law enforcement officer who is either not repre-
sented or who has a non-attorney representative. If the officer is repre-
sented by an attorney, notice shall be provided to the attorney. Notice to 
a law enforcement agency shall be provided to the declaratory advocate 
or disciplinary advocate. If such advocate has not yet been appointed, 
notice shall be provided to the police chief or his or her named designee 
for such purpose. 
§ 2-114. Officer. 
Officer means a law enforcement officer. 
§ 2-115. Police chief. 
Police chief is the chief of police, the acting chief of police, or the 
highest ranking officer of a law enforcement agency, regardless of the 
designation of such position. 
§ 2-116. Prosecutor. 
A prosecutor is an elected local or state prosecutor, state's attorney, 
or district attorney, or a designee thereof, or a United States attorney or 
an assistant United States attorney. 
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§ 2-117. Punitive personnel action. 
Punitive personnel action is punishment imposed as a result of a 
finding of guilt in a disciplinary hearing. 
(a) Per se punitive. The following personnel actions are per se puni-
tive and thus may not be taken unless there has been a finding of guilt in 
a disciplinary hearing: 
(1) dismissal from a law enforcement agency; such action, how-
ever, is non-punitive if the law enforcement officer is a recruit in training 
and the dismissal is based solely on the failure to meet minimum aca-
demic and performance standards; 
(2) suspension from a law enforcement agency; 
(3) demotion in rank; 
(4) loss of base pay, leave pay, or leave time; and 
(5) placement of adverse material in a law enforcement officer's 
record, including any temporary or permanent file relating to personnel, 
performance, promotion, or retirement matters. 
(b) Case-by-case determination of punitive. The following personnel 
actions may be punitive, depending upon whether instituted for the pur-
pose of punishment or as sound, discretionary management decisions 
based on the legitimate needs of a law enforcement agency to maintain an 
efficient and effective organization: 
(1) loss of sick leave, shift pay, bonus pay, or overtime pay; 
(2) involuntary transfer or reassignment; such action, however, 
is non-punitive as applied to a law enforcement officer with less than two 
years service. 
(c) Per se non-punitive. Involuntary transfer or reassignment, dis-
missal, or early retirement is non-punitive if based on the certification of 
two physicians that, because of a medical condition, the law enforcement 
officer lacks the ability to perform at a minimally acceptable level and 
that no less drastic personnel action can accommodate both the needs of 
the officer and the law enforcement agency. 
Title 3. Rights. 
I 
§ 3-101. Generally. 
A law enforcement officer shall enjoy all of the rights, privileges, and 
protections afforded to members of society generally, regardless of 
whether the source is constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or otherwise. 
In no manner shall an officer be deemed to have fewer rights, privileges, 
or protections solely by virtue of his or her status as an officer. This 
includes the right to exercise any privilege or protection without fear of 
threat, harassment, retaliation, or punitive personnel action. Even 
though this section shall be deemed to encompass all rights, privileges, 
and protections, §§ 3-102 through 3-106 address rights, privileges, and 
protections of particular concern to officers. 
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§ 3-102. Bill of rights. 
Each law enforcement officer shall receive a copy of this bill of 
rights, as well as all subsequent amendments by the legislature. Each 
officer shall receive a copy of all administrative regulations promulgated 
pursuant to this bill of rights. Such regulations shall contain at a mini-
mum all conduct subject to punitive personnel action, including the max-
imum punishment for each violation. An officer may waive any right 
provided by this bill of rights, provided such waiver is in writing and 
contains the following language: 
WAIVER OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights is designed 
to provide the law enforcement officer with certain substantive, 
procedural, and remedial protections not afforded to members 
of society generally. You are strongly urged not to waive any 
protection afforded by this bill of rights unless an attorney or 
other knowledgeable individual representing your interest be-
lieves that a waiver of a given right is in your best interest. It is 
a violation of your rights for any individual to obtain or at-
tempt to obtain a waiver from you by trickery, harassment, or 
threat. 
I, , have read and considered the above para-
graph concerning waiver of my rights under the law enforce-
ment officers' bill of rights. I have indicated my decision 
concerning waiver, this day of , 19 __ , as 
follows: 
(a) I refuse to waive any of my rights under the Law En-
forcement Officers' Bill of Rights. 
Signature 
(b) I do not waive all of my rights under the Law Enforce-
ment Officers' Bill of Rights. However, I do waive the following 
rights, either designated by section or explained as follows: _ 
Signature 
(c) I waive all of my rights under the Law Enforcement 
Officers' Bill of Rights. 
Signature 
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§ 3-103. Collective bargaining agreement. 
A law enforcement officer is entitled to all substantive and proce-
dural benefits contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Such nego-
tiated rights may be used by an officer in lieu of, or in addition to, this bill 
of rights. 
§ 3-104. Political activity and other first amendment interests. 
A law enforcement officer, when off-duty and when not acting in an 
official capacity, shall enjoy the same right to engage in political activity 
and the same freedoms of speech, expression, and association afforded to 
members of society generally, subject to reasonable regulation by a law 
enforcement agency with regard to associaton with known felons. 
§ 3-105. Right of non-disclosure. 
A law enforcement officer shall not be required to disclose any per-
sonal, family, or financial information relating to himself or herself or 
any member of his or her family or household, subject to reasonable reg-
ulation by a law enforcement agency with regard to the mental and phys-
ical capabilities necessary to perform as an officer. 
§ 3-106. Fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. 
A law enforcement officer shall enjoy the full complement of all con-
stitutional protections afforded to members of society generally by the 
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution, as 
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 
§ 3-107. Due process of law. 
A law enforcement officer shall be afforded due process of law. In 
determining due process rights, an officer's position of employment shall 
be deemed a property interest, protected by the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, at such time as the officer has successfully com-
pleted all training and probationary periods, but in no event later than 
two years after the commencement of service as an officer. 
§ 3-108. Secondary employment. 
A law enforcement officer is entitled to engage in secondary employ-
ment, subject to reasonable regulation by a law enforcement agency. An 
officer who is licensed to practice law may not be prohibited from provid-
ing legal representation to another officer, even in matters with or against 
the agency, solely because both the attorney and the client are members 
of the same agency. 
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Title 4. Procedures. 
Subtitle 1. Investigation. 
§ 4-101. Notice of investigation. 
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A law enforcement officer under investigation shall be notified of the 
investigation within five days of the commencement of the investigation. 
Notice shall include the general nature and scope of the investigation and 
all criminal, civil, and departmental violations for which reasonable sus-
picion exists. No investigation based on a complaint from outside the 
law enforcement agency may commence unless the complainant provides 
a signed and notarized detailed statement. An investigation based on a 
complaint from outside the agency shall commence within 15 days of 
receipt of the complaint by the agency. 
The notice requirement is continuing in nature in the event of a 
change in the nature or scope of an investigation or the possible crimes or 
violations arising therefrom. The notice requirement is waived if the 
agency is investigating a matter it considers criminal, and not administra-
tive, in which event the agency is precluded from instituting administra-
tive charges against the officer unless and until criminal charges are filed 
against the officer by the prosecutor. 
Subtitle 2. Interrogation. 
§ 4-201. Prior to interrogation. 
(a) Notice of interrogation. A law enforcement agency shall notify a 
law enforcement officer of its intent to subject the officer to interrogation 
at least 72 hours prior to interrogation. The notice shall include the 
name, rank, and command of the interrogating officer and one other per-
son, if applicable, to be present during interrogation. 
(b) Notice of right to a representative. A law enforcement agency 
shall notify the law enforcement officer at least 72 hours prior to the 
interrogation of the right to have a representative present during the en-
tire interrogation and available at all times for consultation. The repre-
sentative may be an attorney or non-attorney. The notice shall include 
the fact that the officer is entitled to 10 days to retain an attorney or five 
days to secure a non-attorney representative and is entitled to a post-
ponement of interrogation, if necessary, to satisfy the time requirements. 
(c) Notice of administrative-criminal election. A law enforcement 
agency shall notify the law enforcement officer of its administrative-crim-
inal election at least 72 hours prior to interrogation. The three election 
options are as follows: 
(1) Notice of a grant of informal transactional immunity pro-
vided by the law enforcement agency. A grant of informal transactional 
immunity provided by the law enforcement agency means that the 
agency is precluded from seeking any criminal charge for any crime aris-
ing from the named transaction. A copy of the grant of immunity shall 
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accompany the agency's notice of election. The notice shall include the 
legal consequences, which are (a) that the law enforcement officer must 
answer all questions specifically, narrowly, and directly related to his or 
her service as an officer; (b) that the answering of such questions bars the 
agency from seeking criminal charges for any crime arising from the 
named transaction; (c) that the failure to answer the questions permits 
the agency to seek criminal charges for any crime arising from the named 
transaction; and (d) that the content of the answers to such questions or 
the failure to provide answers, as the case may be, may result in a disci-
plinary hearing and punitive personnel action. 
(2) Notice of a grant of formal immunity provided by the prose-
cutor. A formal grant of immunity provided by the prosecutor means 
that the prosecutor has formally conferred upon the law enforcement of-
ficer either (a) transactional immunity, meaning that the prosecutor is 
precluded from charging the law enforcement officer with any crime aris-
ing from the named transaction, or (b) use and derivative use immunity, 
meaning that no testimonal evidence, compelled· pursuant to the grant of 
immunity, nor any fruits thereof, may be used against the officer in any 
criminal proceeding. A copy of the grant of immunity shall accompany 
the agency's notice of election. The notice shall include the legal conse-
quences, which are (a) that the officer must answer all questions within 
the scope of the grant of immunity; (b) that the answering of such ques-
tions bars all prosecutors from using the testimonial evidence provided 
pursuant to the grant of immunity, and any other evidence derived there-
from, in any criminal proceeding against the defendant (in the event of a 
grant of transactional immunity, it bars the jurisdiction granting it from 
seeking criminal charges for any crime arising from the named transac-
tion); (c) that the failure to answer such questions may result in criminal 
contempt proceedings and possible incarceration; and (d) that the con-
tent of the answers to such questions or the failure to provide answers, as 
the case may be, may result in a disciplinary hearing and punitive person-
nel action. 
(3) Notice of the election to provide no immunity. The failure to 
provide immunity means that the law enforcement agency has preserved 
all options to proceed in an administrative proceeding, in a criminal pro-
ceeding, or both. This notice shall include the legal consequences, which 
are (a) that the matter under investigation may be pursued in an adminis-
trative proceeding, in a criminal proceeding, or both; (b) that the officer 
has the right to have an attorney present during questioning and that if 
the officer cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for the officer; 
(c) that the officer has an absolute right to remain silent and will not be 
compelled to answer any questions; (d) that if the officer invokes the 
right to remain silent, no punitive personnel action can be taken, or 
threatened to be taken, against the officer and no adverse inference can be 
drawn against the officer in either a criminal or administrative proceed-
ing; and (e) if the officer chooses to answer any question, such answer 
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may be used against the officer in a criminal proceeding, an administra-
tive proceeding, or both. 
(4) Modification of election. If a law enforcement agency elects 
either informal or formal immunity, it may not subsequently rescind that 
election. However, the agency, having elected either informal or formal 
immunity, may add a second immunity election, either unilaterally or 
after negotiation with the officer. If an agency makes no immunity elec-
tion, subsequently it may replace its no immunity election with an elec-
tion of informal immunity, formal immunity, or both. 
§ 4-202. During interrogation. 
(a) Right to a representative. The law enforcement officer has the 
right to retained counsel, appointed counsel, or a non-attorney represen-
tative, as applicable under § 4-201(b), (c)(3). 
(b) Conditions of interrogation. Interrogation shall: 
(1) be conducted at a reasonable time, preferably while the law 
enforcement officer is on duty; 
(2) be conducted at a reasonable location, preferably at the of-
fice of the command of the investigating officer, at the office of the com-
mand of the law enforcement officer being interrogated, or at the office of 
the command nearest to where the conduct under investigation allegedly 
occurred; 
(3) continue only for a reasonable period of time, permitting 
reasonable breaks for personal hygiene, meals, and rest; 
(4) be conducted by one interrogator, with no more than one 
other person present (excluding a court reporter, if used) for the purpose 
of consultation with the interrogator; and 
(5) be recorded by audio tape, video tape, or transcription and, 
upon request by the law enforcement officer, shall be provided, within 10 
days after the interrogation. 
Subtitle 3. Disciplinary hearing. 
§ 4-301. Prior to disciplinary hearing. 
(a) Notice of disciplinary charges. No disciplinary charges may be 
brought against a law enforcement officer unless filed within 90 days of 
the commencement of an investigation, except for good cause shown, in 
which case charges shall be filed within 120 days of the commencement 
of an investigation. The law enforcement agency shall notify the law en-
forcement officer of all disciplinary charges pending against the officer 
not later than five days after the decision to charge. Notice shall include 
(1) the right to be represented by an attorney or non-attorney representa-
tive at all stages of the administrative proceedings; (2) the administi:"ative-
criminal election (in the event that the officer was not previously interro-
gated and therefore not previously notified of the agency's election under 
§ 4-201(c)); and (3) the right to have the issue of guilt decided either by a 
528 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
hearing board or by a hearing officer and that such election must be 
made by the later of 30 days before the hearing or 10 days after notifica-
tion of the hearing date. 
(b) Notice of disciplinary hearing. The law enforcement agency 
shall notify the law enforcement officer, not later than 30 days after the 
notice of disciplinary charges, of the following: 
( 1) the date, time, and location of the disciplinary hearing; such 
hearing shall take place not sooner than 30 days and not later than 60 
days subsequent to this notice; 
(2) the name and mailing address of the hearing officer; and 
(3) the name, rank, and command of the disciplinary advocate, 
if a law enforcement officer, or the n'ame, position, and mailing address of 
the disciplinary advocate, if hot a law enforcement officer. 
Subsequent to this notice, the management of the administrative 
proceedings shall be under the exclusive control of the hearing officer and 
the agency's legal position shall be represented exclusively by the discipli-
nary advocate. 
(c) Change of venue. If the law enforcement officer is subject to a 
punishment of dismissal from the law enforcement agency, the officer is 
automatically entitled to a change of venue. If the officer is not subject to 
dismissal or the law enforcement agency has waived, in writing, the use 
of dismissal as a possible punishment, the officer is entitled to a change of 
venue only upon a showing of a strong likelihood that the actions of the 
hearing board, the hearing officer, or the police chief, as to the issue of 
either guilt or punishment, would not be based solely on the evidence or 
would be based on improper motive or bias. Such motion for change of 
venue shall be made by the later of 30 days prior to the hearing or 10 
days after receipt of the notice of hearing date. Such motion shall be 
ruled on by the hearing officer, unless the requested change of venue is 
based on alleged improper motive or bias of the hearing officer, in which 
case the motion for change of venue shall be ruled on by the police chief. 
A change of venue, whether automatic or granted, shall be imple-
mented by moving the disciplinary hearing to another law enforcement 
agency, using such other agency's police chief, hearing officer, and hear-
ing board. The law enforcement officer entitled to or granted a change of 
venue may waive moving the disciplinary hearing, in which case the dis-
ciplinary hearing shall be conducted in the accused officer's agency, using 
his or her hearing officer and police chief, but using a hearing board se-
lected from another agency. 
(d) Discovery. The law enforcement agency and the law enforce-
ment officer shall be entitled to whatever discovery, e.g., interrogatories, 
depositons, production of documents, would be available if the matter 
were in a circuit court. 
(e). Notice of witnesses. The disciplinary advocate shall notify the 
law enforcement officer, not later than 15 days prior to the hearing, of 
the names and addresses of all witnesses for the law enforcement agency. 
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(f) Production of investigation file. The disciplinary advocate shall 
provide to the law enforcement officer not later than 15 days prior to the 
hearing, a copy of the investigation file, including all exculpatory and 
inculpatory information, but excluding confidential sources. 
(g) Examination of physical evidence. The disciplinary advocate 
shall notify the law enforcement officer, not later than 15 days prior to 
the hearing, of all physical, non-documentary evidence, and provide a 
reasonable date, time, place, and manner for the officer to examine such 
evidence not later than 10 days prior to the hearing. 
(h) Negotiated plea. The law enforcement officer and the discipli-
nary advocate may, at any time prior to a finding of guilt, negotiate a 
disposition of the charges, a maximum punishment, or both. Such nego-
tiated disposition may include an admission of guilt, silence as to guilt, or 
an assertion of not guilty by the accused officer. 
(i) Election of disciplinary hearing finder of fact. The law enforce-
ment officer shall notify the hearing officer of his or her election to have 
the issue of guilt decided by a hearing board or by the hearing officer. 
Such election shall be made by the later of 30 days prior to the hearing or 
10 days after receipt of the notice of hearing date. Such election shall 
include whether the officer demands at least one member of the hearing 
board to be equal in rank to the accused officer. If no timely election is 
made, a hearing board shall be deemed waived and the officer shall have 
the issue of guilt decided by the hearing officer. If an election of a hear-
ing board is made, the hearing officer shall provide to the law enforce-
ment officer and the disciplinary advocate, not later than 20 days prior to 
the hearing, a written list of the nine-member hearing board panel. Each 
party may exercise three peremptory strikes by notifying the hearing of-
ficer of the names struck, not later than 10 days prior to the hearing. If 
the accused officer demanded at least one member of the hearing board to 
be equal in rank to the accused officer, the disciplinary advocate may not 
exercise peremptory strikes to strike all members equal in rank to the 
accused, if any, on the hearing board panel. No additional strikes of any 
kind may be exercised. In the event that less than six members of the 
hearing board panel are struck, the hearing officer shall appoint as the 
hearing board the three highest ranking officers not struck from the hear-
ing board panel list. If the accused officer demanded at least one member 
of the hearing board to be equal in rank to the accused officer, but no 
member of the hearing board panel is equal in rank to the accused officer, 
the hearing officer shall draw, from the hearing board pool, the next of-
ficer equal in rank to the accused officer. This officer shall be named to 
the hearing board in lieu of the lowest ranking officer then on the hearing 
board. 
A law enforcement agency composed of less than 100 law enforce-
ment officers may use a seven-member hearing board panel, with two 
peremptory strikes for each party. An agency composed of less than 50 
530 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
officers may use a five-member hearing board panel, with one peremptory 
strike for each party. 
§ 4-302. During a disciplinary hearing. 
(a) Compel testimony and documentary evidence. The hearing of-
ficer shall have the power to issue summonses to compel testimony of 
witnesses and to compel the production of documentatory evidence. If 
confronted with a failure to comply with a summons, the hearing officer 
may petition the circuit court to issue an order, with failure to comply 
being subject to contempt of court. 
(b) Pre-hearing motions. Each party may file pre-hearing motions. 
Such motions shall be filed not later than 10 days prior to the hearing. 
The hearing officer may rule on any motion in writing prior to the· hear-
ing or may rule on the record at the start of the hearing. 
(c) Access to hearing. All disciplinary hearings shall be open to the 
public unless the accused law enforcement officer requests a closed hear-
ing, in which case the hearing shall be open only to those invited by the 
accused officer. 
(d) Record of hearing. All aspects of the hearing, including pre-
hearing motions, shall be recorded by audio tape, video tape, or 
transcription: 
(e) Sequestration of witnesses. Either party may move for sequestra-
tion of witnesses. 
(f) Oath or affirmation. The hearing officer shall administer an 
oath or affirmation to each witness, who shall testify subject to the appli-
cable laws of perjury. 
(g) Opening statement. Each party is entitled to make an opening 
statement. 
(h) Evidentiary rulings and legal adviser. The laws and rules of evi-
dence for administrative hearings shall apply, and all rulings shall be 
made by the hearing officer, either in response to a motion or objection or 
sua sponte. The hearing officer may have present, or on call, an attorney 
adviser, who may not be (1) a member of the law enforcement agency, (2) 
on a legal staff that represents the law enforcement agency, or (3) se-
lected by, or subject to the approval of, the law enforcement agency. 
§ 4-303. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing board. 
(a) Ruling on burden of production. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, outside the presence of the hearing board, the hearing officer shall 
rule, and may permit argument on, whether the disciplinary advocate has 
met his or her burden of production by establishing a prima facie case as 
to each charge. The hearing officer shall enter a verdict of not guilty for 
any charge for which a prima facie case was not established. 
(b) Written instructions to the hearing board. Any charge for which 
a prima facie case has been established shall be submitted to the hearing 
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board for a finding of fact. Prior to such submission, each party is enti-
tled to make one closing argument without rebuttal. The hearing officer 
shall provide the following items, in writing, to the hearing board for its 
deliberations: 
(1) a verdict sheet listing each charge; 
(2) a list containing each element that must be established to 
constitute each charge; 
(3) instructions that the hearing board should not consider pun-
ishment when determining the issue of guilt; 
(4) instructions that a finding of guilt requires a majority vote of 
the hearing board; 
(5) instructions that no member of the hearing board may vote 
for guilt as to any charge unless that member finds that the disciplinary 
advocate has established by clear and convincing evidence each element 
of the charge and that the conduct was committed by the accused law 
enforcement officer, either as the actual perpetrator or as an accomplice. 
(c) Findings by the hearing board. The hearing board shall submit 
its finding of guilty or not guilty for each charge on the verdict sheet 
provided, which shall be made a part of the record. 
(d) Recommendation of punishment by the hearing board. Each 
charge for which the hearing board finds guilt shall be resubmitted to the 
hearing board for a recommendation of punishment. Prior to such 
resubmission, each party is entitled to present evidence relevant to the 
accused officer's degree of culpability, his or her record as a law enforce-
ment officer, and any other information relevant to the appropriate pun-
ishment. Each party is entitled to make one closing argument without 
rebuttal. For its deliberations, the hearing board shall be provided with a 
written list of all possible punishments for each charge for which guilt 
was found. Additionally, the disciplinary advocate may submit his or 
her recommended punishment for each charge. If guilt was found on 
more than one charge, the disciplinary advocate may submit, in addition, 
his or her recommended overall punishment, which may be different 
than the sum of the individual punishments. The hearing board shall be 
instructed to make a recommendation as to the appropriate punishment 
for each guilty charge, as well as an appropriate overall punishment, 
which may be different than the sum of the individual punishments. 
(e) Recommendations and report of the hearing officer. The hearing 
officer shall submit a written report, with a copy to each party, not later 
than 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, to the police chief, 
which shall contain the following: 
(1) the hearing board's finding of guilty or not guilty for each 
charge; 
(2) the hearing board's recommendation as to the appropriate 
punishment for each charge for which guilt was found, as well as the 
board's recommendation for the appropriate overall punishment; 
(3) whether the hearing officer believes that each finding of guilt 
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is correct or whether the finding of guilt goes against the weight of the 
evidence; for each charge for which the hearing board entered a finding 
of guilt, there shall be an appropriate discussion of the law and the facts; 
and · 
(4) the hearing officer's recommendation as to the appropriate 
punishment for each charge for which guilt was found, as well as the 
hearing officer's recommendation for the appropriate overall 
punishment. 
(f) Order and report of the police chief The police chief shall file a 
written order, with a copy to each party, not later than 30 days after 
receipt of the hearing officer's report. The police chief is bound by each 
not guilty finding of the hearing board and by each guilty finding of the 
hearing board in which the hearing officer concurred. As to any guilty 
finding of the hearing board in which the hearing officer did not concur, 
the police chief may make a finding of guilty or not guilty. The police 
chief shall determine the punishment for each charge of guilty, as well as 
the overall punishment. The punishment for any charge may be no more 
severe than the greater of the two recommended punishments for that 
charge. Similarly, the overall punishment may be no more severe than 
the greater of the two recommended overall punishments. 
§ 4-304. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing officer. 
(a) Findings by the hearing officer. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
each party is entitled to make one closing argument without rebuttal. 
The hearing officer shall make his or her finding of guilty or not guilty 
for each charge, with a finding of guilt requiring clear and convincing 
evidence. 
(b) Recommendation of punishment by the hearing officer. As to 
each charge for which the hearing officer found guilt, each party is enti-
tled to present evidence relevant to the accused officer's degree of culpa-
bility, his or her record as a law enforcement officer, and any other 
information relevant to the appropriate punishment. Each party is enti-
tled to make one closing argument without rebuttal. 
(c) Recommendations and report of the hearing officer. The hearing 
officer shall submit a written report, with a copy to each party, not later 
than 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, to the police chief, 
which shall contain the following: 
(1) the hearing officer's finding of guilty or not guilty for each 
charge; for each finding of guilt, there shall be an appropriate discussion 
of the law and the facts; and 
(2) the hearing officer's recommendation as to the appropriate 
punishment for each charge for which guilt was found, as well as the 
hearing officer's recommendation for the appropriate overall punish-
ment, if guilt was found on more than one charge. 
(d) Order and report of the police chief The police chief shall file a 
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written order, with a copy to each party, not later than 30 days after 
receipt of the hearing officer's report. The police chief is bound by each 
finding of guilty and not guilty. The police chief shall determine the pun-
ishment for each charge of guilt, as well as the overall punishment. The 
punishment on any charge, as well as the overall punishment, may be no 
more severe than that recommended by the hearing officer. 
Subtitle 4. Declaratory hearings. 
§ 4-401. Prior to declaratory hearing. 
(a) All personnel actions under§ 2-117(a) are per se punitive, and 
the law enforcement agency may not take such action unless there has 
been a finding of guilt under§ 4-303 or§ 4-304; consequently, personnel 
actions under § 2-117(a) cannot be the subject of a declaratory hearing. 
(b) The law enforcement agency shall notify the law enforcement 
officer of any personnel action under § 2-117(b ), not later than five days 
after the decision to take such personnel action. Notice shall include the 
effective date of such action, which may be no sooner than 20 days subse-
quent to this notice. The officer shall also be notified that he or she has 
the right to demand a declaratory hearing to determine whether such 
action is punitive or non-punitive. Additionally, the officer shall be noti-
fied that he or she has a right to be represented by an attorney or non-
attorney representative at all stages of the administrative proceedings. 
(c) If the law enforcement officer requests a hearing within 15 days 
of receipt of notice of the proposed personnel action, such personnel ac-
tion shall be stayed pending the outcome of the hearing. 
(d) The law enforcement agency shall notify the officer, not later 
than 30 days after the notice of demand for hearing, of the following: 
(1) the date, time, and location of the hearing; such hearing 
shall take place not sooner than 15 days and not later than 45 days subse-
quent to this notice; 
(2) the name and mailing address of the hearing officer; and 
(3) the name, rank, and command of the declaratory advocate. 
Subsequent to this notice, the management of the administrative 
proceedings shall be under the exclusive control of the hearing officer and 
the agency's legal position shall be represented exclusively by the declar-
atory advocate. 
§ 4-402. During declaratory hearing. 
A declaratory hearing shall be conducted in the manner required for 
a disciplinary hearing under § 4-302. 
§ 4-403. Disposition of declaratory hearing. 
(a) At the conclusion of the hearing, each party is entitled to make 
one closing argument without rebuttal. The hearing officer shall deter-
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mine whether the personnel action at issue is punitive or non-punitive, 
with the burden of pursuasion on the declaratory advocate to establish, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the action is non-punitive. 
(b) The hearing officer shall submit a written report, with a copy to 
each party, not later than 15 days after the conclusion of hearing, to the 
police chief, explaining the reasons for the finding. The police chief is 
bound by the hearing officer's finding. If the personnel action is found to 
be non-punitive, it may take effect immediately. If the personnel action 
is found to be punitive, it is null and void. 
Subtitle 5. Temporary extraordinary procedures. 
§ 4-501. Temporary extraordinary procedures. 
The police chief may order suspension with pay or an involuntary 
reassignment for a law enforcement officer for whom there is probable 
cause to believe that the officer (a) has committed a felony, (b) has com-
mitted a crime of violence, (c) has committed a crime of moral turpitude, 
(d) poses immediate threat to the safety of self or others, or (e) poses 
immediate threat to the property of others. The officer shall be provided, 
not later than 48 hours after such suspension or reassignment, a written 
order setting forth which one or more of the five reasons above support 
such action in the officer's case. 
(a) Criminal charges. If, within 15 days after the written order, the 
law enforcement officer is formally charged, by grand jury indictment or 
criminal information, with a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral 
turpitude, the police chief may continue suspension with pay or involun-
tary reassignment or may order suspension without pay. If the officer is 
subsequently found guilty of, and sentenced for, a felony, crime of vio-
lence, or crime of moral turpitude, the officer is subject to any punitive 
personnel action without a hearing. If the officer is subsequently found 
not guilty of all charges of a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral 
turpitude, the officer shall be returned to duty in the status that existed 
prior to the extraordinary procedure, including back pay and benefits for 
any time suspended without pay. However, the law enforcement agency 
may institute regular disciplinary proceedings against the officer while 
criminal charges are pending or after a finding of not guilty, even though 
the administrative charges arise out of the same conduct involved in the 
criminal charges. 
(b) Civil commitment. If, within 15 days after the written order, the 
law enforcement officer is civilly committed as posing immediate threat 
to the safety of self or others or posing immediate threat to the property 
of others, the police chief may continue suspension with pay or involun-
tary reassignment or may order suspension without pay or placement on 
sick leave, as appropriate. If the officer is subsequently released from 
civil commitment, the officer shall be returned to duty in the status that 
existed prior to the extraordinary procedure, including back pay and 
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benefits for any time suspended without pay. However, the law enforce-
ment agency may institute regular disciplinary proceedings against the 
officer once returned to duty, even though the administrative charges 
arise out of the same conduct for which the officer was civilly committed. 
(c) Neither criminal charges nor civil commitment. If, within 15 
days after the written order, the law enforcement officer is neither for-
mally charged with a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral turpi-
tude, nor civilly committed as posing immediate threat to the safety of 
self or others or posing immediate threat to the property of others, the 
officer shall be returned to duty in the status that existed prior to the 
extraordinary procedure. However, the law enforcement agency may in-
stitute regular disciplinary proceedings against the officer, even though 
the administrative charges arise out of the same conduct for which ex-
traordinary procedures were used. 
Title 5. Remedies 
§ 5-101. Grievance. 
A state agency outside the law enforcement agency shall establish a 
law enforcement officer grievance procedure, which may utilize grievance 
procedures already in effect for other public employees. A law enforce-
ment officer may file a grievance against any other law enforcement of-
ficer for past, present, or threatened denial of any right provided by 
constitution, statute, regulation, or otherwise, provided such denial is re-
lated to the aggrieved officer's service as an officer. An officer may use 
the grievance procedure in addition to, or in lieu of, any other remedy in 
this title. However, no other remedy is foreclosed because of the failure 
to pursue a remedy through the grievance procedure. 
§ 5-102. Injunction. 
(a) To the hearing officer. A law enforcement officer, charged under 
§ 4-301, who is being denied, by a law enforcement agency, any right 
provided by constitution, statute, regulation, or otherwise, may petition 
the hearing officer for an injunction, prohibiting the law enforcement 
agency from violating the law. Such petition for injunctive relief must be 
filed not later than 10 days prior to the hearing or 48 hours subsequent to 
the alleged denial of the right, whichever comes later. The filing of a 
petition stays the hearing until the hearing officer rules upon the petition. 
(b) To the circuit court. A law enforcement officer, charged under 
§ 4-301, whose petition for injunctive relief under § 5-102(a) is denied, or 
who is otherwise still being denied any right afforded by constitution, 
statute, regulation, or otherwise, may petition the circuit court for an 
injunction, prohibiting the law enforcement agency from violating the 
law. Such petition shall be filed not later than 10 days prior to the hear-
ing or 48 hours subsequent to the notice of denial of injunctive relief by 
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the hearing officer, whichever comes later. The filing of a petition stays 
the hearing until the circuit court rules upon the petition. 
(c) To the intermediate appellate court. A ruling by the circuit 
court under§ 5-102(b) is immediately appealable to the intermediate ap-
pellate court by either the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement 
agency. Notice of appeal shall be filed not later than 10 days prior to the 
hearing or 48 hours subsequent to the notice of the denial or grant of 
injunctive relief by the circuit court, whichever comes later. The filing of 
a notice of appeal stays the hearing until the intermediate appellate court 
rules upon the petition. 
§ 5-103. Declaratory relief. 
(a) To the circuit court. A law enforcement officer, not charged 
under § 4-301 and not eligible for a declaratory hearing under § 4-401, 
who is being denied, by the law enforcement agency, any right provided 
by constitution, statute, regulation, or otherwise, may file an action for 
declaratory relief in the circuit court, provided the officer submitted to 
the police chief a notice of demand of such right and such right was not 
afforded within 15 days. 
(b) To the intermediate appellate court. A ruling by the circuit 
court under § 5-103(a) may be appealed to the intermediate appellate 
court by either the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement 
agency. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit court not later 
than 30 days subsequent to the order of the circuit court. 
§ 5-104. Appeal from disciplinary or declaratory hearing. 
(a) To the circuit court from a disciplinary hearing. A law enforce-
ment officer may appeal from a decision of guilt rendered under § 4-303 
or§ 4-304. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit court not later 
than 30 days after the order and report of the police chief. Such appeals 
shall be argued on the record from the administrative agency, unless the 
punishment is dismissal. If the punishment is dismissal, the appeal shall 
be in the form of a trial de novo. A law enforcement agency may not 
appeal a decision rendered under § 4-303 or § 4-304. 
(b) To the circuit court from a declaratory hearing. Either a law 
enforcement officer or a law enforcement agency may appeal a decision 
rendered under § 4-403. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit 
court not later than 30 days after the report of the hearing officer. 
(c) To the intermediate appellate court. A ruling by the circuit 
court under§ 5-104(a) or§ 5-104(b) may be appealed to the intermediate 
appellate court by the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement 
agency. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit court not later 
than 30 days after the order of the circuit court. 
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§ 5-105. Civil suit. 
A law enforcement officer who has been harmed by any individual 
may file suit against such individual seeking money damages. No law 
may limit a cause of action solely because the plaintiff is a law enforce-
ment officer. 
§ 5-106. Legal defense. 
A law enforcement officer, against whom a civil suit is filed, shall be 
entitled to legal representation from the law enforcement agency, pro-
vided that the cause of action arose in the scope of the officer's service as 
a law enforcement officer. If legal representation is denied, the officer 
may seek declaratory relief under § 5-103. 
§ 5-107. Attorney's fees. 
(a) Right to attorney's fees. A law enforcement officer shall be enti-
tled to reasonable attorney's fees if he or she prevails in any of the follow-
ing actions, and may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees if lie or she 
prevails in part: 
(1) a disciplinary hearing under § 4-303 or § 4-304; 
(2) a declaratory hearing under § 4-403; 
(3) a grievance under § 5-101; 
(4) an injunction under § 5-102; 
(5) declaratory relief under § 5-103; 
(6) an appeal under§ 5-104; and 
(7) a petition for attorney's fees under § 5-107(b). 
(b) Petition to the circuit court. A law enforcement officer entitled 
to attorney's fees under § 5-107(a) may petition the circuit court for an 
order establishing the right to, and the amount of, attorney's fees. 
